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I. APPLIED ART IN THE BERNE UNION: THREE OPTIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
The distinctive philosophy of protection that characterizes the laws
of literary and artistic property in the Berne Union countries' was ex-
tended only gradually, and against considerable opposition, to "works
of art applied to industry.' 2 Throughout most of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the separation of "beauty" from "utility" was an axiom rooted in
Enlightenment ideals.3 Reformers who attacked "art for art's sake" as
an elitist slogan found support for functionalism in Greek philosophy
of art and pointed to Cellini's saltcellars or Raphael's candelabra as
proof that art remained art even when applied to useful objects.4 But
1. The Berne Union was created by the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works. A valuable source containing most nations' copyright laws is UNESCO &
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION [WIPO], COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF
THE WORLD (1982) [hereinafter cited as COPYRIGHT LAws]. The Berne Convention, signed Sep-
tember 9, 1886, appears in 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS, Multilateral Conventions, Berne Copyright Union,
item A-1 [hereinafter cited as Berne Convention]; it was revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908,
id at item C-I, 1 L.N.T.S. 217 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Berlin Revision]; it was revised again at
Rome on June 2, 1928, id at item E-l, 123 L.N.T.S. 233 (1931) [hereinafter cited as Rome Revi-
sion]; it was revised again at Brussels on June 26, 1948, id at item F-1, 331 U.N.T.S. 217 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as Brussels Revision]; it was revised again at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, id at
item G-1, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 (1972) (not entered into force) [hereinafter cited as Stockholm Revi-
sion]; it was revised again at Paris on July 24, 1971, id at item H-1, (entered into force July 10,
1974 in accordance with article 28) [hereinafter cited as Paris Revision]. The English texts of the
Brussels and Paris Revisions are reproduced in 4 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, appendi-
ces 26 & 27 (1983). See generally De Sanctis, The International Copyright Conventions, 14 CoPY-
RIGHT 254 (1978).
The United States is not a signatory to the Berne Convention. See 3 M. NIMMER, supra,
§ 17.04[D][1], at 17-11 to 17-12; Gabay, The United States Copyright System and the Berne Conven-
tion, 26 BULL COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 202 (1979); Ringer, The Role of the United States in International
Copyright Law-Past, Present, and Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1058 (1968).
2. S. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION 828-37 (1975); M.A. PEROT-MOREL, LES PRINCIPES DE PROTECTION DES
DEssiNs ET MODELES DANS LES PAYS DU MARCHE COMMUN 15-30 (1968); F. PERRET,
L'AUTONOMIE DU REGIME DE PROTECTION DES DESSINS ET MODELES 234-67 (1974); Duchemin,
La protection des arts appliqubs dans laperspective dun dpit communautaire en matire de dessins
et modtles industriels, 97 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D'AUTEUR [R.I.D.A.] 4, 10-15
(1978); P6rot-Morel, Insuffisance et complexitM du regime international des dessins et modles indus-
triels, reprintedin LES PERSPECTIVES D'UN DROIT COMMUNAUTAIRE EN MATIERE DE DESSINS ET
MODELES INDUSTRIELS 49, 56-60 (Centre Universitaire d'Enseignement et de Recherche de
Proprit6 Industrielle [CUERPI] ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM].
3. F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 11-12, 26-29. In France, the period of separation between the
fine arts or "pure arts" and industry was most marked in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
when "industry was considered the worst enemy of art." C. CARREAU, MERITE ET DROIT
D'AUTEUR 191 (1981) (trans.).
4. S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 831; F. PERET, supra note 2, at 11-12, 17 (citing authorities).
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this lofty discourses minimized the economic aims of industrial art,
which only came into its own when the industrial revolution had made
it possible to reproduce useful articles in series and which then as-
sumed the eminently practical task of increasing sales of goods on the
general products market.6 The Berne Union countries, at the Berlin
Revision Conference of 1908, mentioned the category of "applied art"
for the first time,7 but declined to grant ornamental designs of useful
articles full protection in the law of literary and artistic property. The
Conference left member states free to deal with this controversial sub-
ject matter "so far as the domestic legislation of each country allows."8
The United States, which has never acceded to the Berne Conven-
tion, appeared to go further toward recognizing applied art under the
Copyright Act of 1909 than had the Berne Union countries at the Ber-
5. The functionalism movement reached its height about 1920 with Henri Van de Velde,
Gropius, and the Bauhaus school. See J. HESKETT, INDUSTRIAL DESIGN 19-26, 85-104 (1980); see
also A. BRAUN & J.J. EvRARD, DROIT DES DEssiNs ET MODELES AU BENELUX 11-13 (1975).
6. See, e.g., B. ENGLERT, GRUNDZYGE DES RECHTSSCHUTZS DER INDUSTRIELLEN
FORMGEBUNG 22-24 (1978); M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 16, 29; F. PERRET, supra note 2,
at 11, 15. The "lofty discourse" also downplayed what Ladas calls "the crude and ugly aspect" of
the industrial products of the first half of the nineteenth century. S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 831.
But see J. HESKETT, supra note 5, at 23-27. According to Perret, the Depression of 1929 obliged
manufacturers to give new importance to the appearance of their products. F. PERRET, supra note
2, at 13. In fact, the Depression intensified a process begun much earlier. J. HESKETT, supra note
5, at 11, 27.
7. Applied art is not defined by any copyright legislation, although nearly all domestic
copyright laws expressly mention applied art among the works protected. Duchemin, supra note
2, at 6-7. Duchemin considers works of applied art as "intellectual works. . . [that] differ from
graphic and plastic works in that they are no longer completely gratuitous, as solely the expression
of the artist's message; they also have a utilitarian aspect." Id Ulmer considers the gratuitous
element to be the essential feature of a work of applied art, E. ULMER, URHEBER- UND VERLAG-
SRECHT 146-47 (3d ed. 1980) (stressing necessity of purely artistic elements in addition to func-
tional aspects); Hubmann and Troller stress the element of individuality, see H. HUBMANN,
URHEBER- UND VERLAGSRECHT 34, 62-63 (4th ed. 1978); A. TROLLER, PRECIS DU DROIT DE LA
PROPRIETE IMMATERIELLE 108 (K. Troller & V.J. Vesely trans. 1978). Ladas suggests that "a clear
definition of such works is perhaps not possible." S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 833. Von Pilgrim
asserts that any definition that tends to separate "applied art" from "fine art" is undesirable. V.
von Pilgrim, Der Urheberrechtliche Schutze Der Angewandten Formgestaltung 96 (1971) (unpub-
lished thesis) (available at Frankfort). The line of demarcation between this category of poten-
tially copyrightable works of "applied art" and noncopyrightable "designs and models" is
controversial. See infra notes 123-35 and accompanying text.
8. The Berlin Revision Conference of November 13, 1908, declined to add works of applied
art to the protectible subject matter in article 2, paragraph 1 of the Berne Convention, supra note
1; but in article 2, paragraph 4, this category was mentioned as follows: "Works of art applied to
industrial purposes shall be protected so far as the domestic legislation of each country allows."
See S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 833-36; Duchemin, supra note 2, at 10-11. As a result, member
countries were not obliged to protect works of applied art in domestic copyright laws, "but if they
did, they were required to give the same protection to works of applied art originating in other
member countries, even though these latter countries did not give any protection to such works."
S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 833-34.
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lin Revision Conference of 1908. Congress added the phrase "models
or designs of works of art" to the "works of art" otherwise protected in
section 5(g) of the 1909 Act as "writings of an author." 9 The drafters of
the 1909 Act then deleted a provision limiting protection to "works of
the fine arts" that had been in force since 1870, when the definitions of
copyrightable subject matter were otherwise greatly expanded. 10 The
liberalizing thrust of the 1909 Act was consistent with the 1903 decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Bleistein v. Donaldson Litho-
graphing Co.," which upheld the copyrightability of a circus poster
against the contention that art and utility were antithetical. 12 The Bleis-
tein decision, better known for its statement of the copyright norm
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of merit,13 also helped to estab-
lish the principle of copyrightability for two-dimensional works of ap-
plied art. Section 5(g) of the 1909 Act arguably extended this principle
to three-dimensional models.' 4
9. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 5(g), 35 Stat. 1076-77 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216
(1976)). Although this classification was officially for registration purposes only, it has often been
treated by courts as giving substantive meaning to the phrase "writings of an author." Latman,
Fifteen Years After Mazer v. Stein: .4 Brief Perspective, 16 BULL. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y 278, 278 n.7
(1969).
10. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (repealed 1916); Nolan, AnAppraisalof
Copyright Protectionfor (sefulArticles, reprinted in ABA-SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT LAW, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 216, App. D (1982) [hereinafter cited as ABA-
PTC SYMPOSIUM]. Pogue states that this Act "prepared the path to overlapping protection" with
the design patent law by blurring the "line of demarcation between purely aesthetic articles and
useful works of art." Pogue, Borderland-Where Copyright and Design Patent Meet, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 33, 42-43 (1953). Testimony by the Librarian of Congress during the hearings that led to the
1909 Act supports the position that Congress intended an expansion of coverage by the elimina-
tion of the "fine arts" qualification. Hearings Before Comms. on Patents on S. 6330 and H.
19,853, 59th Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1906); see Note, Protecting the Artistic Aspects ofArticles of Util-
ity.: Copyright or Design Patent, 66 HARv. L. REv. 877, 879 n.16 (1953).
11. 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
12. Certainly works are not the less connected with the fine arts because their pictorial
quality attracts the crowd and therefore gives them a real use--if use means to increase
trade and to help to make money. A picture is none the less a picture and none the less a
subject of copyright that is used to advertise soap. . . or. . .as. . .they may be used to
advertise a circus.
Id at 251 (Holmes, J.); see Note, Works ofAppliedArt: An Expansion of Copyright Protection, 56
S. CAL. L. REv. 241, 252-53, 260 (1982).
13. "It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations. ... Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251.
The general norm in the European Community countries is that "in assessing protectibility no
judgment of the aesthetic value should be made." See A. DIErz, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY: A COMPARATIVE INVESTIGATION OF NATIONAL COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION 34
(1978). The anti-merit norm is expressly codified at article 2 of the French Copyright Law of
1957, 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 1, France, at item 1.
14. See, e.g., Umbreit, 4 Consideration of Copyright, 87 U. PA. L. REV. 932, 933 (1939);
Pogue, supra note 10, at 43-44. The term "model" in foreign literature signifies a three-
dimensional design. In the United States, the term "design" covers both two-dimensional designs
and three-dimensional models, and it is normally so used in this article.
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The United States Copyright Office, however, implemented the
1909 Act as if the statute had adopted the temporizing solution of the
Berlin Conference, which mentioned applied art without more. In
1910, the Copyright Office issued a regulation providing that the term
"works of art" included "all works belonging fairly to the so-called fine
arts," namely, "paintings, drawings, and sculpture," and that "produc-
tions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character are not
subject to copyright registration, even #f artistically made or orna-
mented."'5 Despite an amendment to this regulation permitting regis-
tration of "artistic drawings notwithstanding that they may afterwards
be utilized for articles of manufacture,"1 6 the practice of the Copyright
Office until 1949 was to deny registration to any three-dimensional ob-
jects that "would fall within the category of multiple commercial pro-
duction of works of the applied arts."'17 This practice was intended to
separate design patent law from copyright law and to prevent designers
and manufacturers from circumventing the strict eligibility require-
ments for design patent protection by resorting to the less stringent re-
quirements of copyright law.' 8
The Copyright Office had thus, by administrative rulemaking,' 9
kept alive the distinction between fine and applied art that the 1909 Act
15. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS TO
COPYRIGHT, BULL. No. 15, § 12(g) (1910)(emphasis added), reprinted in Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, 212 n.23 (1954). The same regulation also provided that "no copyright exists in toys, games,
dolls, advertising, novelties, instruments or tools of any kind, glassware, embroideries, garments,
laces, woven fabrics, or any similar articles." Id This policy was continued in 1917, 1926, and in
17 C.F.R. § 201.4 (1938). See Pogue, supra note 10, at 44.
16. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS TO
COPYRIGHT, § 12(g) (1926); Dulin, Design Protectiorn Walking the Pirate Plank?, 12 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT Soc'Y 321, 324 n.19 (1965).
17. Derenberg, Copyright No-Man's Land- Fringe Rights in Literary andArtistic Property, 35
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 627, 646 (1953).
18. Pogue, supra note 10, at 44; Note, Copyrighting Works ofArtistic Craftsmanshp Embodied
in Articles of Practical Use, 27 IND. L.J. 130, 130-33 (1951).
For the United States Design Patent Law, see Act of Aug. 29, 1842, ch. 263, 5 Stat. 544
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 171-173 (1976)). The American position was similar to those of the
United Kingdom (until 1968) and Italy (especially after 1941). See infra note 132; text accompa-
nying notes 204-26.
At this time, the Design Patent Law of 1842, as consolidated in 1870 and revised in 1902, was
still being enforced with a degree of liberality. Umbreit, supra note 14, at 934; Nimetz, Design
Protection, 15 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 79, 121-24 (1967). This permissive period ended in
the Second Circuit as early as 1916, and in other jurisdictions during the 1930's. Id at 125-27.
19. Section 207 of the Copyright Act of 1909 permitted the Copyright Office to establish
"rules and regulations for the registration of claims to copyright." The 1976 Act, 17 U.S.C. § 702
(1982), gives the Register of Copyrights substantial rulemaking authority even with regard to pol-
icy matters. Latman, Letterfrom the United States ofAmerica, 16 COPYRIGHT 315, 315-16 (1980).
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had apparently abandoned.20 In so doing, the United States copyright
authority seemed accurately to interpret the spirit of the Berlin Confer-
ence of 1908.21 Then, in 1948 at the Brussels Conference convened to
revise the Berne Convention, proponents of legal recognition of indus-
trial art overcame part of the resistance they had encountered at Berlin
in 1908. After 1948, member states of the Berne Union could no longer
ignore the protectibility of some industrial art under their laws of liter-
ary and artistic property.2 2 As a result, countries outside the Union
that had remained hostile to copyright protection for applied art, such
as the United States, were spurred to review their positions in order to
maintain the minimum degree of reciprocity that comity and the exi-
gencies of international trade made advisable.
23
A. Legitimation of AppliedArt in United States Law.
In December 1948, the United States Copyright Office changed the
definition of a "work of art" in Regulation Section 202.8. The new
definition included "works of artistic craftsmanship, in so far as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned, such
as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware and tapestries, as well as all
works belonging to the fine arts."' 24 In 1949, the Register published his
opinion that mass-produced artistic jewelry could qualify as copyright-
20. Denicola, AppliedAri and Industrial Design: A SuggestedApproach to Copyright in Useful
Articles, 67 MINN. L. REv. 707, 710 (1983); Note, supra note 10, at 879.
21. This meant that applied art could not have been a major stumbling block in the way of
efforts to bring the United States into the Union, see Ringer, supra note 1, at 1055-63, although
there was indignation in the Berne Union concerning the failure of the United States generally to
accord foreign works the same level of protection available within the Union. Id at 1060. It also
meant that the counterfeiting of foreign designs in the United States was no more disruptive of
international copyright relations than were similar practices in certain Berne Union countries,
which the Berlin Revision of 1908 had not rendered clearly illegal. For flagrant design piracy in
the Netherlands, see, for example, Cohen Jehoram, Specific Design Protection and Copyright in
Benelux and Dutch Law, reprinted in DESIGN PROTECTION 21, 24 (1976)(collecting papers deliv-
ered at a symposium in Amsterdam in 1975) [hereinafter cited as AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM].
Nonetheless, there were outcries in the United States concerning design piracy from both foreign
and domestic sources, but these outcries failed to persuade Congress to enact any of the series of
design bills that had been proposed since 1904. See Note, Designer Law: Fashioning a Rem edyfor
Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. REv. 861, 865 (1983). For the problem of dress designs pirated from
France, see S. GOTsHAL, TODAY'S FIGHT FOR DESIGN PROTECTION (1957), reprinted in Hearings
on S. 1884 Before the Senate Subcom., on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights of the Senate
Comm on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 171, 192-95 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Design Pro-
tection Hearings 1961].
22. See infra text accompanying notes 98-104.
23. Derenberg, supra note 17, at 630; see dlso A. DiErz, supra note 13, at 9-10.
24. Works of art (Class G), 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1949). The annual report of the Register of
Copyrights for 1948 announced the change by declaring that the Copyright Office would register
works of art "if they display artistic features, whether or not.. . they have utilitarian purposes."
Pogue, supra note 10, at 65 n.152.
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able works of art on analogy to Cellini's saltcellars; the Copyright Of-
fice accepted for registration many three-dimensional works of applied
art in the next few years.25 By September 6, 1952, when the United
States signed the Universal Copyright Convention at Geneva,26 this
country's domestic law appeared to afford limited recognition to ap-
plied art, consistent with treaty obligations and with the future working
relations between the Geneva countries and the Berne Union.27
Ironically, the federal judiciary, which had upheld the
copyrightability of an advertising poster in 1903, resisted the new dis-
25. Derenberg, supra note 17, at 647-48; Warner, Copyrighting Jewelry, 31 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
487, 489 (1949).
26. Universal Copyright Convention, 6 Sept. 1952, 3 COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 1, at
Multilateral Conventions, U.C.C., item A-I, 216 U.N.T.S. 132 (1955), revised at Paris, 24 July
1971, id at item B-I, 25 U.S.T. 1343, T.I.A.S. No. 3324, 943 U.N.T.S. 178 (1974). The United
States has ratified both Acts. 4 M. NIMMER supra note 1, app. 21.
After the Second World War, it became imperative to "bridge the gap" between members
and nonmembers of the Berne Union. The United States Copyright Office, under Register Arthur
Fisher, took a leading role in these efforts, which were sponsored by UNESCO and which resulted
in the Universal Copyright Convention. Kaminstein, Arthur Fisher Memorial, in 1 STUDIES ON
COPYRIGHT xiii (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kaminstein, Fisher Memorial]; Ringer, supra note 1, at
1060-61; see also M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 161. The spirit of the Geneva Convention
is the same as that of the Berne Convention, i.e., to assure a minimum level of protection to
authors and artists, but with much greater leeway left to national legislation under the Geneva
accord. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 167-68. Nevertheless, it was necessary for
"[a]dvocates of international copyright protection... to lay the groundwork for altering the do-
mestic law in the United States." Ringer, supra note I, at 1061. On the framework created by the
two conventions in the modem period, see Ulmer, International Copyright After the Paris Revi.
sions, 19 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 263 (1972); De Sanctis, supra note 1; Kaminstein, Report ofthe
Rapporteur ofthe Conferencefor the Revision offthe Universal Copyright Convention, 19 BULL.
CoPYRIGHT Soc'Y 211 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Kaminstein, Rapporteur]; see also 3 M. NIM-
MER, supra note 1, § 17.04[B].
27. The Geneva Convention recognized applied art indirectly in connection with the com-
plex provisions of article IV that determined the minimum term of protection to be established
under the treaty. The broad subject-matter categories of protectible works in article I speak only
of "literary, scientific and artistic works." M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 168; Frangon,
Modde et droits d'auteur, reprinted in PROTEGER LA FORME 96, 98-99 (1981) (collection of papers
presented at symposium in Paris) [hereinafter cited as PARIS SYMposiuM]. The provisions of arti-
cle IV(2), pertaining to the duration of protection, are declared inapplicable to applied art under
article IV(3); this article requires those countries that copyright works of applied art to provide a
minimum term of ten years of protection. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 168; S. LADAS,
supra note 2, at 835. With this proviso, a principle of reciprocity was established in article IV(4),
according to which works treated as applied art in both the country of origin and the receiving
country would be granted protection for the period established by the law of the country of origin.
S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 835; M.A. PEROT-MoREL, supra note 2, at 169.
The net result is that works of applied art are presumed to be included within the broad
category of "artistic works" protectible under article I, but if a member country chooses to protect
such works only by means of a sui generis design law, it has not violated the Convention. Fran-
on, PARIS SYMposium, supra, at 99. The operational differences between the Geneva Convention
and the Berne Convention as regards applied art were then further reduced through the work of
intergovernmental committees. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 170; see also De Sanctis,
supra note 1, at 256-57, 261; Ringer, supra note 1, at 1064.
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pensation. Most courts clung to the art versus utility dichotomy that
the Copyright Office had stubbornly maintained for nearly forty years
despite the express liberalization of the 1909 Act.28 In the words of
Professor Derenberg, judicial scrutiny of the new regulation thus re-
sulted in a rude awakening for those "who had assumed that, by regis-
tering such objects as works of art or designs for works of art, they had
actually acquired copyright protection.
'29
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
heard Stein v. Mazer,30 the Copyright Office intervened with an amicus
brief contending that the statuettes of male and female dancing figures
were entitled to copyright protection under the 1909 Act despite their
commercial use as lamp bases.3' The Fourth Circuit, relying heavily
on this brief, upheld copyrightability.32 The Supreme Court of the
United States atrmed the Fourth Circuit's decision in the landmark
case of Mazer v. Stein,33 which validated Regulation Section 202.8 and
established for the first time the protectibility of applied art in United
States copyright law.34
The issue for a majority of the Supreme Court was not whether a
manufacturer had the right to register a lamp base but rather whether
an artist's right to copyright a work of art was compromised by his
intention to apply that work of art to mass-produced useful articles.
35
The Court answered in the negative, because the creator of a picture or
28. Latman, supra note 9, at 279. The courts had largely ignored the liberalization of the
1909 Act in s'ection 5(g). Note, Proteclionfor the Aristic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72 HARV. L.
REv. 1520, 1524 (1959). Of seven decisions in the early 1950's concerning the copyrightability of
statuettes used as bases for table lamps, three had upheld copyrightability and four had not. Stein
v. Expert Lamp Co., 96 F. Supp. 97 (N.D. Ill. 1951) denied copyrightability, was affirmed by the
Seventh Circuit, 188 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1951), and was denied certiorari, 342 U.S. 829 (1951).
Similarly, Stein v. Benederet, 96 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 13 (E.D. Mich. 1952) denied copyrightability.
The Sixth Circuit stayed an appeal until after the Supreme Court decision in Mazer v. Stein, 347
U.S. 201 (1954), and then found copyrightability. Stein v. Benaderet, 214 F.2d 822 (6th Cir. 1954).
In contrast, Stein v. Rosenthal, 103 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Cal. 1952) upheld copyrightability and was
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, 205 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1953). In Stein v. Mazer, 111 F. Supp. 359
(D. Md. 1953), copyrightability was rejected; but the Fourth Circuit reversed on appeal, 204 F.2d
472 (4th Cir. 1953), and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari, 346 U.S. 811 (1953).
29. Derenberg, supra note 17, at 648.
30. 204 F.2d 472 (4th Cir. 1953), affd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
31. See Pogue, supra note 10, at 56. The Copyright Office opposed the criterion of the artist's
"intention" as administratively impracticable and also contended that design patent law and copy-
right law were not mutually exclusive. In so doing, it rejected the "intended use" doctrine then
current in United Kingdom law. See infra note 132.
32. Stein v. Mazer, 204 F.2d 472, 477 (4th Cir. 1953), aft'd, 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
33. 347 U.S. 201 (1954).
34. Id at 205-08. How firm the court's intention was to expand § 5(g) of the 1909 Act is
unclear. Compare Dulin, supra note 16, at 321, 325 and 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at
2-88 with Note, supra note 28, at 1525 (talks of "dicta") and Denicola, supra note 20, at 712, 715.
35. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 205.
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a statue was an author whose "writings" fell within the constitutional
enabling clause.36 The Court held that the distinction between "fine
arts" and "useful works of art" had ended with the 1909 Act's deletion
of the fine arts clause of the 1870 Act.37 Because the statutory authority
to protect "works of art" and "reproductions of works of art" encom-
passed the statuettes in question, they could not be excluded by judg-
ments concerning their aesthetic value or by "a narrow or rigid concept
of art."' 38 Moreover, the potential patentability of the statuettes as
lamps did not bar their copyrightability as works of art, even though
the United Kingdom had reached the opposite result.39 "The dichot-
omy of protection for the aesthetic is not beauty and utility but art for
the copyright and the invention of original and ornamental design for
design patents." 40
The decision in Mazer v. Stein had a "revolutionary impact" that
took some time to make itself felt.4' With Mazer, the United States
acquiesced in the proposition, formally honored by most of the world,
that an ornamental design did not necessarily cease to be artistic when
embodied in a useful article.42 But the Mazer Court never addressed
36. Id at 207-08; see also COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SECOND SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1975 RE-
VISIoN BILL, ch. VII, at 8-10 (1975 Draft) [hereinafter cited as REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975].
37. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 212. In its amicus brief the Copyright Office admitted to having
stretched the letter of its own regulation on some 60 occasions by allowing registration of "works
of art possessing utilitarian aspects." Id From this the Court derived "a contemporaneous and
long-continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them that would
allow the registration of such a statuette as is in question here." Id at 213. In fact, what the
Register had conceded was that, prior to 1948, an object "in a standard art form," such as a
sculpture or painting, would not be turned away merely because the Copyright Office had reason
to know of its "possible utilitarian aspects." See Pogue, supra note 10, at 65 n.152 (quoting Regis-
ter of Copyright's amicus brief to the Fourth Circuit).
38. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 214 ("Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to
permit a narrow or rigid conception of art.").
39. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217. The defendant had urged the Court to follow then current
United Kingdom law. See infra note 132. See generally Note, supra note 28, at 1526-27 (arguing
for strict separation of design patent law from copyright law, but recognizing "inference of a
congressional purpose to allow utilitarian objects protection under either scheme").
Umbreit believed that the application to design patents of the precedents of mechanical pat-
ents rather than of copyrights was an "accident of administration"; and that the overlapping of
subject matter, which had occurred since very early times, reflected "the tendency to extend the
protection of copyright to things which in their nature cannot be the subject of a copyright."
Umbreit, supra note 14, at 934-35. The doctrine of election was rejected by the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, In re Yardly, 493 F.2d 1389, 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see Frijouf, Simultaneous
Copyright and Patent Protection, 23 COPYRIGHT L. SYMp. (ASCAP) 99, 113-14 (1977).
40. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218.
41. See REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, at 10.
42. This is viewed as the narrow holding of Mazer v. Stein. Note, supra note 28, at 1525.
Unless this proposition is accepted, copyrightability of even a traditional work of art can turn on
the nature of the material support or on the end use to which the work is put. This, in turn, creates
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the related problem that some, many, or most ornamental designs
might not rise to the level of protectible works of applied art. Perhaps
the traditional art form of the statuettes obscured this issue 43.or per-
haps the Court assumed that the nondiscrimination principle of Bleis-
tein dictated a very broad definition of a work of art.44 The Supreme
Court's failure to determine the legal criteria by which a candidate for
protection as applied art should establish its credentials as a work of art
in the first instance thus begged the very question that had split the
Berne Union into three camps at the Brussels Conference of 1948.
4 5
B. Legitimation of AppliedArt in the Berne Union.
1. The Unity ofArt Thesis in France. The copyright approach to
industrial art46 rests on the notion that ornamental designs of useful
articles should not be denied protection as artistic works merely be-
cause of their industrial character. A cultural and political bias in
favor of gratuitous art or "art for art's sake" fueled resistance to this
proposition.47 It is now clear, however, that copyright protection of
aesthetic designs affects competition between useful articles whose legal
status is otherwise determined by the laws of industrial property.48 The
tension with the "work" as the basic unit of protection in modem copyright law. See, e.g., A.
DIETZ, supra note 13, at 33-34; F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 240-42; cf. Copyright Act of 1976, 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)("works of authorship").
43. Latman, supra note 9, at 278-79 ("On the other hand, the Court may simply have recog-
nized the impossibility of defining 'art' in a meaningful way as a matter of law.").
44. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-88 ("The Mazer opinion can be read to mean
that any useful article, at least if it is aesthetically pleasing in appearance, is subject to copyright
protection with respect to its form."). Professor Niminer's reading is essentially consistent with
the "unity of art" thesis developed in France; see infra notes 60-78 and accompanying text; infra
note 347. The Copyright Office did not read Mazer this way.
45. "In recent years an important problem has arisen as to whether ornamental designs of
useful articles (also referred to as 'applied art' or 'industrial designs') come within the category of
copyrightable 'works of art."' HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., IST SESS., RE-
PORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT
LAW (Comm. Print 1961), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
12 (1976) [hereinafter cited as REGISTER'S REPORT 1961]. A Swiss observer in the 1960's predicted
that the Mazer Court's failure to establish suitable criteria would cause problems later on. H.
SECRETAN, LA PROTECTION DES DESSINS ET MODELES INDUSTRIELS Er DES OEUVRES D'ART
APPLIQUE AUX ETATS-UNIS Er EN SUiSSE-ETUDE DU DROIT COMPARE 124-25 (1964).
46. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 11-12, 26-29; E. ULMER, supra note 7, at 146; V. von
Pilgrim, supra note 7, at 85-90, 92-94, 102-11.
48. The individual design or model reflects both technical imperatives linked to the method
of manufacture and functional exigencies. See, e.g., Gaubiac, La thiorie de l'uniti de i'art, 111
RIDA 2-3 (1982); Perret, La protection des crations defornes utilitaires oufonctionelles dans le
cadre d'un droit spce6que communautaire, reprinted in GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 2, at
139-40. Designs and models are also destined to be reproduced in series; their commercial ex-
ploitation is largely determined by factors governing the market segment in which the useful ob-
ject is to be sold rather than by economic factors operating on the market for works of art as such.
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laws governing industrial property, including patent, trademark and,
since the eighteenth century, sui generis design laws, 49 obey different
legal principles that drive most useful articles toward free competi-
tion.50 As Madame Prot-Morel observed in 1968, industrial art is a
legal hybrid that different legal subcultures subject to conflicting and
sometimes irreconcilable demands.51
During the nineteenth century, French courts recognized that "art
applied to industry" could aspire to legal protection as art.
5 2 Sui
generis design protection was also established in France at a very early
date.5 3 For nearly a century, French courts and commentators strug-
gled to establish a strict line of demarcation between designs that de-
served protection as "pure art" under the French copyright law of 1793
and those that deserved only the protection afforded by the special de-
sign law of 1806. 54 Between 1806 and 1902 France experimented with
five different criteria for distinguishing the subject matter of these two
regimes: 1) the method of reproduction,5 5 2) the purpose or end use of
the design,5 6 3) the secondary or accessory character of the aesthetic
features, 57 4) the status of the creator,58 and 5) the relative artistic value
M.A. PEROT-MOREL,supra note 2, at 18-22; Benussi, Droit Italien, reprinted in GRENOBLE SYMPO-
SIUM, supra note 2, at 118; Strunkmann-Meister, Leistungsschutz und industrieform, 66 ARCHIV
FUR URHEBER-, FUNK-, UND THEATERRECHT [UFITA] 63, 64-67 (1973); cf Note, Present Design
Protection in the United States, 5 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 139-40 (1958)(this note is by an anony-
mous professional author) [hereinafter cited as Present Design Protection]; REGISTER'S REPORT
1961, supra note 45, at 13.
49. The first legislation on designs seems to have been a British Act of 1787 "for the encour-
agement of the arts of designing and printing linens, cottons, calicoes and muslins." S. LADAS,
supra note 2, at 829. The French design law of 1806, however, first made "industrial designs...
a branch of industrial property. . . and it was this law which was copied or imitated all over the
world." Id
50. Wallace, Design Protection in the United Kingdom , reprinted in AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 21, at 40.
51. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 16.
52. Finniss, The Theory of "Unity ofArt" and the Protection of Designs and Models in French
Law, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 615, 618-19 (1964).
53. See supra note 49.
54. See P. GREFFE & F. GREFFE, TRAITE DES DESSINS ET DES MODELE 4-6 (rev. ed. 1974);
Finniss, supra note 52, at 616-17; Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 42-49.
55. This criterion distinguished between handcrafted items, which were copyrightable, and
works reproduced by mechanical means, which were not. Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 44-45.
56. Creations intended for industrial reproduction were protected by the law on designs and
models. Id at 44-45. For the difficulties of implementing this criterion without inconsistencies
and without damage to the concept of the work, see id at 44-46; Finniss, supra note 52, at 619-20.
The purpose or destination test, which French courts abandoned prior to 1902, became popular
outside of France and still influences a number of European systems. Id at 619-21; see F. PER-
RET, supra note 2, at 240-42.
57. Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 46-47. This criterion, reportedly proposed by Philippon in
Traits de la Proprilto des Dessins et des ModIes Industriels (1880), stressed the gratuitous nature
of art "applied" to industrial objects as distinct from designs determined by the utilitarian object
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of the candidate design.5 9 French courts found all of these criteria diffi-
cult to apply; in the end, their inconsistent and increasingly arbitrary
decisions60 paved the way for Pouillet's attack on the validity of draw-
ing any line of demarcation whatsoever.6
1
Pouillet and his followers argued that there could be no discrimi-
nation as to the degree of legal protection accorded different forms of
aesthetic creativity, and that all creations were entitled to protection in
the law of literary and artistic property:
Whence comes the difficulty that is found in clearly defining the na-
ture and character of the industrial design and model? It comes...
from the fact that we have got it in our heads that art and industry,
two things made to be allied and united, should be separated, and
because we have dreamed of establishing a line of demarcation be-
tween them.
62
Pouillet therefore rejected all such distinctions as necessarily based on
judges' subjective assessments of aesthetic merit:
It is a remarkable thing that as long as the question is that of
appreciating a .work conceived through the inspiration of purely ab-
stract and speculative thought, everyone is in agreement concerning
the principle of the unity of art. . . , but as soon as an application of
itself. See F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 242; Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 46-47. In practice, the task
of determining whether a design was predominantly industrial or merely decorative in nature
proved too difficult for the French courts even in the nineteenth century, i.e., before industrial
aesthetics began to integrate form and function. Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 46-47.
58. "If the creator was a manufacturer, the law of designs and models was to apply. . . if he
was an artist, the law of artistic property applied." Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 46-47. But a dis-
tinction between manufacturers and artists breaks down in the case of artisans and becomes
meaningless if the manufacturer is also an artist or when the artist transfers the rights of reproduc-
tion to a firm. Id
59. The subjectivity and insufficiencies of the first four criteria led the French courts, in the
final phase of this pre-1902 period, to experiment with overt subjectivity, i.e., a test of the artistic
level of the work in question. Finniss, supra note 52, at 621; Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 48-49.
This criterion was quickly rejected as leaving "the ordinary man to the whim of law courts."
Ptrot-Morel, Specfic Protection of Designs and Its Relation to Protection by Copyright in French
Law, reprinted in AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM, supra note 21, at 49; see also Gaubiac, supra note 48,
at 48-49. Nevertheless, artistic value is perhaps the most frequently used criterion in the European
Community today. See infra notes 281-83 and accompanying text.
60. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 42-45; Desbois, Le systmefranqais: La thkorie de
l'unitb de l'art, reprinted in GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 2, at 74.
61. E. POUILLET, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE PROPRIETE LrrrERAIRE ET ARTIS-
TIQUE ET DU DROIT DE REPRESENTATION (2d ed. 1894) [hereinafter cited as E. POUILLET,
PROPRIETE ARTISTIQUE]; E. POUILLET, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DES DESSINS ET
MODELES (5th ed. 1911) [hereinafter cited as E. POUILLET, DESSINS ET MODELES]. According to
Algardi, Pouillet was anticipated by Huard. See Z.O. ALGARDI, DisEGNO INDUSTRIALE E ARTE
APPLICATA 65-66 (1977).
62. E. POUILLET, DSSINS ET MODELES, supra note 61, at 49 (trans.). Despite its role in
ornamenting merchandise and in influencing the consumer's choice, the industrial design is seen
as a creation of the spirit, sometimes a creation of genius. Id at 51-53 (referring to works of art
applied to useful articles by Michelangelo, Cellini, and Raphael).
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art is involved, as soon as an immediate and direct use of the object
appears indicated, then the most disparate opinions emerge and, with
the help of strong feelings, the result is the worst inconsistencies and
the most unexpected contradictions.
63
Pouillet's "theory of the unity of art"64 gained legislative recogni-
tion in both France65 and Belgium. 66 Viewing attempts to establish a
rational line of demarcation between the design law and the copyright
law as futile, Pouilet maintained that decorators, painters, sculptors,
and fashion designers were all artists whose works uniformly deserved
to be governed by the copyright paradigm.67 Under Pouillet's influ-
ence, French copyright law, as amended in 1902, extended protection
to "designers of ornaments, whatever may be the merit and the purpose
63. Id at 51 n.1 (the English translation is available in Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 60), 50-53.
64. This theory criticized legal distinctions between true artistic designs and lesser designs.
See E. POUILLET, DESSINS ET MODELES, supra note 61, at 49-54; see also Finniss, supra note 52, at
615-16.
65. See Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 4-7 (1902 amendment to 1793 Copyright Law protected
"sculptors and designers of ornaments. . . whatever may be the merit and purpose of the work");
Finniss, supra note 52, at 616-17. This was reconfirmed by the design law of July 14, 1909, which
amended the law of 1806 and accepted the unity of art thesis in Article 1. Gaubiac, supra note 48,
at 4-5. Nevertheless, some courts and commentators continued to resist implementation of this
thesis until much later. Id at 6-7. A special law of March 12, 1952, repressed the counterfeiting
of clothing designs and other products of seasonal industries; it expressly endorsed the unity of art
principle in article 1. Id The principle was further consolidated by the French copyright law of
March 11, 1957, 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 1, France, item 1 (protecting "authors" of "all
intellectual works, regardless of their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose" (art. 2)); the
Cour de Cassation silenced the remaining resistance with a series of decisions in the 1960's. P.
GREFFE & F. GREFFE, supra note 54, at 25-35. The ascendancy of the unity of art thesis as a
matter of law is no longer contested in France. Desbois, supra note 60, at 63-77. But see F. Greffe,
L'application de la loi du 11 Mars 1957, PARIS SYMPOsIUM, supra note 27, at 114-22 (reporting new
resistance by French courts not unlike the resistance to the copyright approach that emerged in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1976). See Reichman, Design Protection
After the Copyright Act of 1976: A Comparative View of the Emerging Interim Models, 31 J. Copy-
RIGHT Soc'Y 267, 312-21 (No. 3, Feb. 1984)(forthcoming) [hereinafter cited as Reichman, After the
Copyright Act].
66. The unity of art thesis was officially adopted in Belgium by Royal Decree of January 29,
1935, which extended copyright protection under the law of March 22, 1886 "to all productions of
form, from the most humble to the most sublime." A. BRAUN & J.J. EVRARD, supra note 5, at 15.
The unity of art principle in Belgium, however, was rejected by article 21 of the Uniform Benelux
Designs Law, which took effect January 1, 1975. See infra notes 281, 610 and accompanying text;
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 283-97.
67. E. POUILLET, DESSINS ET MODELES, supra note 61, at 52-54; see also C. CARREAU, supra
note 3, at 198-202; P6rot-Morel, supra note 59, at 47. In reality, strenuous efforts were made to
limit the unity of art thesis by insisting on a distinction between non-art and art, a distinction that
some leading commentators believe Pouillet himself had accepted. See, e.g., P. GREFFE & F.
GREFFE, supra note 54, at 24; P rot-Morel, supra note 59, at 47. But see E. POUILLET, DESSINS ET
MODELES, supra note 61, at 52. In the end, the failure to arrive at defensible distinctions of this
kind led to the broadest application of the unity of art thesis in France. P. GREFFE & F. GREFFE,
supra note 54, at 24, 35-38; P6rot-Morel, supra note 59, at 47-49.
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of the work."' 68 By the 1930's, despite pockets of judicial resistance,
French law had rejected every test of aesthetic creation that "would
allow industrial art to be separated from real art."69 Consequently,
originators of "all creations of form, even the most modest," obtain a
generous bundle of economic and moral rights for a term of life plus
fifty years from creation, and need not comply with any formal prereq-
uisites whatsoever, such as notice, registration, or deposit.
70
Despite the triumph of the unity of art thesis, the French legisla-
ture did not repeal the special design law of 1806. Instead, the legisla-
ture passed the design law of July 14, 1909, still in force,71 which
further refined the advantages conferred by sui generis legislation with
respect to establishing proof of ownership, facilitating transfers of title,
and restricting competition.72 The unity of art principle, expressly con-
68. See supra note 65.
69. Finniss, supra note 52, at 623-24; P6rot-Morel, supra note 59, at 47. The ascendency of
the unity of art thesis is attributed, however, to the inadequacy of other solutions rather than to its
intrinsic persuasiveness. See, e.g., M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 44-45; F. PERRET, supra
note 2, at 243-46. The desirability of continuing unlimited protection of industrial art in French
copyright law has been challenged in recent years. See, e.g., P6rot-Morel, supra note 59, at 62-65.
But see Franqon, supra note 27, at 102-03. See general, Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 2-3, 12-43, 60-
70. Pressure on the border with patent law is also reported. See P6rot-Morel, Protection of De-
signs and How It is Related to the Law on Patents in France, reprinted in AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 21, at 67-78 [hereinafter cited as Perot-Morel, Designs and Patents]; see also infra text
accompanying notes 83-87.
70. P. GREFFE & F. GREFFE, supra note 54, at 35-38; Desbois, supra note 60, at 64-66; Fin-
niss, supra note 52, at 615.
71. Law on Designs and Models (Design Statute), July 14, 1909, as amended most recently
by Decree of April 24, 1980, English version reprinted in UNESCO & UNITED INTERNATIONAL
BUREAUX FOR THE PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC
WORKS[BIRPI], DESIGN LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (A. Bogsch ed. 1969-1971), France
item 1 [hereinafter cited as DESIGN LAWS]; see also DESIGNS AND UTILITY MODELS THROUGHOUT
THE WORLD 129-32 (A.M. Greene ed. 1983)(summary of provisions in English) [hereinafter cited
as DESIGNS AND UTILITY MODELS]. The French design law of July 14, 1909, confers a maximum
of fifty years of protection on objects that are rendered distinctive by features of shape and config-
uration or by other exterior effects. Such designs must be novel and, to a certain extent, qualita-
tively original in the patent sense. In principle, the protection afforded by the design law is
absolute. In practice, protection depends on a showing of bad faith, and sanctions cannot be
invoked against an infringer without prior deposit and registration. The French law differs from
those of other European Community countries in that the act of deposit and registration does not
create the right to protection under the French design law; it serves to establish the date of crea-
tion and a presumption of ownership. Divulgation without deposit does not destroy novelty under
the design law in France (within the European Community, this is true only of France); and
deposit may be made at any time. A secret deposit, valid for 25 years, is also permitted. Desbois,
supra note 60, at 64-66; Duchemin, Les dfficultbs relatives a l'organisation dun dpat com-
munautaire en rnatitre de dessins et modbles industriels, reprinted in GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM, supra
note 2, at 173-203. See generally P. GREFFE & F. GREFFE, supra note 54. French design law,
which cumulates with the French copyright law, is atypical. See Duchemin, supra, at 180-81
(comparative table); see also infra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
72. Finniss, supra note 52, at 618, 626-28.
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firmed by the law of 1909 and later by the copyright law of March 11,
1957,73 gave designers and manufacturers the opportunity to cumulate
the advantages of both acts without penalizing them for failing to take
one route or the other in any given case.74 Provided that a design were
registered under the design law of 1909, the provisions of this law
might fully satisfy the owner's legal needs. If, for one reason or an-
other, his attempt to invoke the design law proved abortive or other-
wise insufficient, the owner could simultaneously invoke the protection
of copyright law in the very action for infringement under the design
law.75 If, finally, the creator had ignored the design law altogether, his
entitlement to copyright protection from the date of creation would not
suffer merely because special design protection might have been avail-
able had he taken the pains to meet the requirements of registration
and deposit.
76
The unity of art thesis in France produced two results of primary
importance from the comparative standpoint. First, it led France to
extend copyright protection to all industrial art, including commercial
designs "on the lower frontier of applied art" that "depend on what is
called industrial aesthetics. ' 77 Second, it led to gradual integration of
the copyright law and the special design law into what is technically
described as a regime of absolute or total cumulation .78
73. See supra note 65.
74. "The principle of the unity of art not only entails an option [to choose] between the two
statutes; but also the two statutes may be cumulated to the fullest extent save where their respective
provisions are incompatible." Desbois, supra note 60, at 66 (emphasis in original)(trans.)
75. Desbois, supra note 60, at 66-74; Finniss, supra note 52, at 626-28. For example, the
design could fail to meet the substantive prerequisites of the design law; or the photographic
reproduction submitted for deposit could fail to reveal its salient features; or the initial deposit,
valid for five years, might not have been renewed in time. The unity of art principle, by permit-
ting absolute cumulation between copyright and design law, avoids loss of rights against an in-
fringer in such cases. Desbois, supra note 60, at 66-68; P. GREFrE & F. GREFFE, supra note 54, at
36. Even when a deposit under the design law has been properly accomplished, the owner might
prefer to invoke the moral rights or the strong remedies of French copyright law, not to mention
the longer duration it confers. Prot-Morel, supra note 59, at 52-53. Copyright law also confers
penal sanctions, rights of succession, and procedural advantages not available under the design
law. Id at 54-56.
76. See Desbois, supra note 60, at 66; P6rot-Morel, supra note 59, at 57.
77. Finniss, supra note 52, at 615; Prot-Morel, supra note 59, at 57-58 ("The artistic charac-
ter is not considered").
78. P6rot-Morel, supra note 59, at 52 (although it is "remarkable to apply two different laws
to one object," the principle of cumulative protection is the necessary consequence of the unity of
art theory). France is the only country within the European Community that affords the possibil-
ity of total cumulation between copyright law and a special regime of design protection. Duche-
min, supra note 2, at 42-43.
Cumulation between copyright and design law in the French system is not a two-way street in
the sense that not every "creation" protected by the 1957 copyright law is qualified to invoke
special design protection under the 1909 law. Desbois, supra note 60, at 73.
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2. Revival of the Sui Generis Regime of Design Protection. If
Pouillet's "simple but seminal" idea79 eventually prevailed in France,
the soundest writers caution that it was a victory by default rather than
by persuasion.80 The chief virtue of this position was that it eliminated
arbitrary distinctions between pure and industrial art that French juris-
prudence found unworkable and then intolerable.8' Nevertheless, the
"unity of art" theory continues to elicit skepticism even in France.
82
Many of those moved by Pouillet's evocation of Cellini were dismayed
to see the laws of literary and artistic property expand to protect the
designs of such articles as plastic salad bowls, drinking glasses, fire-
place grates, a hair brush, the luggage rack of a motor scooter, and the
hexagonal head of a lubricating pump.
8 3
The unity of art doctrine glossed over the affinity of ornamental
designs of useful articles to industrial property, 4 an affinity recognized
by the Paris Union at the International Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property in 1883.85 Arguably, France and Belgium, which
79. E. POUILLET, DEssINs ET MODELES, supra note 61, at 54.
80. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 246 (a makeshift solution); see also supra note 69.
81. Desbois, supra note 60, at 74 (the unity of art thesis "avoid[s] controversies discouraging
for their subtlety and inconsistent decisions on the merits.") (trans.).
82. See supra note 69. Difficulties attributed to this theory, besides the breadth of protection
as such, include the long term of protection; the application of moral rights to industrial designs;
the complex status of employee designs and designs made for hire; the severity of the copyright
remedies; and the lack of notice to third parties owing to the absence of formal requirements in
the copyright law of the Berne Union. See generally Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 12-43. Intensive
efforts to reform the French system have been conducted since the 1970's, without success. Perot-
Morel, supra note 59, at 63-64. For the latest survey, see Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 60-65.
83. See, e.g., P. GREFFE & F. GREFFE, supra note 54, at 30-31; P~rot-Morel, supra note 59, at
57, 61; Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 284-88 (breadth of protection in
Belgium between 1935 and 1975).
84. The industrial design is often seen as an analogue of the utility patent owing to its effects
on commerce, and its legal status has been "influenced to a certain degree by the characteristic
principles of industrial property law." M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 16. But see Umbreit,
supra note 14, at 934-35.
85. The Convention of Paris, signed in 1883, established the International Union for the
Protection of Industrial Property, to which some 92 states have adhered, including the United
States. See 22 INDUS. PROP. 6-8 (1983)(table of member states). This treaty was revised in 1900 at
Brussels, in 1911 at Washington, and in 1925 at The Hague, 74 L.N.T.S. 289, 1 WIPO, MANUAL
OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CONVENTIONS [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CONVEN-
TIONS], item D-l; it was further revised in 1934 at London, 192 L.N.T.S. 17, 1 INDUSTRIAL PROP-
ERTY CONVENTIONS, supra, item E-l; it was further revised in 1958 at Lisbon, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, 1
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CONVENTIONS, supra, item F-i; and it was further revised in 1967 at
Stockholm, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 1 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CONVENTIONS, supra, item G-I (for Eng-
lish versions of the 1934, 1958, and 1967 texts, see also DESIGNS AND UTILITY MODELS, supra note
71, at 427, 439, and 453).
Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Paris Convention of 1883 recognized "industrial designs and
models" as a separate branch of industrial property, and this Convention continues to set mini-
mum standards for the regulation of industrial designs within the framework of international
industrial property law. See 1 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CONVENTIONS, supra, item A-I.
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had sought to rescue artistic designs from the exigencies of patent
law,8 6 were now converting copyright law into a de facto industrial
property law without the characteristic safeguards of the industrial
property paradigm. 8 7 Moreover, critics observed that many of the
items that French copyright law protected displayed no aesthetic crea-
tivity whatsoever.8 8 Such claims, though open to debate in individual
cases, 89 reinforced suspicion that applied art suffered from a chronical-
ly low degree of creative content, due in part to the subordination of
aesthetic features to technical exigencies and to the marketing methods
characteristic of a consumer economy.90
86. S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 832-33; Duchemin, supra note 2, at 28-29. Ladas summarizes
the dissatisfaction with the patent-law paradigm as follows:
The requirements for novelty, the refusal to protect designs on the ground that their
appearance was often connected with an industrial result, the conditions for deposit, and
the administrative procedure of examination in many countries-all of these with the
consequent expense of obtaining protection--seemed inconsistent with the character of
their creations and their value.
S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 832.
The "requirements for novelty" mentioned by Ladas normally include a "qualitative origi-
nality" test (akin to nonobviousness), as this term is used in the present article. See generally
Duchemin, supra note 2, at 17-29, 65-73.
87. "[T]he theory of the unity of art entails an undermining of the [Copyright] Law of 1957
and an allgnment with the law of industrial property." Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 40-41. More-
over, "industrial and commercial exploitation, the chief characteristic of designs and models,
makes the [Copyright] Law of 1957 hard to apply." Id; see also Ptrot-Morel, Les projets con.
munautaires en matilre de dessins et modkles ornamentaux, Conference at the University of Pavia,
Nov. 26-27, 1979 (concerning "aspects of the international evolution of industrial property law"),
reprinted in 30 RIVISTA DI DIrIrro INDUSTRIALE 378-93 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Pdrot-Morel,
Pavia Conference].
88. The following is a typical expression of dismay:
One should not forget that this theory was spawned by a false conflict between art and
industry. By evoking scholastic examples of Benvenuto Cellini's saltcellar or candelabra
by Raphael, one has supposedly justified drawing into the orbit of copyright law a body
of intellectual products that bear only an apparent resemblance to the creations covered
by this regime.
F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 246 (trans.); see also A. BRAUN & J.J. EVRARD, supra note 5, at 14-15;
see also Duchemin, supra note 71, at 191-92 (quoting Vittorio De Sanctis); P6rot-Morel, supra
note 59, at 58-59 (quoting Plaisant).
89. See, e.g., Desbois, supra note 60, at 66-67; see also Wallace, supra note 50, at 39:
The intellectual property world is divided into patent men and copyright men ...
Copyright men know little about patents and do not mind. They are content to let the
patent men get on with it so long as they don't interfere with copyright. Patent men, on
the other hand, know a little about copyright, and of what they do know, they disap-
prove. . . . [To them] copyright men were grasping: they wanted too long a period of
protection; they wanted it for matter which was sometimes quite devoid of novelty; they
considered they were entitled to protection as a matter of natural justice, regardless of
. . . the public interest . . . ; and they wanted it without even taking the trouble to
prepare and deposit a specification setting out what they claimed to own (or, perhaps
preferably, to employ someone to do it for them).
90. The minimally creative design "on the 'lower' frontier of applied art," Finniss, supra note
52, at 615, has proved troublesome since at least the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Gaubiac, supra
note 48, at 60-63; Ljungman, The New Nordic Design Legislation under Comparative Aspects, 4
INT'L REv. OF INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. [IIC] 336, 342-43 (1973)(low degree of creativity
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Other members of the Berne Union viewed with increasing diffi-
dence this expansion of protectibility in France and Belgium under the
unity of art thesis.9' Opponents of the copyright approach intensified
efforts to distinguish applied art from noncopyrightable "industrial de-
signs" on conceptually tenable grounds.92 Two dominant positions
emerged. One, typified by Italy, insisted on the "duality of art." On
this view, ornamental designs were normally ineligible for copyright
protection because their dependence on useful articles made them pri-
marily objects of commerce and deprived them of the independent
existence deemed a basic attribute of true works of art.93 The second
position, typified by Germany, conceded copyright protection to a lim-
ited number of exceptional designs but rejected the rest as lacking the
requisite degree of artistic intensity or value.
94
It should be stressed that countries opposed to the unity of art the-
sis did not automatically relegate designs excluded from copyright law
to the public domain. Both Germany and Italy, while subscribing to
different exclusionary criteria, agreed in principle that designs of useful
articles should be regulated by sui generis design laws modeled on the
French design law of 1806.95 These sui generis design laws96 placed
produces risk of identical creations). At the time Pouilet wrote, moreover, mass-produced indus-
trial articles were unsightly and product standardization had not occurred. With an extreme de-
gree of technical standardization, not foreseeable in Pouillet's time, the influence of the marginally
differentiated design component on consumer decisions has increased dramatically. See, e.g., F.
PERRET, supra note 2, at 11-15; J. HESKETT, supra note 5, at 68-84, 127-44; Bowen, Design Patents
and Modern Industrial Designs, 37 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 744, 748-52 (1955); Dalsimer, New Concepts
of Design Protection, 8 IDEA 168, 168-69 (1964)(Eighth Annual Public Conference of the Patent,
Trademark, and Copyright Research Institute). On the depersonalization of modem design and its
legal implications, see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 276-83 (discussing the
views of Hubmann and Strunkmann-Meister).
91. See, e.g., Reimer, The Relations between Copyright Protection and the Protection of De-
signs and Models in German Law, 98 R.I.D.A. 36, 40 (1978)(The Tribunal of the Empire in Ger-
many rejected the unity of art thesis in 1911, despite positive views of commentators); see also
infra note 210 and accompanying text (Italian courts disregarded the unity of art thesis despite
favorable provisions in the Italian copyright law of 1925). Outside the Berne Union, opposition
was equally intense. At the Hague Conference of 1925, for example, "the British and American
delegations were unwilling to accept the principle of cumulative protection of works of art by the
Copyright and Industrial Property laws," and a French proposal to this effect "was not insisted
upon." S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 836. Foreign literature often speaks of the "excesses" of the
copyright approach to ornamental designs. See, e.g., Perot-Morel, supra note 59, at 59.
92. See, e.g., S. LADAs, supra note 2, at 837-38.
93. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 21, 89-111.
94. Id at 69-88.
95. See supra note 49.
96. Germany enacted such a design law (Geschmacksmuster) in 1876. See Englert, The Law
of Industrial Designs in Germany-Actual State and Reform Proposals, 12 IIC 773 (1981). For
English text, see Law Concerning Copyright in Designs (Design Statute) of 11 January 1876,
DESIGN LAWS, supra note 71, Federal Republic of Germany, item 1; see also Utility Model
(Gebrauchsmuster) Act of 1968, as amended to 1980, reprinted in 6 IIC STUDIEs: GERMAN INDUS-
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ornamental designs within a hybrid legal framework, heavily influ-
enced by patent law, that seemed consistent with the industrial charac-
ter of the useful articles in which any artistic components were
embodied.
The legal status of industrial art thus varied from country to coun-
try, despite the broad multilateral conventions that otherwise regulated
artistic property on the one hand and industrial property on the other.
97
The 1948 Brussels Conference to Revise the Berne Convention did not
eliminate either the tension or the impediments to trade caused by such
inconsistent treatment. Participants in the Conference were unable to
reach a consensus regarding the unity of art thesis promoted by France.
Consequently, their attempt to systematize the international regulation
of industrial art ended in an awkward compromise.
98
Legitimation of applied art within the Berne Convention was a
key element of this compromise. Works of applied art were expressly
incorporated within the broad list of protectible subject matter set forth
in article 2 of the 1948 revision.99 From the French perspective, this
left no doubt that works of applied art were henceforth to be "viewed
broadly as artistic works."u °
Adherents of other views succeeded in imposing two major reser-
vations. Each country in which protection was sought acquired the
right to limit the duration of copyrights in applied art.' 0 ' In addition,
TRIAL PROPERTY, COPYRIGHT AND ANTITRUST LAWS 68-75 (English translation) [hereinafter
cited as IIC STUDIES]. For a nontechnical, capsule summary of both acts, see DESIGNS AND UTIL-
ITY MODELS, supra note 71, at 135-41.
Italy enacted its design law in 1868. This law was revised by Decree No. 1411 on Models and
Designs of August 25, 1940, as amended May 23, 1977 and June 27, 1979 (Decree No. 338). The
1940 law covers both ornamental designs and models and utility models. M. FABIAN[, MODELLI E
DISEGNI INDUSTRIALI 9-10 (1975). For English texts, see Design Statute, DESIGN LAWS, supra
note 71,Italy, item 1 [hereinafter cited as Italian Design Law of 1940]; for a nontechnical, capsule
summary, see DESIGNS AND UTILITY MODELS, supra note 71, at 185-88.
97. Perot-Morel, Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 379-80.
98. Fran~on, PARIS SymPoSIuM, supra note 27, at 98-99. See generally P6rot-Morel, GRENO-
BLE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 2, at 49-61. The copyright approach to applied art, urged by France,
was most strongly resisted by Italy. Id at 57.
99. After 1948, the relevant portion of article 2(1) declared that the "term 'literary and artistic
works' shall include every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may
be the mode or form of its expression, such as ... works of applied art." Brussels Revision, supra
note 1.
100. S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 834; Franqon, PARIS SYMPOSIuM, supra note 27, at 98.
101. Article 7(l) provided that "[t]he term of protection granted by this Convention shall be
the life of the author and fifty years after his death." Brussels Revision, supra note 1. But the
duration of protection for works of applied art was governed by article 7(3): "In the case of...
works of applied art, the term of protection shall be governed by the law of the country where
protection is claimed, but shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin of the work." Id
(emphasis added). Within the European Community, only Luxembourg has in fact limited the
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national governments retained authority to define the applied art to be
protected by domestic copyright law, and to distinguish between this
category of applied art and a subcategory of "designs and models" that
could be subjected to more restrictive regimes.' 0 2 States electing to ex-
ercise this option could then deny copyright protection to a foreign de-
sign protected as applied art in the country of origin by finding that the
design did not qualify as applied art under the territorial law of the
receiving state. Moreover, in derogation of the basic right of national
treatment under the Convention, a receiving state that might otherwise
have recognized foreign designs as applied art under territorial law
would nonetheless deny copyright protection if the designs were pro-
tectible only as "industrial designs or models" in the country of ori-
gin.'03 In short, the 1948 text of the Berne Convention admitted
applied art to full standing as copyrightable subject matter but author-
duration for applied art, to a period of fifty years from creation. See Duchemin, supra note 2, at
8-9, 73-93.
102. Article 2(5) of the Brussels text of 1948 replaced article 2(4) of the previous text. Article
2(5) provides:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the extent of
the application of their laws to works of applied art and industrial designs and models, as
well as the conditions under which such works, designs and models shall be protected.
Works protected in the country of origin solely as designs and models shall be enti-
tled in other countries of the Union only to such protection as shall be accorded to de-
signs and models in such countries.
Brussels Revision, supra note 1.
103. Articles 2(5), 4(1) & 5, Brussels Revision, supra note 1; Derenberg, supra note 17, at 629-
30; Duchemin, supra note 2, at 10-15; P6rot-Morel, GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 2, at 58.
Member states were thus allowed to draw the kind of demarcation line that had been abolished de
facto in France and dejure in Belgium. S. LADAs, supra note 2, at 834; see supra notes 66, 78. This
resulted in "the great diversity of legislation. . . and the even greater uncertainty [that subsists] at
the international level." Duchemin, supra note 2, at 12-13.
This compromise was modified as regards implementation but not as to principle at the
Stockholm Revision Conference of July 14, 1967. See S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 835; Duchemin,
supra note 2, at 14-15 (art. 2(5) of 1948 text became art. 2(7) of 1967 text, which added language
mandating copyright protection for foreign designs in a receiving member country that lacked any
sui generis design law at all). Moreover, article 7, paragraph 4, as revised, expressly reaffirmed the
right of member states to limit the period of protection for applied art, but nonetheless established
a minimum term of 25 years from the date of creation. Stockholm Revision, supra note 1; P6rot-
Morel, GRENOBLE SYMPOsiuM, upra note 2, at 59-60. In most cases, this did not require member
states to protect more items as applied art than before, but only to confer a duration of at least 25
years on those items they did protect. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 14-15; see supra note 101. With
specific regard to the Benelux countries, however, articles 2(7) and 7(4) did aim to enlarge copy-
right protection for Italian designs, because these countries possessed no special design laws at the
time and Italy protected designs only under a design law. See Duchemin, supra note 2, at 14-15.
The Benelux countries agreed, in 1966, to adopt the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, which took
effect on 1 January 1975. See infra note 117; Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at
283-97.
The Paris Revision of 1971, which entered into force on July 10, 1974, carried forward the
dispositions regarding applied art as they appeared in the 1967 text. See Paris Revision, supra
note 1.
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ized--or indeed invited-members to curb the excesses of the copyright
approach by recourse to the kind of subsidiary legal framework that
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property had long
recognized.Y°4
The decisions of the Brussels Conference in 1948 profoundly influ-
enced the evolution of design protection law in both member and non-
member countries. Within the Berne Union, the movement to absorb
industrial designs and models into the law of artistic property lost a
momentum it never regained. 10 5 Sui generis design laws, long the "ne-
glected relative" of industrial property law, were assigned a new
role. 10 6 The growing economic importance of design, the high costs of
development and promotion, and the enormous losses from misappro-
priation in a field in which "counterfeiting is endemic" elicited pres-
sures for more effective protection in every country, pressures that
partly account for the spread of the copyright approach in the first in-
stance.' 0 7 Special design laws could alleviate fears of overprotection
and excessive restraints of trade evoked by this approach, 08 and could
provide legal safeguards lacking in copyright law.10 9 This, however,
presupposed both modernization of these laws and their universal
adoption. 0
104. Fran~on, PARIS SYMPOSIUM, supra note 27, at 98-99. This solution, within the double
framework of the two conventions, was "both illogical in principle and difficult to implement."
P6rot-Morel, GRENOBLE SYMPOSiuM, supra note 2, at 61 (trans.).
105. S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 837.
106. Id at 828; Bogsch, Towards a More Effective Protection of Designs in the United States of
America, 1959 INDUS. PROP. Q. 3, 14.
107. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 19; F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 13-19; Bassard, La
Contrefaqon et la manikre dont seprot.gent en France, crateurs el entrepreneurs, reprinted in PARIS
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 27, at 66 ("Counterfeiting is a phenomenon in full expansion. It tends to
operate on an international and industrialized scale.")(trans.); see also J. HEsKETr, supra note 5,
at 184, 199-200. For evidence of similar pressures in the United States, see especially Fisher, The
Operations of the Copyright Office (address before the meeting of the ABA Section of Patent,
Trademark and Copyright Law, August 30, 1960), reprinted in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ABA-SEC-
TION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 202, 206-07 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Fisher
Address] (economic importance of protecting new appearance designs from fast-moving copiers).
108. See, e.g., Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 207-08 ("there are grave dangers in the ten-
dency of courts to apply the doctrines of copyright to this whole field of design"); see also S.
LADAS, supra note 2, at 832-33 (copyright is simple to obtain and of long duration, but protects
only against copying; design law is normally of short duration, but claims to protect against in-
dependent creation as well).
109. "[T]he view in the world (and I believe the predominant view in the United States) is that
when you apply design to functional objects-that is, to objects which convey something more
than their own appearance--you need a specialized law with a relatively short term." FisherAd-
dress, supra note 107, at 207; see also S. LADAs, supra note 2, at 837-39; supra note 50 and accom-
panying text; infra note 121.
110. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 18-19.
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The Lisbon Conference to Revise the Paris Convention took the
first step in this direction in 1958 by adopting a new article providing
that "industrial designs shall be protected in all the countries of the
Union.""' All member countries were thereafter obliged to ensure a
reasonable degree of design protection within the framework of the
Paris Convention, although each country remained free to determine
the nature, subject matter, and conditions of such protection." 2 The
second step was taken on November 28, 1960, with the revision and
simplification of the Hague Arrangement of 1925, which permits a sin-
gle international deposit of protected designs.' 13 The third step was to
try to standardize national design legislation 14 through a world-wide
effort to develop a model design law, or at least an agreed set of princi-
ples that would further the goals of uniformity and modernization.
1 15
111. Article 5 quinquies, Paris Convention (1958), supra note 85.
112. See Duchemin, supra note 2, at 28-29; see also Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra
note 21, at 156 (testimony of Federico, acknowledging need for a United States design law to
satisfy general provisions of Paris Convention as revised at Lisbon).
113. The Hague Arrangement of 1925, which provides machinery for eliminating the disad-
vantages and expense of separate deposits in each member country, is now administered by the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in Geneva. This Arrangement, despite its prac-
tical importance, has had little effect on the unification of national legislation. Duchemin, supra
note 2, at 32-33. See Hague Arrangement on the International Deposit of Industrial Designs or
Models, November 6, 1925, 74 L.N.T.S. 341; amended at London, June 2, 1934, 205 L.N.T.S. 179,
1 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CON'rVENTIONS, supra note 85, at item A-I; revised at The Hague, No-
vember 28, 1960 (not yet in force), I INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY CONVENTIONS, supra note 85, at item
B-1. A deposit under the Hague Arrangement produces in the contracting countries the same
effects as if the designs and models had been directly deposited there on the date of the interna-
tional deposit. This deposit is also entitled to the six month priority period instituted by the Paris
Convention. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 32-33. The Revision of 1960 undertook technical modifi-
cations with a view to greater harmonization of national design laws and also with the hope of
making the Arrangement accessible to many more countries. Id
114. The Conference at The Hague was preceded by the work of a high-level group of experts
that aroused "great expectations." Ljungman, supra note 90, at 336-37. In the United States, Reg-
ister Fisher declared that, "in connection with the Hague diplomatic meeting. . . numerous states
are considering revising their domestic design laws as we are.. .[E]ssentially, the Hague revision
is a very simple thing, but it illustrates, with respect to our domestic problems, the worldwide
interest in this whole situation." Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 207.
The task of reconciling different viewpoints proved too difficult, however, and the 1960 text
never entered into force. Ljungman, supra note 90, at 337. "It appears to have little chance of
being applied within the near future." Duchemin, supra note 2, at 32-33. G. Finniss, Director of
the French National Institute of Industrial Property, was Vice-President and Rapporteur G6n6ral
of the Diplomatic Conference for Revising the Hague Arrangement on Designs and Models. Fin-
niss's strong views in favor of the unity of art thesis, see generally Finniss, supra note 52, may have
influenced developments in the United States during the 1960's, but could not have facilitated the
task of reconciling different national viewpoints. For the use of Finniss's views in the United
States, see Hearings on S. 1237 Before the Subcomm on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 41, 48-49 (1965)(testimony and statement of Ellis
Arnall) [hereinafter cited as Design Protection Hearings 1965].
115. "This reform movement takes place on both the national and the international level
.... [O]n the international level, the movement toward better design protection is, so to speak, a
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This reform movement culminated in the Tokyo Resolution of the
International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property
(AIPPI) in 1966116 and in a new generation of design laws enacted in
many countries." 7 As late as 1968, Mine. P~rot-Morel pointed out that
many important countries had no special design laws at all while most
countries retained inadequate legislation. By 1978, Mine. Englert
found the protection of industrial designs "in a state of radical change,"
total one .. " Bogsch, supra note 106, at 11-13. Among the various groups of experts at work
was a subcommittee of the European Community's Coordinating Committee for Harmonizing the
Law of Industrial Property (President of the Coordinating Committee was again G. Finniss, Di-
rector of the French National Institute of Industrial Property). This subcommittee produced a
report by Professor Roscioni, then Director of the Italian Patent Office; the Roscioni Report, how-
ever, elicited no follow-up action from the Coordinating Committee. B. ENOLERT, supra note 6,
at 22, 26; Duchemin, supra note 2, at 65-73. For echoes of the Roscioni Report in the United
States, see infra note 260 and accompanying text.
The International Association for the Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI) began a ma-
jor study project in 1959, as did the International Literary and Artistic Association (ALAI), while
the World Intellectual Property Organization started work on a model law for developing coun-
tries, completed in 1969. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 65-73; see Model Law for Developing Coun-
tries on Industrial Designs (1969), 3 SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW, 257-66 (K.
Zweigert & J. Kropholler eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM
LAW ].
Even the centrally planned economies, grouped under the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA), were developing model design protection laws, although at a slower pace.
The result was the Agreement on the Legal Protection of Inventions, Industrial Designs, Utility
Models and Trademarks in the Framework of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation,
signed at Moscow on December 4, 1973, reprinted in 3A SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM
LAW, supra, at 524 (signatories include Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, G.D.R., Hungary,
Mongolian P.R., Poland, Romania, U.S.S.R.).
In the United States, meanwhile, the Copyright Office was keenly interested in these reforms.
"The problem of appropriate protection for ornamental designs of useful articles-or what is
sometimes and less exactly called industrial design-is not restricted to the United States, but is
worldwide in extent. Most of the developed nations are now giving consideration to the matter
....'" Hearing on S. 2075 and S. 2852 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks, and Copy-
rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1960)(statement of Arthur
Fisher, Register of Copyrights) [hereinafter cited as Design Protection Hearings 1960].
116. S. LADAs, supra note 2, at 868-71; Englert, supra note 96, at 773. The Tokyo resolution
set forth a statement of basic points that should enter into the formation of a modern design law.
S. LADAs, supra note 2, at 869.
117. See, e.g., Nordic Design Laws, reprinted in 10 INDUS. PROP. 223-40 (197 1)(English ver-
sion)(effective in 1970 in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, and in 1971 in Finland); Uniform
Benelux Designs Law, signed as part of the Benelux Designs Convention on October 25, 1966,
effective January 1, 1975, reprinted in 13 INDUS. PROP. 177-83 (1974)(English version); Order on
Industrial Designs, January 17, 1974, German Democratic Republic, reprinted in 14 INDUS. PROP.
144-54 (1975)(English version); Statute on Industrial Designs and Models No. 539 of June 8, 1981,
effective January 1, 1982, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reprinted in WIPO, INDUSTRIAL
PROPERTY LAWS AND TREAaas, Soviet Union, item 4-0001 (English version), 22 INDUS, PROP.
(June 1983)(attachment); Protocol on Patents and Industrial Designs within the Framework of the
Industrial Property Organization for English-Speaking Africa (ESARIPO), December 10, 1982,
reprinted in WIPO, INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY LAWS AND TREATIES, Multilateral Treaties, item
(1)(B)(ili), 22 INDUS. PROP. (March 1983)(attachment).
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as a result of which leading countries in all political and economic
blocs, including the centrally planned economies and the developing
countries, had either enacted new design laws or given high priority to
the reform of existing laws." 8
It cannot be said, however, that these reform efforts have led to the
coherent system of design regulation anticipated after the decisions of
the Paris Union in 1958.119 The number of designs deposited under
domestic design laws has been relatively small in relation to the
number of designs launched on the market each year. 20 Further, the
technical solutions devised by various committees of experts have not
succeeded in eliminating the drawbacks of the "patent approach" that
traditionally make design protection costly, slow, and administratively
inconvenient, as well as of uncertain legal effectiveness. 21 Above all,
the Berne Union's inability to establish a clear line of demarcation be-
tween applied art protectible in copyright law and industrial designs
protectible in sui generis design law has undermined even those
achievements that did emerge from twenty-five years of reform
efforts. ' 2
2
3. The Intractable Problem of Cumulation. The legal history of
industrial art in the twentieth century may be viewed as a continuing
effort to establish special regimes of design protection without unduly
derogating from the general principles of copyright law.' 23 The diffi-
118. B. ENGLERT supra note 6, at 26; M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 18-19.
119. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 34-39, 74-75 ("no truly satisfactory system of national protec-
tion exists [within the European Community]"). At an international symposium at Grenoble in
1977, not a single speaker was willing to defend his national system of design protection. P6rot-
Morel, Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 389.
120. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 35. Systematic design piracy, conducted on an international
scale, has become a major problem. See, e.g., Bassard, supra note 107, at 66.
121. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 35-39, 73-93; Duchemin, GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM, supra note
71, at 184-85. Design protection laws normally require deposit or registration without prior divul-
gation. Id at 175-83. Although the requirement of a search of the prior art has been eliminated
in most countries, novelty is always required and qualitative originality (akin to nonobviousness)
is usually required. B. ENOLERT, supra note 6, at 56-60, 78-84.
122. See, e.g., Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 2-3, 48-49; P6rot-Morel, GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 2, at 61. "[Tjhere is no subject matter within the domain of industrial property that has
elicited such diverse and sometimes confused ideas, and such a multiplicity of efforts yielding so
little success." M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 121 (trans.).
123. See Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 48-59; Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65,
at 365-86. The chief disadvantage of the Brussels compromise concerning applied art was that it
gave new impetus to the very line-drawing exercises that had ultimately led to adoption of the
unity of art thesis in France. Any line of demarcation "implies the existence of a no-man's land"
of greater or lesser importance depending on the criteria used. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 62-63;
see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 313-21 (discussing L Batlin & Son v.
Snyder). Moreover, every satisfactory criterion, according to the French view, must account for
the fact that "the most stunning objects are exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art in New York"
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culty of this task becomes apparent when it is recalled that, within the
Berne Union, works of art original in the copyright sense 124 obtain
long-term protection without formalities, whereas under special design
laws, only short-term protection is normally available for novel and
qualitatively original designs deposited or registered prior to divulga-
tion.125 Even the most technically refined design laws can govern only
those designs that fall within their jurisdictional sweep. The harder a
country makes it to obtain copyright protection for industrial art, the
more that country's special design law may determine the scope of the
design protection actually available within that system. If a country
makes it easy for industrial art to qualify for copyright protection as
applied art, designers will have less incentive to make use of a special
design law and design protection will increasingly be characterized by
the copyright approach. The true scope and effectiveness of any given
design law will therefore depend on the extent to which the scope of
protection it affords, and the conditions it imposes, are undermined by
the concurrent availability of copyright protection for industrial art. At
the same time, measures needed to limit concurrent protection are
likely to derogate from general principles of copyright law.
126
Hindsight suggests that the reform of sui generis design laws after
1958 was thwarted by the decisions made at Brussels in 1948, which
hardened the preexisting attitudes toward applied art and converted
cumulation into "the biggest problem of all for the protection of de-
signs and models."' 27 Cumulation means that concurrent protection is
available for ornamental designs of useful articles in copyright and spe-
cial design law.128 When concurrent protection is always possible, as in
the French regime of absolute cumulation, special design laws serve as
optional methods of augmenting manufacturers' rights, without forfeit-
and that everyday useful articles figure prominently in private art collections. Franel & Gaubiac,
Prolegomknes, reprinted in PARIS SYMposiuM, supra note 27, at 15.
124. Normally, this means independent creation. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 76-79. But in
the case of designs protected as "applied art," states may require a degree of creativity that sur-
passes mere independent creation. See F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 85-89; infra note 131 and
accompanying text.
125. Article 4(2) Brussels Revision, supra note 1; Article 5(2) Paris Revision, supra note 1.
"Design law generally requires that a design be both novel and original-concepts borrowed from
patent law." Cohen Jehoram, Design Laws in Continental Europe and Their Relation to Copyright
Law, 8 EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RFviaw [EIPR] 235, 236 (1981).
126. See, e.g., Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 58-61 ("Whereas it appears necessary to make a
certain distinction, it is impossible to implement it."); Pdrot-Morel, Le droft compan4 et ses en-
seignements, reprinted in PARIs SyMPosIuM, supra note 27, 137-38, 145-46.
127. Franel & Gaubiac, supra note 123, at 18; see supra text accompanying notes 98-104.
128. S. LADAs, supra note 2, at 840; M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 30; Cohen Jehoram,
supra note 125, at 235.
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ing protection against copying under the law of artistic property. 129
When, as in the Italian regime of noncumulation, there is virtually no
possibility of concurrent protection for ornamental designs and models,
short-term protection in a special design law becomes the only safe
route regardless of the degree of artistic content. Italian manufacturers
locked into the design law can lose all protection if they fail to meet its
formal and substantive prerequisites, which reflect a modified patent-
law paradigm. 130 When partial cumulation is practiced, as in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, the Benelux countries, and the Scandina-
vian countries, manufacturers occasionally obtain copyright protection
for designs and models that manifest exceptional creativity. As a rule,
however, systems that allow partial cumulation attempt to relegate
most industrial art to special design laws despite general principles of
copyright law that prohibit legal discrimination on the basis of artistic
merit.131
Three options-cumulation, noncumulation and partial cumula-
tion-have thus continued to exist in the Berne Union's intellectual
property law system after the Brussels Conference of 1948. Some coun-
tries have shifted allegiance over the course of time, notably the United
Kingdom 32 and the Benelux group.133 The choices among these op-
129. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78. The unity of art doctrine thus routinely per-
mits long-term protection of aesthetic designs, with moral rights and without any formalities
whatsoever.
130. See infra text accompanying notes 200-26, 356-412.
131. Perot-Morel, Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 385-86; Perot-Morel, supra note 126, at
141-42. The system in the Federal Republic of Germany is the prototypical regime of partial
cumulation within the European Community. See generaly Reichman, After the Copyright Act,
supra note 65, at 293-97 (Benelux system), 336-40 (Federal Republic of Germany).
132. The situation in the United Kingdom is atypical, and citations to its law should be used
with caution. Prior to 1968, the United Kingdom adhered to a system ofnoncumulation by express
preference of the Copyright Act of 1911. This aligned the United Kingdom with Italy's position,
except that the United Kingdom adopted a purpose or destination test that tended to exclude
designs reproduced in more than 50 single articles from copyright protection. Excluded designs
were protectible, if at all, under the Registered Designs Act of 1949 or its predecessors, which
follow the patent law paradigm. Cornish, Cumulative Protection for Industrial Designs, 8 U. BRIT.
COLUM. L. Rv. 219, 226-30 (1973); Wallace, Protection for Designs in the United Kingdom, 22
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 437, 437-39 (1975). The United Kingdom's Copyright Act of 1956 re-
tained the anticumulationist stance of prior law and provided for a "terminable copyright," i.e.,
designs copyrightable as artistic works when applied to more than 50 single articles forfeited pro-
tection with respect to these articles only. Wallace, supra, at 440. In 1968, a hurriedly drafted one-
clause bill, introduced by a Private Member of Parliament with some government support, suc-
ceeded in amending section 10 of the Copyright Act of 1956 "so as to postpone the loss of copy-
right in mass-produced articles for 15 years from the date in which the articles were first
marketed." Wallace, supra, at 439-40; see Cornish, supra, at 230-33.
The desired effect of the 1968 "bill," known as the Design Copyright Act of 1968, was to
install a regime ofpartial cumulation for a period of 15 years, because even a design registerable
under the Registered Designs Act of 1949 could receive copyright protection for 15 years when
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tions made by different countries reflect more than domestic self-
interest; they also reflect fundamental differences of principle concern-
ing both the nature of art and the proper limits of protection for intel-
lectual property, which differences are exacerbated by the hybrid
nature of industrial art.134 Until they are resolved or tempered by com-
promise, no international system of design protection can fulfill its
goals, despite continuing efforts at harmonization and reform.
135
C. Options for the United States.
International preoccupation with special regimes of design protec-
tion since 1958 should not obscure the importance of the Berne Union's
embodied in a useful article. The "bill, "however, said nothing about excludingjuncdionally dictated
designs from its sweep. From 1972 on, English courts began to afford copyright protection to
nonartistic, purely technical designs, originally deposited in two-dimensional form and later em-
bodied in three-dimensional models, on analogy to dolls made from cartoon characters. "No
matter how mundane or functional" the design, it was now copyrightable "regardless of the exist-
ence, or non-existence, of patent, design patent or other industrial property rights." Stevenson,
Protectionfor Industrial Designs under the British Copyright Act of.1956, 8 A.P.L.A. Q.J. 369, 369
(1980); see Baillie, Design Copyright Protection in the United Kingdom, 15 INVL LAW. 92-93 (1981).
Meanwhile, a three-dimensional aesthetic design for a suite of furniture, not deposited originally
in two-dimensional form, was denied copyright protection because it was not a "work of artistic
craftsmanship" within the meaning of the 1956 Act. Bloom, Lost in the Bronx, 22 BULL. COPY-
RIGHT SOC'Y 199-207 (1975); see also RUSSELL-CLARK ON COPYRIGHT IN INDUSTRIAL DESIoNS
78, 142-44, 148-52 (M. Fysh ed. 1974).
In the United Kingdom, the lines between copyright law, patent law, sui generis design law
and utility models (not officially protected) have thus become blurred and, indeed, hopelessly
confused as the result of "a series of mistakes and oversights on the part of legislative draftsmen."
Stevenson, supra, at 369. An inquiry by a parliamentary commission left the situation more con-
fused than before. See COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS LAW-REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE TO CON-
SIDER THE LAW ON COPYRIGHT AND DESIGNS (THE WHITFORD REPORT) Cmnd. 6732 (1977);
Dworkin, The Whitford Committee on Copyright and Designs Law, 40 MOD. L. REv. 685, 685-89,
694-96 (1977). Most recently, a government Green Paper denounced the anomaly of protecting
"functional designs without aesthetic merit" for life plus 50 years, simply because the designs were
derived from two-dimensional drawings, while protecting three-dimensional aesthetic designs for
only 15 years in the same copyright law and registered designs for 20 years under the Registered
Designs Act of 1949. REFORM OF THE LAW RELATING TO COPYRIGHT, DESIGNS, AND PERFORM-
ERS' PROTECTION-A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 4-8 Cmnd. 8302 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
REFORM OF THE LAW (UK)]; see Tarnofsky, Reform of United Kingdom Copyright, 18 COPYRIGHT
367, 367-68 (1982)(stresses harmful effects of protecting foreign products on domestic market
under current regime without corresponding protection for English products elsewhere in Berne
Union). For these reasons, the situation in the United Kingdom is not used as a basic point of
reference for this article.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 609-11. See generally Reichman, After the Copyright
Act, supra note 65, at 283-97.
134. PNrot-Morel, Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 381; see also Reichman, After the Copy.
right Act, supra note 65, at 367-73.
135. PNrot-Morel, supra note 2, at 61; Cohen Jehoram, supra note 125, at 240. For recent
proposals, see, for example, Haertel, Harmonisation des lgislations des Pays des Marchk Commun
ou relance d'un droit communautaire en matire de dessins et modtles, GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 2, at 31-39; Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 64-70.
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decision at the Brussels Conference in 1948 to legitimate applied art.1 36
This foundation was further consolidated at subsequent revision con-
ferences and through negotiations of inter-governmental committees,
which narrowed the distance between the Berne and the Geneva Con-
ventions.1 37 With the 1954 decision inMazer v. Stein, the United States
Copyright Office, under the leadership of Arthur Fisher, persuaded the
United States, through its Supreme Court, to join an international con-
sensus favoring recognition of applied art as copyrightable subject
matter. 38
Mazer v. Stein, however, opened the very question of cumulation
left unresolved at the Brussels Conference of 1948. The Court ac-
knowledged in dictum that the availability of protection for ornamental
designs under the patent law should not necessarily bar the
copyrightability of applied art. Yet the United States possessed no sui
generis design law like those enacted abroad;139 its design patent law
had come, through judicial construction, to protect very few ornamen-
tal designs since the 1920's."40 The significance of Mazer was thus un-
clear. The decision could have been construed to put the United States
on a number of paths: first, broadly protecting industrial art under
copyright law; 141 second, permitting only narrow access to copyright
law,' 42 with state unfair competition law a possible alternative for
136. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 10-13.
137. See supra notes 26-27, 98-104 and accompanying text.
138. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 63 (testimony of Arthur Fisher); Ka-
minstein, Fisher Memorial, supra note 26, at xiii; Ringer, supra note 1, at 1061 (Ringer speaks of
adjustments to domestic law under aegis of "advocates of international copyright protection").
Kaminstein and Ringer, respectively, succeeded Fisher as Register of Copyrights.
139. See supra note 21; see also Note, supra note 21, at 865 (listing 71 design bills not passed
by Congress since 1914).
140. See Derenberg, supra note 17, at 693-706 (discussing a ten-year survey of design patent
litigation, which found that more than three times as many design patents were adjudged invalid
than were found to be valid); see also Nimetz, supra note 18, at 83 ("the hostility of the courts to
patents in general and to design patents in particular makes a design patent a most uncertain form
of protection").
141. See I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-88, 2-96.3; infra note 347 and accompa-
nying text. The following language from the opinion supports this broad reading: "They [works of
art] must be original, that is, the author's tangible expression of his ideas. . . . Such expression,
whether meticulously delineating the model or mental image or conveying the meaning by mod-
ernistic form or color, is copyrightable." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 214 (1954)(citing Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903)).
142. See, for example, the separate opinion of Justices Douglas and Black who questioned
whether the useful articles allowed to register for copyright protection at the time of Mazer were
"writings" of authors in the constitutional sense. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,220-21 (1954)(sepa-
rate opinion of Douglas, J.); see also B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 55 (1967);
Denicola, supra note 20, at 722-27, 741; Comment, Copyright Protectionfor Mass-Produced, Com-
mercialProducts:.A Review of the Developments Following Mazer v. Stein, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 807,
822-23 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Chicago Critics]. The view that ornamental designs should not
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noncopyrightable designs;1 43 third, permitting similarly narrow access
to copyright law, while protecting the bulk of ornamental designs in a
new, sui generis design law.1'
To understand the evolution of design protection in the United
States,145 one must first determine whether the United States adopted
one of the positions taken by the Berne Union countries-cumulation,
noncumulation, or partial cumulation-after Mazer. 146 This in turn
focuses attention on differences between the "copyright approach" and
the "patent approach" to industrial art,147 and on the extent to which
obtain any form of protection, in or out of copyright law, is shared by no country within the
European Community and by few, if any, countries within the OECD group; it is also inconsistent
with the views of the CMEA countries. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
143. Justice Douglas, whose doubts about the wisdom of Mazer were expressed in a separate
opinion, see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 220-21 (1954)(Douglas, J.), later came to regard the
misappropriation theory of unfair competition law as a possible solution despite the preemption
doctrine he announced in the Sears-Compco cases of 1964. See Nimmer, A Comment on the Doug-
las Dissent in Lee v. Runge, 19 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 68, 71 (1971); infra notes 420-24 and
accompanying text. Compare Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 288-93
(Netherlands courts in this period used unfair competition law to rescue designs excluded from
copyright law).
144. In fact, the Copyright Office intended the legitimation of applied art in the United States
to be merely the first step in a program to establish an American regime of sui generis design
protection in keeping with the spirit of reform emerging abroad. This task was shouldered with
"endless effort" by Arthur Fisher, the Register of Copyrights at the time Mazer v. Stein was de-
cided. Kaminstein, Fisher Memorial, supra note 26, at xiii-xiv; see also Derenberg, supra note 17,
at 705.
145. A bibliography of the literature on this question has been prepared by the Copyright
Office and published by the Library of Congress. See B. RINGER, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DESIGN
PROTECTION (1955); SUPPLEMENT TO BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DESIGN PROTECTION (W. Strauss and B.
Ringer eds. 1959); K.M. MOTr, BIBLIOGRAPHY ON DESIGN PROTECTION-SUPPLEMENT (1976).
146. This would be the logical point of departure regardless of the status of special design
legislation, since the United States Design Patent Law of 1842 remained in force after the recogni-
tion of applied art in Mazer. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
147. Under the "copyright approach," the basic criterion for protection should be originality
in the sense of independent creation; in foreign literature, the term "subjective novelty" is fre-
quently used instead of "originality in the copyright sense." The work seeking protection should
be the designer's own work and not something he has copied. Wallace, supra note 132, at 437.
Under the "patent approach" to design protection, standards of objective novelty must be satis-
fied. The designer of an original form may nonetheless lose his exclusive rights if he was antici-
pated by a very similar design, while the proprietor of a protected design may be able to prevent
anyone else from marketing articles bearing the same or a very similar design. Id; Ljungman, The
Scandinavian Approach in Design Frotection-Aims and Outcomes-In Comparison with the New
Benelux Legislation, reprinted in AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM, supra note 21, at 119.
The terms "copyright approach" and "patent approach" must be used with caution, as the
distinction is seldom as clear-cut in practice as the prototypes suggest. The terms do reflect an
underlying conflict of attitudes that is responsible for many of the difficulties and misunderstand-
ings encountered in this field:
Normally the paths of patent men and copyright men do not cross. It is only on those
rare occasions when the question of design protection is under consideration that the
clash of minds occurs. Each contestant knows instinctively that the principles which he
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unfair competition law accommodates ornamental designs otherwise
denied protection.
This article concentrates on the copyright approach to industrial
art in the United States, from the Mazer decision of 1954 to the Gen-
eral Revision of Copyright Law enacted in 1976.148 The subject can be
subdivided into two periods. During the first, from 1954 to 1969, the
Copyright Office tried to limit the access of industrial art to protection
afforded by the Copyright Act of 1909, while pressing Congress for
prompt enactment of a sui generis design law intended to resolve many
of the problems known to exist abroad. 149 In the second period, from
1969 to 1976, the Copyright Office sought to limit the breaches in de-
fenses erected earlier, while Congress delayed enactment of both the
general revision of copyright law and the special design law incorpo-
rated within it.15o
Since 1954, the United States has experimented with each of the
basic positions in foreign law and found all of them unsatisfactory.
151
Similarities between interim models emerging in the federal appellate
courts and the primary models in foreign law help to account for what
otherwise appear to be a series of actions and reactions in domestic law
with no clear logic of their own. The resulting contradictions have split
United States Courts of Appeals into opposing camps not unlike those
found within the European Community and the Berne Union as a
whole.1 52 Courts can more effectively address difficulties created by the
learnt in his apprentice days and has practised since, are the right ones. It is what the
Americans expressively call a "gut reaction."
Wallace, supra note 50, at 39; see supra note 89.
148. Copyright Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982): § 101
("Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," "useful article"), § 102 (subject matter of copyright),
§ 113 (scope of exclusive rights in pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works), § 301 (preemption
with respect to other laws), § 410 (registration and issuance of certificate), § 702 (Copyright Office
regulations).
149. "[I]t seems it is much better and more appropriate not to deal with these problems merely
as a phase of copyright law, but by a sui generis short-term law resting on its own bottom. I think
that this is the general view in the world." Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 63-
64 (testimony and statement of Arthur Fisher, Register of Copyrights).
150. A second article by the author deals with the period from 1976 to the present, in which
the Copyright Office and the courts have tried to administer a set of cryptic instructions handed
down by Congress-without a design law-in the Copyright Act of 1976. See generally Reichman,
,4fter the Copyright Act, supra note 65; see also infra text accompanying notes 634-47.
151. The present article deals mainly with noncumulation. Phases of cumulation and partial
cumulation are the primary focus of Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65.
152. The division is as follows: The Second Circuit is following a regime of partial cumula-
tion. See Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909-11 (2d Cir. 1980); Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, 632 F.2d 989, 993-94 (2d Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & Sons v. Snyder, 536 F.2d
486, 490-92 (2d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976). The District of Columbia and
Eleventh Circuits are following a regime of noncumulation. See Norris Indus. v. ITT Corp., 696
F.2d 918, 922-24 (11th Cir. 1983); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 800-04 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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failure of the 1976 Copyright Act to adopt a coherent position with
regard to industrial designs153 by comparing current problems in the
United States with those already faced abroad. 154 European observers
should benefit from this comparative analysis,155 which illuminates as
well the merits and demerits of proposals concerning the enhancement
of trade through more satisfactory regulation of design protection at
the international level.'
56
II. EvOLUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT APPROACH FROM MA4ZER V
STEIN TO THE GENERAL REVISION OF 1976
A. Rise and Fall of the First Noncumulationist Model
1. Art in the Historical and Ordinary Sense. The United States
judiciary, which had resisted the implementation of Regulation Section
202.8 between 1948 and 1953,157 was prepared initially to give Mazer v.
Stein a very broad reading. In 1955, for example, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the pro-
tectibility of a costume jewelry necklace, declaring that "a common-
place fashion accessory," although "not an expression of 'pure' or 'fine'
art," could nonetheless be copyrighted as a work of art. 5 8 In the same
year, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld
The Ninth Circuit, although excluding nontraditional utilitarian designs from copyright law, has
expanded the federal law of unfair competition to protect the excluded designs. See Fabrica, Inc.
v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 893-94 (9th Cir. 1983). See generally Reichman, After the
Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 312-86.
153. Although the term "industrial design" continues to be used in the literature and the case
law, it is less satisfactory than the terms "designs of useful articles" or "ornamental designs of
useful articles." See Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 56 (statement of Arthur
Fisher). The term "industrial designs" includes nonornamental, purely technical designs having
no eye-appeal whatsoever. Use of the term "industrial designs" also accentuates the tendency of
courts and writers to treat the objects of protection as artifacts rather than "works" embodied in a
material support. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)("works of authorship").
154. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65 at 365-86.
155. The different models operating separately under foreign law have, in the United States,
interacted with one another within a single field of legal operations removed from some of the
historical factors influencing developments abroad. The evolution of the copyright approach in
the United States thus sheds new light on the disruptive effects that designs of useful articles have
been producing within the world's intellectual property law system as a whole.
156. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 365-86; see also J. HESKETT,
supra note 5, at 184, 199-200 (increased role of design in international trade leads governments to
stimulate design innovation for export purposes).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29.
158. Trifari, Krussman & Fishel v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see also
Trifari, Krussman & Fishel v. B. Steinberg-Keslo Co., 144 F. Supp. 577, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Hollywood Jewelry Co. v Dushkin, 136 F. Supp. 738, 739 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
The characterization of the object as "commonplace" would have excluded it from protection
under the special design law soon to be proposed by the Register of Copyrights. See § 2(a), S.
2075 (O'Mahoney-Wiley-Hart Bill), 86th Cong., Ist Sess. May 28, 1959, refining H.R. 8873 (Willis
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the copyrightability of a doll modeled after a chimpanzee then appear-
ing on television.159
Continued decisions in this vein could have led to a United States
version of the French unity of art thesis. Under the 1909 Act, this
meant that copyrighted designs would obtain protection for a maxi-
mum period of 56 years, and an average period of 28 years,'60 without
moral rights,161 on condition that strict formal prerequisites had been
satisfied. Even the broadest reading of Mazer v. Stein could not have
freed applied art in the United States from the requirements of publica-
tion with notice, and of registration and deposit1 62 prohibited under
the Berne Convention, 63 nor could it have accorded such works either
the moral rights or the long duration routinely available under the
Convention. 164 For these reasons, the paradigm underlying Mazer
seems closer in spirit to the special design bill the Copyright Office was
Bill), 85th Cong., 1st Sess. July 23, 1957 (copy on file at the Center for Research Libraries, Chi-
cago, Illinois).
159. Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 436 (2d Cir. 1955) (citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,
214 (1954)). Both this case and the costume jewelry cases, supra note 158, were decided under the
regulation upheld in Mazer, 37 C.F.R. § 202.8(a) (1949). In 1958, the Second Circuit upheld the
registration of costume jewelry earrings, apparently under the same 1949 regulation, in Boucher v.
Du Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948, 949 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 936 (1958). The decision in
Mazer was said to be "a complete answer" to a claim that jewelry was noncopyrightable subject
matter.
160. Copyright Act of 1909, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81. The renewal copyright, valid for a
second period of 28 years, was conditioned upon timely application at the Copyright Office within
one year prior to the expiration of the original copyright. A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW:
HOWELL'S COPYRIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 Acr 72-73 (5th ed. 1979). In 1959, about
eighty-five percent of the copyrights registered under the 1909 Act were not being renewed.
Ringer with Culp, Renewal of Copyright, reprinted in I STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 503, 583 (1963).
161. Among the rights not granted under either the 1909 or the 1976 Copyright Acts are the
"moral rights" (droit moral) recognized under the Berne Union system, which are normally per-
petual in duration, inalienable, and intended to safeguard the author's artistic reputation rather
than the proprietary aspect of the copyright. See 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 8.21, at 8-247.
162. Formal prerequisites under the 1909 Act included publication with notice on pain of
technical forfeiture; actual registration as a prerequisite for an infringement action; deposit of "the
best edition... then published" (§ 13)(not usually a cause of invalidation). Works intended for
exhibition might qualify for registration in unpublished form. See Copyright Act of 1909, supra
note 9, §§ 5, 10-14, 19, 24-25; A. LATMAN, supra note 160, at 110-11, 152-57; see also Henn, Cas-
sandra Considers Copyright, 25 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 453, 457, 465, 471 (1978)(criticizing 1976
Act).
163. Article 5(2), Paris Revision, supra note I (repeating article 4(2) of 1948 Brussels Revi-
sion), provides that "The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject to any
formality."
164. On moral rights, see A. DIETZ, supra note 13, at 66-78. The period of protection in the
Federal Republic of Germany has been extended to life plus seventy years, twenty years more
than the Berne Union norm. A. DiETZ, supra note 13, at 164. Since the 1948 compromise, the
Berne Union members may, and do, derogate from some convention norms with regard to applied




about to sponsor 65 than to the copyright paradigm accepted by the
Berne Union.
166
The Copyright Office, however, intended to move toward the
Berne Union's copyright paradigm in its program for a general revision
of the copyright law, begun in 1955.167 In 1953, a committee of experts
had begun drafting a modem design bill for the United States. Al-
though Mazer's legitimation of applied art was largely due to Copy-
right Office intervention, 168 Register Fisher soon gave the committee
his support.1 69 Viewing this project as an opportunity to forestall the
problems of overprotection associated with the copyright approach in
France and Belgium, he endorsed the policy that designs of useful arti-
cles should in principle seek protection exclusively from the sui generis
regime under study.' 70
Register Fisher's decision rendered particularly delicate the task of
managing the category of applied art in the short run. The Copyright
Office optimistically assumed that a new design bill could be enacted
before the legislative phase of the general revision of copyright law.171
Nevertheless, interim measures were needed to prevent the acquisition
of rights and the accumulation of expansionist precedents that would
165. See infra text accompanying notes 247-56.
166. See Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 102 (recognizes affinities between 1909 Act (USA)
and special design laws); see also Ringer, supra note 1, at 1062.
167. REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at ix-x (Preface); Nimmer, Implications of/he
Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L.
REv. 499, 499-502 (1967). General revision bills tracked the Berne model as far as legislatively
feasible but not far enough to qualify for membership in the Berne Union. See Henn, supra note
162, at 457, 465, 471; supra note 163.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 286-87. Giles S. Rich, now a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, became chairman of the Coordinating Committee
on Designs, set up after Congress decided not to deal with ornamental designs in the patent law
reforms of 1952. The Committee proposed the Willis Bill, H.R. 8873, supra note 158, introduced
in the 85th Congress in 1957 and subsequently revised and promoted by a National Committee for
Effective Design Legislation. The sequel to the Willis Bill was the O'Mahoney-Wiley-Hart Bill, S.
2075, supra note 158, presented to the 86th Congress in 1959. Latman, A Proposalfor Effective
Design Legislation: S. 2075 Examined, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 279, 279-80 (1959). Judge
Rich was assisted by advisers from the Patent Office and the Copyright Office, including the future
Register, Barbara Ringer. See Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 47-54 (testi-
mony of Judge Rich); Hearings on H.R 2223 Before the House Subcoman on Courts, Civil Liber-
ties, and the Administration of Justice of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 992
(1975) (testimony of Alan Latman) [hereinafter cited as Hearings 1975]. Professor Latman was
counsel to the National Committee for Effective Design Legislation. Id
170. See supra note 149; infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text; Design Protection Hearings
1960, supra note 115, at 66 (testimony of Arthur Fisher).
171. REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, at 7; see also Hearings 1975, supra note
169, at 1855 (testimony of Barbara Ringer).
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be difficult to eliminate once new legislation was enacted.'72 The first
regulation issued after Mazer, in 1956, therefore signalled caution to
the courts in section 202.10(c):
When the shape of an article is dictated by, or is necessarily responsive
to, the requirements of its utilitarian function, its shape, though
unique and attractive, cannot qualify it as a work of art. If the sole
intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that it is unique
and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However,
where the object is clearly a work of art in itself, the fact that it is also
a useful article will not preclude its registration.'
7 3
This regulation seems to have exerted a temporary restraining in-
fluence on the courts. 174 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, which had allowed a commonplace
design to be copyrighted in 1955, upheld the denial of registration to a
stylized, modernistic watch face in 1957 in Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches v. Benrus Watch Co. 175 The district court applied the
"colloquial rather than philosophical" definition of a "work of art" that
it found in the 1956 regulation. 176 Apparently influenced by the "sole
intrinsic function" language of section 202.10(c), 177 the court drew the
line of protectibility at what it understood to be "works of artistic
craftsmanship." 78
172. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 66 (testimony of Arthur Fisher); De-
sign Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 86 (testimony of Giles Rich) ("the late Register of
Copyrights, Arthur Fisher, has often described the situation as one where he was holding his foot
on the door to keep this flood of useful articles out of the Copyright Office until such time as we
could get a proper kind of law to take care of it").
173. 21 Fed. Reg. 6024 (1956)(emphasis added)(repealed, 43 Fed. Reg. 966 (1978), 37 C.F.R.
966 (1978)).
174. The view that the Copyright Office's regulations were continually liberalized after Mazer
v. Stein is correct with reference to the period following this 1956 regulation, which attempted to
cut back on the broad reading of Mazer v. Stein. The view that courts are inclined to accept as a
work of art any work "which by the most generous standard may arguably be said to evince
creativity" did not apply to designs of useful articles in the period 1956-1958; the extent to which it
applies in the Second Circuit after 1976 is debatable. See I M. NIMME, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at
2-84. But see Reichman, After the CopyightAct, supra note 65, at 297-350 (partial cumulation in
the Second Circuit).
175. 155 F. Supp. 932, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), modifed, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).
176. 155 F. Supp. at 934.
177. Plaintiff had argued unsuccessfully that utility could not be the "sole intrinsic function"
of its design because the artistic effect of the design made it difficult to tell time from the face of
the watch. ,acheron, 155 F. Supp. at 934-35.
178. The District Court proceeded to uphold a design patent on the same watch face, "every
element" of which had been "anticipated by the prior art." Validity was premised on the rear-
rangement of old elements that "has the necessary beauty and originality born of the inventive
faculty." Id. at 935.
On appeal, Chief Judge Clark, in dissent, reminded the district court that "to my knowledge,
our court has never sustained a design patent challenged for lack of novelty." Vacheron & Con-
stantin-Le Coultre Watches v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637, 643 (2d Cir. 1958)(Clark, C.J.,
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Similarly, in 1958, the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit upheld the denial of copyrightability to a
"cardboard star with a circular center bearing the photograph of an
entertainer."1 79 The court expressly endorsed the Register's contention
that "a thing is a work of art. . . if it appears to be within the historical
and ordinary conception of the term art."' 80 Rigorously applied, this
rationale could have overruled previous decisions validating dolls and
even costume jewelry as copyrightable works of art.
In retrospect, however, it seems clear that the 1956 regulation
could not have sustained for very long the restrictive effects desired by
the Copyright Office. No modem designer ignores the function of the
article he shapes. Accordingly, language in the first sentence of section
202.10(c) that appeared to exclude from protection all articles whose
shapes were "necessarily responsive to" their utilitarian functions was
so broad that it sidestepped the Supreme Court's strictures against a
"narrow or rigid conception of art."'" The final sentence of the regu-
lation, which permitted copyrightability of an object clearly a work of
art in itself, said either too little or too much. If this sentence meant
that the Copyright Office was to make an assessment of the artisti6
dissenting). For Judge Clark, however, these "highly ornamented watches" were copyrightable
under Mazer v. Stein and its immediate progeny. Id at 644.
179. Bailie v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 425, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1958)(per curiam). In 1960, after an amend-
ment to the regulations, the Register did issue a certificate for "multipointed spherical foil and
plastic stars" not challenged as works of art. Elekes v. Bradford Novelty Co., 183 F. Supp. 730,
731-33 (D. Mass. 1960); See I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-85. In view of the separa-
bility test in use at least as early as 1958, and officially adopted in 1959, this was less contradictory
than it looks. See infra text accompanying notes 197-201.
180. Bailie, 258 F.2d at 426, (citing Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1953)("A
cardboard star which stands because of folded flaps does not fall within that conception.")). Pro-
fessor Latman regards this case as illustrating insufficient "originality or creativity." Latman,
supra note 9, at 280. This was the direction that United States case law would vigorously pursue
from 1976 on. See Reichman, Afler the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 308-21.
181. See supra text accompanying note 173. The notion that the "shape of an article...
dictated by ... the requirements of its utilitarian function," 21 Fed. Reg. 6024 (1956)(repealed, 43
Fed. Reg. 966 (1978), 37 C.F.R. 966 (1978)), should not be protectible in copyright law is accepted
nearly everywhere. The obvious reason is not that such designs cannot be works of art, but rather
that their protection would circumvent the strict requirements of the patent law. See Baker v,
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1880); PArot-Morel, Designs and Patents, AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM,
supra note 69, at 67-69. But see supra note 132 (discussing the United Kingdom).
Nevertheless, the notion that "the shape of an article. . .[that] is necessarily responsive to
... the requirements of its utilitarian function," 21 Fed. Reg. 6024 (1956)(repealed, 43 Fed, Reg.
966 (1978), 37 C.F.R. 966 (1978)) cannot be copyrightable is a formula for the exclusion of most
industrial art, which in a broad sense is "necessarily responsive to" utilitarian functions by defini-
tion. The 1956 regulation thus restated the traditional antinomy of art versus utility. It also
evoked the "aesthetic surplus" doctrine that developed in Germany around 1907. See Reimer,
supra note 91, at 40-42 ("aesthetic surplus" test stressed that aesthetic elements added to func-
tional aspects must attain level of work of art). See generally Reichman, After the Copyright Act,
supra note 65, at 337-38.
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value of designs seeking registration, it seemed to validate considera-
tions of merit that Bleistein prohibited; this would necessarily beg the
question of the Register's authority to make such determinations.
182
This language may also have signified an administrative preference for
a regime of partial cumulation.
83
When Vacheron reached the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in 1958,' 84 these issues proved troublesome. Chief
Judge Clark, dissenting, attacked the inconsistency of the Copyright
Office in permitting registration of ordinary costume jewelry under the
authority of Mazer but denying registration to the highly artistic watch-
face design in Vacheron.185 He also flatly denied the authority of the
Copyright Office to act as if it possessed "judicial or discretionary func-
tions such as has the Commissioner of Patents."' 8 6 Judge Hand, writ-
ing for a weak majority,187 avoided resolving the question of authority
to judge art.188
182. 188 U.S. 239 (1903). Register Fisher claimed that the Copyright Office did in fact possess
such authority. Fisher 4ddress, supra note 107, at 205; see also Berger, ,4uthority of the Register of
Copyrights to Reject Applications for Registration, reprinted in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 393-408
(1963).
183. "Clearly a work of art in itself' implies that differences in the degree of creative content
or of artistic value may become critical determinants of copyrightability. Under regimes of partial
cumulation, courts are willing, to a greater or lesser extent, to undertake such an assessment of
creative content in individual cases. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. That the United
States Copyright Office preferred and, between 1955 and 1976, often covertly practiced a regime
of partial cumulation is one of the theses of this study. See infra text accompanying notes 533-56,
578-633.
184. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir.
1958), modifying 155 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
185. 260 F.2d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1958)(Clark, C.J., dissenting); see supra note 178. This incon-
sistency resulted in part because the decisions admitting costume jewelry under Mazer predated
the Copyright Office's choice of a line of defense. IfMazer validated costume jewelry, then denial
of copyrightability to a highly artistic watch-face design seemed inconsistent. If, however, the
1956 regulation validly narrowed Mazer, and the Copyright Office intended to impose a rather
high threshold for ornamental designs thereafter, then denial of copyrightability was consistent
with the regulation and part of a campaign to eliminate designs embodied in useful articles from
copyright law.
The Register's intention to elevate the standard for copyrightability under his 1956 test to a
very high threshold appears from the denial of registration to a design so exceptional that the
lower court found it had met even the test of nonobviousness under the design patent statute. See
supra note 178 and accompanying text; infra notes 578-633 and accompanying text.
186. acheron, 260 F.2d at 644-45 (Clark, C.J., dissenting).
187. Judge Lumbard concurred on narrow grounds. Id at 642 (Lumbard, J., concurring).
188. "It is true that 'works of art' is a loose phrase whose perimeter is hard to define," he
conceded. "Nevertheless, the decision here did not demand the exercise of a discretion. . . con-
clusive with the Register," in view of the writ of mandamus that might lie in other cases. Vacher-
on, 260 F.2d at 640. This decision established that actual registration, rather than an application
for registration without more, was a prerequisite for an infringement action under the 1909 Act.
A. LATMAN, supra note 160, at 156. Section 411 of the 1976 Act now permits an infringement
action even where registration has been refused. Nova Stylings, Inc. v. Ladd, 695 F.2d 1179, 1181
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Earlier that year, however, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit had determined in Bailie v. Fisher that the Copyright
Act of 1909 established "a wide range of selection within which discre-
tion must be exercised by the Register in determining what he has no
power to accept."' 189 Because Bailie dealt specifically with the scope of
the 1956 regulation concerning applied art, the Register's authority ex-
tended by inference to determining when "the object is clearly a work
of art in itself."' 190 These cases laid the foundation for the conflict be-
tween the circuits that developed after Congress enacted the Copyright
Act of 1976.191
The legality of the Register's criterion was open to question on
other grounds as well. Regulation Section 202.10(c) appeared to mean
that only "art in the historical and ordinary sense" was copyrightable,
as the District of Columbia Circuit had declared in Bailie.192 Yet, in
the "historical and ordinary sense," art and utility were antithetical by
definition, a position the Copyright Office had maintained for forty
years prior to 1949. On this interpretation, the 1956 regulation implic-
itly resurrected the "dichotomy of. . . beauty and utility" that the
Supreme Court had expressly disapproved in Mazer.193
Until Vacheron in 1958, section 202.10(c) seemed capable of
"holding the line" of copyrightability against designs of useful articles
that practitioners were beginning to register under the authority of
Mazer.194 After Vacheron, further insistence upon the test of aesthetic
(9th Cir. 1983). But the Copyright Act of 1976 may have increased the power of the Register by
authorizing denial ofregistration upon a determination that a claim is invalid. Compare 17 U.S.C.
§ 410(b) (1982) with the implied authority claimed by Berger, supra note 182, at 398.
189. Bailie v. Fisher, 258 F.2d 425,426 (D.C. Cir. 1958)(per curiam)(quoting Bouve v. Twenti-
eth Century-Fox Film Corp., 122 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1941)).
190. Regulation § 202.10(c) (1956), supra text accompanying note 173.
191. In a case arising after passage of the 1976 Act, the Second Circuit adopted a test not
dissimilar from the one it undermined in Vacheron, which led to conflict with the District of
Columbia Circuit once again. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1980); supra note 152 and accompanying text; Reichrnan,After the CopyrightAct, supra note 65, at
323-40.
192. "A thing is a work of art if it appears to be within the historical and ordinary conception
of the term art." Rosenthal v. Stein, 205 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1953), quoted in Bailie v. Fisher,
258 F.2d 425, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1958)(per curiam), defendedin Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp.
939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'don other grounds, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S
908 (1979).
193. 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
194. Once the practicing bar saw what Mazer had to offer, the results staggered the Copyright
Office. Some 3400 ornamental designs of useful articles were registered in 1959; in 1960 the figure
rose to 5800, a 70% increase, "despite the Copyright Office taking a rather resistant, holdthe-line
attitude with respect to. . . how far we should extend the original copyright concept, say, into the
lamp field." Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 58-59 (testimony of Arthur
Fisher)(emphasis added).
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value implicit in the regulation was dangerous in view of Judge Clark's
position t95 In order to minimize the risk of cumulation on the French
model-between copyright law and a design law-the Office needed
another criterion capable of excluding as many ornamental designs as
possible without running afoul of Bleistein and without emptying
Mazer of all meaning.
196
To resolve this predicament the Copyright Office adopted in 1958
a "negative" interpretation of Mazer that sought to avoid the need to
define a "work of art" for legal purposes. 197 In "an effort to 'imple-
ment' the Mazer decision,"'' 9 8 the Office amended section 202.10(c) of
its 1956 regulation by deleting clearly a work of art in itself and in-
serting a test of artistic separability:
If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact
that the article is unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as
a work of art. However, if the shape of a utilitarian article incorpo-
rates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or pictorial repre-
sentation, which can be identjqed separately and are capable of
existing independently as a work of art, such features will be eligible
for registration. 199
195. Id at 59 (testimony of Fisher, who feared that registrations of ornamental designs "might
jump in a short time to many hundreds or thousands percent increase" absent restrictive measures
of Copyright Office pending sui generis legislation that it was helping a committee of experts to
draft).
196. See S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 859.
197. Latman,supra note 9, at 282. The new test, to be introduced officially in 1959, was in use
at least as early as 1958. See Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at 139-40.
198. See REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. REP.
No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54-55 (1976); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-89.
199. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1959), as amended June 18, 1959 (revoked Jan. 1, 1978, 43 Fed.
Reg. 966 (1978))(emphasis added). The entire regulation, which repeats the 1956 regulation in
parts (a) and (b), is set forth below:
§ 202.10 Works of art (Class G).
(a) General. This class includes published or unpublished works of artistic crafts-
manship, insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con-
cerned, such as artistic jewelry, enamels, glassware, and tapestries, as well as works
belonging to the fine arts, such as paintings, drawings and sculpture.
(b) In order to be acceptable as a work of art, the work must embody some crea-
tive authorship in its delineation or form. The registrability of a work of art is not af-
fected by the intention of the author as to the use of the work, the number of copies
reproduced, or the fact that it appears on a textile material or textile product. The poten-
tial availability of protection under the design patent law will not affect the registrability
of a work of art, but a copyright claim in a patented design or in the drawings or photo-
graphs in a patent application will not be registered after the patent has been issued.
(c) If the sole intrinsic function of an article is its utility, the fact that the article is
unique and attractively shaped will not qualify it as a work of art. However, if the shape
of a utilitarian article incorporates features, such as artistic sculpture, carving, or picto-
rial representation, which can be identified separately and are capable of existing inde-
pendently as a work of art, such features will be eligible for registration.
Compare the 1956 text, supra text accompanying note 173.
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The United States Copyright Office thus quietly embraced the
"theory of dissociation" on which the Italian regime of noncumulation
is grounded.2°° The American test of separability, introduced officially
by the 1959 regulation, was an analogue of the Italian test of scin dibillt
adopted by the Italian Copyright Law of 1941.201 This criterion,20 2 if
applied as in Italy, could have excluded even more industrial art from
copyright law than the most rigorous test of aesthetic value.203
2. An Interim Theory of Dissociation. The unity of art theory
asserts that industrial art is art;204 the theory of dissociation starts from
the premise that industrial art is inextricably bound up with industrial
products.205 Industrial products are protected by the laws of industrial
200. The criterion of separability arises from the so-called theory of dissociation, officially
adopted in article 2(4) of the Italian Copyright Law of April 22, 1941 (No. 633), as amended by
Decree No. 195, January 8, 1979,2 COPYRIGHT LAws, supra note 1, Ray item 1. See M. FABIANI,
supra note 96, at 18-30; F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 257-67.
201. See S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 842, 859; F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 263-64, n.254 &
n.258. In 1980, Franel and Gaubiac reconfirmed the use of the separability criterion by both Italy
and the United States. Franel & Gaubiac, supra note 123, at 16; see also Note, Toward a More
Systematic Approach to the Protection ofArt Applied to Industry, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 287,
288 (1959)(this anonymous "note" on Italian law was condensed and translated from DRIrTTO
D'AUTORE 27-32 (Jan.-Mar. 1957)(it was published in its United States version about the time of
the 1959 regulation) [hereinafter cited as Italian Law]; Waldheim, Don't Maim our Copyrights, 7
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 160, 161 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Waldheim, Don't Maim];
Waldheim, The "Anti-Maim" Rule-New Design Bill Shares Majority View Among Nations, 8
BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 359 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Waldheim, New Design Bill]. Italian
writers prefer the term scindibiltz (separability) to the more theoretical notion of "dissociation."
See M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 99.
202. The criterion of separability adopted by the Copyright Office was quickly said to have
"prevented copyright registration for purely functional designs (such as those of automobiles and
refrigerators) which contain no separable pattern or ornamentation." Present Design Protection,
supra note 48, at 139 (emphasis added). According to Professor Latman, the Copyright Office now
viewed Mazer as holding that "a most traditional art form-a human figure" was "not disquali-
fied from protection as a 'work of art' solely because it is embodied in a functional article."
Latman, supra note 9, at 278; see also REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, at 8. But
see 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-96 (rejecting the notion that the figure and the base
were ever separable).
The Copyright Office ignored the unity of art language in Justice Reed's opinion when it
adopted the Italian criterion. See supra note 189. Professor Nimmer implies that the Copyright
Office may have overstepped its authority in so doing. I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-
89.
203. See infra notes 407-12 and accompanying text. The Federal Republic of Germany im-
poses the most stringent test of aesthetic value. Prot-Morel, Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at
386; see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 337-400.
204. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 66. According to Pouillet, the unification of industrial
and artistic designs within a single regime of protection would encourage "the progress of art, that
is, the progress of all that serves to embellish our existence, to lend it charm, of all that responds to
this aspiration for beauty, an ideal that inspires every human soul." E. POUILLET, DEssiNs ET
MODELES, supra note 61, at 54 (trans.).
205. G. SENA, I DiRiTr SULLE INVENZIONI E SUI MODELLI INDUSTRIALI 450 (1976).
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property, which, in Italy, treat ornamental features of "shape, design,
and color" as the subject matter of a special design law.20 6 The ques-
tion then arises as to when elements of shape, design, and color used to
embellish an industrial product may be considered "works of art ap-
plied to industry" and therefore protectible under copyright law
notwithstanding the existence of a special design law. The answer, ac-
cording to the theory of dissociation, is that copyright protection will be
accorded to a work that contains its own message and conserves its
artistic value independently of the material support in which it is
embodied.
20 7
The theory of dissociation was carried to its logical conclusion in
the last reform of relevant Italian law. Article 5 of the Italian Design
Law of 1940 declared expressly that ornamental designs and models
should not be protectible in copyright law.20 8 Article 2(4) of the Italian
Copyright Law of 1941 codified the principle of dissociation by grant-
ing protection to works of art applied to industry "if their artistic value
is separable20 9 [scindibile] from the industrial character of the product
with which they are associated. ' 210 In keeping with the strictures of the
design law, however, the protection afforded by copyright law is not
206. Id. Industrial models normally fall within the special legal regimes established for them
by the Italian Design Law of 1940, supra note 96. Article 5 of this law establishes special protec-
tion for ornamental designs and models while Article 2 protects functional designs as utility mod-
els. Id
207. "Dissociability occurs when the idea is expressed with such creative value as to contain its
own value within itself, so that the [physical] matter constitutes only the vehicle necessary for the
passage of the idea from the spirit of the creator to the spirit of other men." G. SENA, supra note
205, at 453 (quoting Auletta)(trans.).
208. Article 5, Italian Design Law of 1940, supra note 96.
209. The official translation, in COPYRiGHT LAWS, supra note 1, Italy item 1, article 1(4) says:
"if their artistic value is distinct from the industrial character of the product with which they are
associated." (emphasis added). This conveys the sense ofdissociabitz, G.SENA, supra note 205, at
451, more than the sense of scindibile, which is the exclusionary criterion actually used in the
statute. The translators of Italian Law, supra note 201, at 288, use the term "dissociability" for
dissociabiltis while rendering scindibile as "separable." This article adopts the same terminology.
210. Article 2(4), Italian Copyright Law of 1941, supra note 200 (as translated, supra note 209);
see M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 27. After a long period that witnessed the usual tensions be-
tween copyright law (Law of 19 September 1882) and design law (Law of 30 August 1868), the
Italian Copyright Law of 1925 had seemed to resolve matters in favor of the unity of art thesis.
Nevertheless, the Italian High Court, following the views of Piola-Caselli in TRATTATO DEL DIR-
rrro D'AUTORE (1927), "forged the doctrine of dissociation that would establish the frontier be-
tween the regime of copyright law and that of designs and models." F. PERREr, supra note 2, at
257 (trans.). It was this doctrine that the Italian government officially adopted in the Copyright
Law of 1941, only one year after the Design Law of 1940. Id at 257-58; M.A. PEROT-MOREL,
supra note 2, at 94-108. *For the origins of the controversial theory of dissociation in German
idealism, see F. PERRET , supra note 2, at 255-58.
The United Kingdom until 1968 also enforced a regime of noncumulation, which was based,
however, on a criterion of intentions or destination that had at one time also been welcomed by
French and Italian case law. M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 24-25; see supra note 132.
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concurrent.211 If a designer seeking access to copyright law should
properly have looked to Italian design law for protection, as is nor-
mally the case, then protection in copyright law is precluded whether or
not the formal and substantive prerequisites of the design law can effec-
tively be met.212 If a design actually registered under the design law
might have qualified for copyright protection instead, the act of regis-
tration will normally constitute a renunciation of the protection that
copyright law might otherwise have provided.213
By expressly adopting the principle of dissociation, article 2(4) of
the Italian Copyright Law recognized that ornamental designs do con-
tain aesthetically valid features. If most ornamental designs of useful
articles nonetheless fail to qualify for protection as works of applied
art, it is not-in theory-because of their utilitarian character or be-
cause they lack artistic merit. Instead, most designs do not retain the
artistic values they otherwise possess when dissociated or separated
from their material supports because industrial design combines the
aesthetic and useful qualities of a product into an indivisible whole.214
Such designs are fit subjects for the Italian design law: traditionally
they obtained a four-year term of protection on demonstration of nov-
elty and qualitative originality.215
The principle of dissociation is most easily understood in terms of
material separability. The figures on the doors of the Florentine Bap-
tistery would retain their artistic features even if embodied in other
211. Italian Design Law of 1940, art. 5, supra note 96; see Franzosi, Droll Italien, reprinted in
GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 2, at 109-10; F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 258; see also Italian
Law, supra note 201, at 287.
Article 1 of the Italian Copyright Law of 1941, supra note 200, protects "[ilntellectual works
having a creative character. . . whatever their mode or form of expression." Prior to 1941, Italian
copyright law, like French copyright law, protected works "regardless of their merit or destina-
tion." The copyright law of 1941, however, suppressed this formula to avoid conferring upon
trivial objects the broad protection of copyright law. This reinforced the notion of noncumulation
between the two regimes. M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 29.
212. Fran~on, Rapport de synthkse, reprinted in GRENOBLE SYMPOSIUM, supra note 2, at 293
(citing Franzosi and Benussi); Italian Law, supra note 201, at 288. See generally M.A. PEROT-
MOREL, supra note 2, at 94-99. Protection under the design law may be forfeited either by failure
to make timely registration and deposit; or by failure to meet the substantive requirements (nov-
elty and qualitative originality); thus the strict separation between the two regimes can produce
harsh results. Sena, Drolt italien, reprinted in PARIS SymposIuM, supra note 27, at 172.
213. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 97-99.
214. M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 26-27; G. SENA, supra note 205, at 443-44, 451; F. PERRET,
supra note 2, at 258-59; Franzosi, supra note 211, at 109-10.
215. Article 5, Italian Design Law of 1940,supra note 96; G. SENA, supra note 205, at 444,454-
55, 460-61. The four-year period of protection originally conferred by Italian design law was
atypical. In 1977, the design law was amended to increase the term of protection to fifteen years,
the norm within the European Community. Law of 23 May 1977, No. 265; Z.O. ALOARDI, supra
note 61, addendum (Avvertenza).
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media.216 A caryatid supporting an arch is no less sculpture than a
similar figure performing no useful function. The design woven into a
carpet could also be incorporated into a painting. Textile designs, how-
ever, are generally considered an integral part of the fabric itself; for
this reason they are said to lack independent artistic value.217
This simple test of material or physical separability of artistic fea-
tures from the useful article does not exhaust the theory of dissociation.
Scindibilta can result from the mere possibility of conceiving a work
independently of the object in which it is embodied, that is, when the
work possesses "conceptual separability" in the abstract or ideal
sense.218 The form Cellini gave his saltcellar could also have been ap-
plied to a candy container or to an inkpot, arguably without interfering
with the practical uses of these articles. This form would meet the test
of conceptual separability.219 But the abstract capacity to separate
form from object is said to be lacking in the case of most industrial
designs and models.220 According to Professor Perret, a leading de-
fender of the theory,
The shape or "form" of a shoe is not superimposed upon the shoe; it
constitutes the shoe itself and cannot be transposed to another utilita-
rian article, such as a lamp. In the one case, the form appears as an
incidental element in the production of the object, in the other as a
necessary factor.2
21
Dissociation theory subjects "creations of form," whose aesthetic
character is manifested in the lines' and shape of a product, to the de-
216. M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 27 n.49; G. SENA, supra note 205, at 451. But Sena holds
that not just any stylized relief superimposed upon metal panels by means of an industrial process
could qualify as applied art. Id at 452.
217. Although this treatment of fabric designs has been criticized, see, e.g., M. FABIANI, supra
note 96, at 46; G. SENA, supra note 205, at 451, a recent case reported by Sena indicates that these
designs are protectible only under the design law. A scarf (foulard) by a noted designer was
denied copyright protection: "the artistic level, especially in the domain of fashion, is deemed
insufficient." Sena, supra note 212, at 172-73 (trans.). Wallpaper and upholstery designs could
claim copyright protection, according to Algardi, if the artistic elements produced a strong effect.
Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 256-57 (citing no cases). This suggests that their two-dimensional
effect is insufficient of itself to qualify them as applied art.
218. M. F~AIANI, supra note 96, at 28. "Separability or dissociability is. . . conceptual and
should be understood as a possibility that the object lends itself to being enjoyed as a pure aes-
thetic fact, independently of its use as an article that can satisfy other needs." G. SENA, supra note
205, at 452 (trans.).
219. F. PERREr, supra note 2, at 262-63; accord M. FABiANI, supra note 96, at 27 n.49. But see
Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 56-57 ("An object constitutes a unity which the law cannot destroy").
220. Italian courts generally "interpret the separation between artistic value and utility in a
very restrictive fashion." Sena, supra note 212, at 172 (trans.). Hence the protective regime will be
that governing ornamental designs and models. See, e.g., G. SENA, supra note 205, at 453; Italian
Law, supra note 201, at 287-88; see also infra text accompanying notes 399-410.
221. F. PERRr, supra note 2, at 262-63 (trans.). The same reasoning would, according to
Perret, apply to automobiles and furniture. Id at 262.
1185Vol. 1983:1143]
1186 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1983:1143
sign protection law in force. It excludes from copyright law those func-
tional shapes, devoid of ornamentation, that cannot be conceived of
separately from the material objects they "circumscribe in space. '2 22 In
practice, dissociation theory excludes virtually all three-dimensional
designs, because only the design that has been added to the object with-
out losing its autonomous character is ever copyrightable.22 3 In theory,
a criterion of separability should conduct most two-dimensional de-
signs safely into copyright law because such designs "can rarely be con-
sidered an integral part of the useful article. u224 Their incorporation
into an object that will be reproduced in series does not alter their ex-
pressive capacity.225 Dissociation theory thus attempts to distinguish
the subject matter of copyright law from the subject matter of design
law with a high degree of precision; the theory is allegedly more suc-
cessful than others in drawing the distinction without offending the
principle that forbids discrimination on the basis of merit.
22 6
3. Toward an American Regime of Sui Generis Protection. After
Vacheron in 1958, the United States Copyright Office found the Italian
theory of dissociation appealing because of its capacity to distinguish
copyrightable works of applied art from noncopyrightable industrial
designs with at least formal deference to the Bleistein principle of non-
discrimination. Nevertheless, the Copyright Office considered its
222. F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 263; accord Franzosi, supra note 211, at 110; Benussi, supra
note 48, at 119.
223. F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 263 nn.254 & 258, 264-67 (citing an exceptional case in
United States law that proves the rule, namely, that of certain statuettes of Bali dancers incorpo-
rated in a lamp base and accorded copyrightability in Mazer v. Stein); see also S. LADAS, supra
note 2, at 842, 859.
224. F. PERETr, supra note 2, at 263.
225. Id But Italian Courts have rejected the view that two-dimensional designs remain sacro-
sanct once embodied in useful articles. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. Benussi, writ-
ing in 1977, conceded that certain authors exclude the possibility of concurrent protection in
Italian law in all cases, including two-dimensional designs; but he rejected this position. Benussi,
supra note 48, at 121-22.
The exact status of two-dimensional designs embodied in useful articles under current Italian
law may be deemed an "open question." M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 46 (Fabiani used this term
in regard to copyright protection of fabric designs in 1975). If this makes recourse to the design
law a necessary precaution, it would be consistent with the letter of the design law itself, which
expressly recommends total noncumulation (art. 5(2), Italian Design Law of 1940). Nevertheless,
article 2 of the Italian Copyright Law of 1941, which imposed the criterion of separability, does
not expressly mandate recourse to the design law. Benussi, supra note 48, at 121-22; see infra note
405 and accompanying text.
226. See, e.g., M. FABiANI, supra note 120, at 29 ("The criterion of separability adopted by our
system is ... a subtle criterion, but unexceptionable from the theoretical point of view, even if not
always very easy to apply in practice." (citing Ascarelli) (trans.)); F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 264-
65. But see infra note 409 and accompanying text (views of critics). See also Reichman, After the
CopyrightAct, supra note 65, at 324-33 (discussing conceptual separability in the Second Circuit).
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criterion of separability a temporary measure to prevent the premature
expansion of copyright protection of applied art under a broad reading
of Mazer v. Stein.227 Adoption of dissociation theory was merely the
first step toward obtaining a major reform of design legislation that the
Copyright Office hoped would be even more anticumulationist than the
Italian model.228 The second step would involve both completing the
design protection law then under study and strictly defining the new
law's relationship to the copyright law so as to exclude designs of useful
articles from copyright protection. 229 The third step was to obtain
rapid congressional approval of this scheme before the legislative phase
of the general revision of copyright law got under way.230
In keeping with this plan, the Copyright Office had officially
amended the 1956 regulation in 1959, with a view to placing it on a
more defensible legal footing.231 In the amended regulation, the test of
separability justified immediate denial of registration to "purely func-
tional designs. . . such as those of automobiles and refrigerators...
which contain no separable pattern or ornamentation."
232
The copyright officials knew the risks of this maneuver. Persons
close to the Copyright Office publicly deplored weaknesses inherent in
the separability test almost as soon as the 1959 regulation was formally
announced. In October 1959, Barbara Ringer wrote:
The borderline between copyrightable and uncopyrightable designs
is extremely difficult to draw, although the Copyright Office Regula-
tions as recently amended on June 18, 1959 (37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c)),
make the . . . attempt .... The Copyright Office is encountering
serious difficulties in attempting to deal with this problem....
227. The Copyright Office assumed that new design legislation would be quickly approved.
See supra note 171 and accompanying text. Persons close to the Copyright Office criticized the
separability test during 1958-1959, the same period in which the test was officially introduced. See
Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at 139-40; infra note 233 and accompanying text
(Ringer's criticism). Moreover, the provisions of the design bills endorsed by the Copyright Office
in 1959 apparently would have terminated copyright protection of most designs embodied in use-
ful articles, at least as to that industrial embodiment, without regard to separability. This was
implemented by H.R. 8873, the Willis Bill, supra note 158, §§ 28(b), 33, and S. 2075, supra note
158, §§ 27(b), 32, which both proposed amendments to the Copyright Act of 1909. See infra notes
258-63 and accompanying text.
228. See infra text accompanying notes 264-71.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 167-70; supra notes 195, 227.
230. "We are going to Congress, and we are. . . arguing a broad case that industrial design in
this country and in the world indicates the need for sui generis protection.. ." Fisher Address,
supra note 107, at 209.
231. See supra text accompanying notes 197-200.
232. Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at 139; see also Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at
1857 (testimony of Barbara Ringer).
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. . . Most important is the fact that at its present state of develop-
ment the copyright law protects only those designs which can be sep-
arately identified as "works of art" and excludes many aesthetically
superior designs of useful articles. This distinction seems dicult to
justify on the grounds of logic or policy.233
Two mandamus actions challenging the legality of the amended regu-
lation's separability test were already pending against the Register,
with more expected;234 the Copyright Office looked to special design
legislation to obviate the difficulties inherent in that test.235
Recognizing that "the design problem is in ferment internation-
ally" and that there was "general agreement here and abroad that
traditional concepts of patent, copyright and unfair competition law do
not fit the design situation," 236 the Copyright Office had become ac-
tively involved in refining a new bill that was to become "a model for
the whole world." 237 This bill would afford "sharply limited but realis-
tic protection for original designs. . . tailor-made to meet the contem-
porary design situation. ' 238 The project could also block expansion of
state unfair competition law in the design field, which was viewed as a
significant threat.2 39
The bill that emerged in 1959, S. 2075, had benefited from the
contribution of experts in all branches of intellectual property law.
240
233. Ringer, The Casefor Design Protection and the O'Mahoney Bill, 7 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 25, 29-30 (1959) (emphasis added). Ms. Ringer published this article while she was Assis-
tant Chief of the Examining Division, United States Copyright Office.
Even earlier, in February 1958, an unsigned article in the same journal, written in support of
H.R. 8873 (the Willis Bill, supra note 158) declared:
It is illogical to give very long and broad protection to some designs, and to withhold
protection from other designs esthetically as valuable-for example, to permit copyright
registration for the design of a spoon handle in the shape of the Eiffel Tower, but to deny
registration for an unornamented but functionally designed spoon handle.
Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at 139-40.
234. Ringer, supra note 233, at 29-30; see infra notes 419-24 and accompanying text.
235. Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 211.
236. Ringer, supra note 233, at 30-31. Adding "designs to the subject matter of organic copy-
right protection," as in previous bills, was 'just as inappropriate as lumping designs under the
patent laws had been a century before." Id. at 27.
237. Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 211.
238. Ringer, supra note 233, at 31; RIGISTER's DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at
7. George Cary and Barbara Ringer were the Copyright Office's emissaries to the drafting com-
mittee. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 48 (testimony of Judge Giles S. Rich).
239. Ringer, supra note 233, at 29-30; see infra notes 419-24 and accompanying text.
240. S. 2075, supra note 158, introduced May 28, 1959. The basis for discussion had been the
Willis Bill, H.R. 8873, supra note 158, introduced July 23, 1957. The new bill, known as the
O'Mahoney-Wiley-Hart Bill, was presented to the 86th Congress. See Latman, supra note 169, at
280. For the committee of experts, see supra notes 169-70. Questions addressed by similar groups
of foreign experts were in this way approached without the nationalistic infighting that seems to
have choked off some of the more promising innovations that had been developed overseas. See
supra notes 114-15. But see infra note 347 (divisions among leading United States scholars).
1188 [Vol. 1983:1143
DESIGN PROTECTION
A basic premise of the bill's supporters was that full copyright protec-
tion of industrial designs was "too broad and vague."24 1 They also dis-
missed the misappropriation theory of unfair competition law as
grounded on "virtually nonexistent standards."2 42 Nevertheless, unlike
foreign reform proposals, the new design bill was to "rest generally on
the concept of originality, which in a broad sense can be called the
principle of copyright. a24 3 There would be no requirement "that the
design be either 'inventive' or novel-the fundamental stumbling
blocks of design patent law."244 The bill's supporters rejected the pat-
ent approach as too narrow, inflexible, slow and costly for the fast-
moving, short-lived products of competitive industries; too absolute in
its scope of protection; and too susceptible to the "judicial hostility"
241. Ringer, supra note 233, at 30; see supra notes 108-09 (views of Fisher). Bogsch, apprais-
ing the reform from the perspective of foreign law, warned that the copyright requirement of "a
work of art" could exclude many categories of attractive and distinctive designs not rising to the
required level; hence copyright protection risked being too narrow. Bogsch, supra note 106, at 5.
Among the "numerous practical and theoretical disadvantages" of copyright protection, Reg-
ister Fisher drew attention to the duration of such protection; to the fact that copyright law would
protect even designs not applied to an article of utility; and to the need for a system of registration
as recognized "both domestically and internationally." Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra
note 115, at 56, 57, 61, 63 (testimony and statement of Arthur Fisher). But see Duchemin, supra
note 71, at 184-85 (concerning registration).
242. Ringer, supra note 233, at 30. "By extending common law concepts of unfair competition
to the design field, and with the tendency to eliminate the elements of 'passing off' or misrepresen-
tation, not merely a long term but a perpetual set of rights may be created. A number of recent
cases illustrate this tendency." Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 57 (statement
of Arthur Fisher); see infra notes 419-24 and accompanying text.
243. Ringer, supra note 233, at 31; see also Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at
61 (testimony of Arthur Fisher); Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 209-10 ("the pending bills are
all based essentially on principles of originality and copyright"); supra note 147.
244. Ringer, supra note 233, at 31; see also Latman, supra note 169, at 281 ("Original in the
sense of independent creation, created without copying"). This was to be implemented in S. 2075,
supra note 158, by sections 1(a) and 2 when read together. In contrastforeign design laws require
at least a novelty test, and most of them also require a qualitative originality test akin to nonobvi-
ousness in the United States Design Patent Law, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103, 171 (1982). See supra
notes 109, 121, 125. The foreign law requirement will usually be termed "qualitative originality"
in this paper in order to distinguish it from originality in the copyright sense.
Whether S. 2075 as drafted truly implemented a test of mere "independent creation," as its
sponsors contended, is open to question. The ambiguity arose in part from section 2(a), which
excluded "a design that is staple or commonly known." S. 2075 §§ 2(a), 3, supra note 158. Patent
lawyers at the time spotted the ambiguity of section 2. See Resolution of the Milwaukee Patent
Law Association, Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 93-94; Design Protection
Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 181 (letter from Robert C. Watson, Commissioner of Patents).
Patent law specialists have again pointed to the same ambiguity in a recent successor bill (H.R. 20,
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1983). See Fryer, Protection of Ornamental Designs of UsefulArticles-The
Legislative Opportunity, reprinted in ABA-SEcTION OF PATENT, TRADEMAKR AND COPYRIGHT
LAW, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 166-67 (1982)(uncommon design and uncommon variation re-
quirements); infra text accompanying notes 581-98.
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that was characterized as "usual." 245 Yet repeal of the design patent
statute was neither proposed nor desired.
246
To qualify for protection under the proposed design law, a mini-
mum degree of creative content was required: standard, commonplace,
or staple designs were expressly excluded.247 Instead of the search of
prior art required by the design patent law, the bill provided for "an
'administrative' screening process, similar to the trademark opposition
procedure." 248 The design to be protected would "relate. . .to (1) the
appearance (2) of a useful article. Thus the utility of the article, while a
touchstone to coverage, is not what is being protected. ' 249 The bill ex-
245. Ringer, supra note 233, at 25-26. In introducing H.R. 8873 (known as the Willis Bill),
supra note 158, Representative Willis suggested that patent law was not the place to deal with
design protection. 103 CONG. REC. 12,504-05 (1957). "The novelty search was costly, time-con-
suming, and not always ... realistic" and the standard of "invention or nonobviousness" was
"impossible. . .to meet." Bogsch, supra note 106, at 4-7. Expense and delay were prohibitive:
in 1959, a lapse of one year between filing and issuance was typical; only about 12% of design
patents were issued in six months or less, 52% took one year or more, 12% took more than two
years, and there was a backlog of 8700 design patent applications pending or awaiting action.
Ringer, supra note 233, at 25-26. "Patents for designs have been difficult to obtain and more
difficult to sustain and many have felt it was not worth the effort and the protection illusory."
Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 51 (testimony of Judge Giles S. Rich).
Professor Brown discovered that the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
the country's foremost intellectual property court, had upheld only two design patents between the
1920's and the 1970's. B. KAPLAN & R. BROWN, CASES ON COPYRIGHT 158, n.N (3d ed. 1978).
Statistics recently published by the Patent and Trademark Office show an invalidation rate at the
appellate level of 100 percent for the period 1968-1972, and 67 percent for the period 1973-
1977. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE STUDY OF COURT DETERMINATIONS OF PATENT
VALIDITY/INvALIDITY, 1973-1977,reprintedin PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) no. 455,
D-1 (Nov. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as PTO INVALIDATION STUDY]. On the period 1973-1977,
see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 308-12, 333-61 (reports new trend for
1974-1983).
246. "[l]t is agreed that there is an area appropriate for design patents where invention can be
established, where novelty can be established and where the greater protection that follows from
being able to assume this burden is appropriate. The proposed legislation does nothing to disturb
design patents." Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 208. This position was consistently main-
tained. See, e.g., Latman, supra note 169, at 284; REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note
36, ch. VII, at 12.
247. Despite the requirement of originality in the sense of independent creation (not copied),
see supra note 243, the protected design, although not subject to "any test of novelty, unobvious-
ness, or inventiveness ... cannot be so staple or commonly known as to lack a minimum of
creativity." Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 70 (statement of Alan Latman).
Section 3 of S. 2075, supra note 158, required substantial adaptations of matter otherwise in the
public domain. For the difficulties of reconciling these provisions, see infra text accompanying
notes 581-98.
248. Latman, supra note 169, at 281, 283;see § 12 of S. 2075, supra note 158. This was more in
line with the trend in foreign design law. See, e.g., Englert, supra note 96, at 784.
249. Latman, supra note 169, at 280. Under S. 2075, the protected design "consists of those
original elements of a useful article that are intended to give the article an ornamental appear-
ance." S. 2075 § l(b)(1), supra note 158; see also Bogsch, supra note 106, at 6 (protectible design
must at least be "attractive and distinctive").
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cluded designs dictated solely by the function or purpose of the article
embodying the design.250 The term of protection was to be five years,
reduced from an earlier proposal of ten years that was felt to go "far
beyond the needs of most segments of industry. '251 The proposed law
also required registration within six months from the time the design
was "made known," to avoid technical forfeiture.
252
The United States "design copyright law" proposed in 1959 was to
operate side-by-side with the preexisting design patent law. The design
patent law would continue to afford short-term protection to ornamen-
tal designs of useful articles against identical or substantially similar
designs even when independently created, provided that the prerequi-
sites of ornamentality, novelty, and nonobviousness had been met.
253
The design copyright law would offer short-term protection to orna-
mental designs of useful articles that were "created without copying"
against unauthorized copying but not against independent creation.
254
The dual regime of design protection that resulted was a major innova-
250. S. 2075 § 2(c), supra note 158. This excluded utility models. See infra text accompanying
notes 377-86.
251. S. 2075 § 5, supra note 158; see Latman, supra note 169, at 282. Duration was not a major
issue.
252. S. 2075 §§ 4, 9(a), supra note 158. A design was to be "made known" when, "by the
proprietor of the design or with his consent, an article embodying the design is anywhere publicly
exhibited, publicly distributed or offered for sale, or sold." S. 2075 § 4(b), supra note 158. Regis-
tration required an oath under section 9(d) that the design had in fact been "made known."
The fact that technical forfeiture would occur for failure to register within six months after
the design was made known was not necessarily inconsistent with the notion of a "design copy-
right" in view of the technical forfeitures for publication without notice then normal under the
1909 Copyright Law.
253. "Because of the broader scope of patent protection, however, it was provided that design
protection under the bill would terminate as soon as a design patent issued." Latman, supra note
169, at 284; see also REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 14-15. The duration of protection
in design patent law is 3-1/2, 7 or 14 years.
254. S. 2075 § 8(d), supra note 158. Register Fisher testified that the new bill's "prohibition
against actual copying is all that is desirable in the public interest -or for the protection of the
creative designer." Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 56 (testimony of Arthur
Fisher).
Foreign design law, even if it demands high subject matter prerequisites, rarely protects
against more than "actual copying." M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 19. This anomaly is
criticized particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany where subject matter prerequisites
include a form of nonobviousness but protection extends to copying only. See, e.g., Englert, supra
note 96, at 778-79. Continuation of the Design Patent Law along with S. 2075 helped to ward offa
similar anomaly in the American reform. Without the design patent law, the apparently low sub-
ject matter prerequisites of sections 1 and 2 of S. 2075, see supra note 158, could tend to drift
upwards toward the novelty and nonobviousness platforms vacated by a repealed design patent
law.
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tion despite its imperfections.255 By allowing users to choose the kind
of design protection they needed without seeking to reconcile the pat-
ent and copyright approaches in a single legal regime, the proposed law
departed from the AIPPI's Tokyo Resolution of 1966, which had inva-
riably given rise to design laws based on the industrial property
paradigm.25
6
The line of demarcation to be established between the new design
law and the Copyright Act of 1909 was crucial to the success of this
proposal. Would a manufacturer, offered a choice between soft design
protection on soft terms for five years or hard design protection on hard
terms for a maximum of fourteen years, also be entitled to claim soft
protection on soft terms for up to fifty-six years in copyright law?
Could a designer circumvent both components of a dual regime of de-
sign protection by asserting that a particular design possessed "separa-
ble" artistic values or that it otherwise constituted a "work of applied
art?"
The group of American experts answered both questions in the
negative. 257 They said that the line of demarcation between copyright
law and design protection law should be based on the "usefulness" of
255. Bogsch, supra note 106, at 9. The term "dual system" was used by Arthur Fisher in his
last public address, which urged the American Bar Association to support sui generis design legis-
lation. Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 210.
As to imperfections: "The draftsmen of S. 2075 have not solved all of the problems since they
were faced with the need for a delicate balance of interests which defies the drafting of a perfect
piece of legislation in this area." Latman, supra note 169, at 286. Perhaps the biggest defect of the
dual regime was a lack of clarity concerning the requirement that proteetible designs not be "sta-
ple or commonplace." See S. 2075, supra note 158, § 2 (uncommon design), § 3 (substantial revi-
sion of common design); see also infra text accompanying notes 581-600.
256. For the statement of basic points to guide future design legislation endorsed by the Asso-
ciation for the Protection of Industrial Property (AIPPI) in 1966, see S. LADAS, supra note 2, at
868-71. For a major reform adopted in this period, see, for example, Reichman, After the Copy-
right Act, supra note 65, at 293-97 (the Benelux reform). The 1959 American proposal seemed to
anticipate some of the criticism that would be leveled at the generation of design laws influenced
by the AIPPI model. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 366-73.
257. See Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 210. Technically speaking, the negative answers
had been given by section 28 of the Willis Bill of 1957 and in the proposed amendment to section
33 of the Copyright Act the bill contained. See H.R. 8873 (Willis Bill), supra note 158. The effect
of the Willis Bill would have been to amend the Copyright Act so that "an ornamental design of a
useful article shall not be subject to copyright under the Copyright Law." Bogsch, supra note 106,
at 10. The same approach was then carried over into sections 27 and 32 of S. 2075. This was
consistent with efforts of the Copyright Office, after Mazer v. Stein, to "resist. . . the trend toward
long-term copyright claims in the design of useful articles." Design Protection Hearings 1960,
supra note 115, at 57 (statement of Arthur Fisher). But vested interests launched so powerful an
attack on these provisions that the sponsors subsequently backed down. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 272-98.
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the article in which the design or work of art was embodied. 258 A
broad definition of a "useful article" was accordingly drafted to include
"an article normally having an intrinsic function other than merely to
portray its own appearance or to convey information."259  Under this
definition, works of fine art were not useful articles "because their nor-
mal and intrinsic function is to portray their own appearance"; simi-
larly, books, maps or documentary films did not fall within this
definition because they "convey information." 260
258. S. 2075 §§ l(b)(l), (2), 32, surpra note 158. "[T]here no longer would remain the impossi-
ble task of determining what is a 'work of art.' Substituted is the inquiry as to utility which, while
by no means a simple one, seems much more appropriate and workable." Latman, supra note 169,
at 280.
If S. 2075 was intended to repulse "vested interests," see supra note 257, the method was
subtle. In theory, the designer or manufacturer who took the position that his three-dimensional
model was not applied to a useful article could place a copyright notice on it and attempt to ignore
the design law. In practice, the very existence of a sui generis law protecting designs of useful
articles made this option risky because failure to obtain timely registration of the design of a
useful article under the design law forfeited all protection. Hence, a designer or manufacturer in
doubt, while contending that his models were not "designs of useful articles," was nonetheless
induced to register in design law lest all protection be lost if a court found the model in fact to be a
"design of a useful article." To register under the proposed design law, the applicant had to
declare that the article was a useful article by indicating its utility under section 9(c)(3) of S. 2075.
This specification would almost certainly have entailed mandatory exclusion from copyright law
under section 32 of S. 2075 (which proposed an amendment to the Copyright Act of 1909). (Com-
pare the similar effect of registration under the Italian Design Law of 1940, discussed supra in text
accompanying note 213.) If it were subsequently determined that the article was not a useful
article despite the above-mentioned declaration, the design protection rights were nonetheless ex-
pressly preserved by section 9(e) of the bill.
As to nonembodied two-dimensional designs, as well as two-dimensional drawings or photo-
graphs of three-dimensional objects, the proposed design law would arguably have eliminated
both the preexisting exception permitting copyright in models derived from cartoons and protec-
tion in copyright law for the two-dimensional design if "utilized in the design of a useful article."
S. 2075 §§ 27, 32, supra note 158; see infra notes 311-23 and accompanying text. Once again, the
safe approach was to register any two-dimensional design or drawing of an article that could be
useful as "the design of a useful article" when the article was about to be marketed. In this event,
copyright protection as to the useful article, but not as to its two-dimensional representation, was
lost by operation of section 32 of the design law, which would have modified the Copyright Law
of 1909.
259. S. 2075 §§ l(b)(2), 32, supra note 158 (which would have introduced the same language
into the Copyright Act of 1909). This definition was carried over from the Willis Bill. Cf. Copy-
right Act of 1976 § 101, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)(final definition of a useful article).
260. Bogsch, supra note 106, at 7 (referring to the Willis Bill); Latman, supra note 169, at 280.
A goblet on display would remain a useful article because it normally had an intrinsic (utilitarian)
function related to drinking. Id. But what if a painting were later embodied in a tray; would it
become the design of a useful article and, as a tray, be governed by the design bill while retaining
copyright protection as a painting? Such a solution would have implemented the approach of the
Roscioni Report of 1962, see supra note 115; Prrot-Morel, Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 389.
The Roscioni proposal would have protected the painting as a work of art in copyright law, while
forcing products to which the painting was applied, such as an upholstery design, into a special
design law. Id Sections 27 and 32 of S. 2075 can be read this way, and Bogsch thought that the
Willis Bill had clearly taken this option. Bogsch, supra note 106, at 10.
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Design protection attached only after embodiment in the useful
article, and normally after disclosure through marketing.261 Until de-
sign protection attached, the design, if a work of art not embodied in a
useful article, would retain any copyright protection it had.262 After
disclosure through marketing, the design of the useful article would be
protected only by design law; even if a work of art, it would become
ineligible for copyright protection against other useful articles. A pre-
viously copyrighted work of art later "utilized in the design of a useful
article" would similarly cease to enjoy copyright protection as to the
useful article, which would instead be governed by the design law.
263
"Industrial designs" were in this way to be quarantined and lim-
ited to a term of protection that could vary from a minimum of three
and one-half to a maximum of fourteen years and that would in prac-
tice seldom exceed five years, a lead-time period.2 " The line of demar-
cation with copyright law, the weakest link in any special regime of
design protection,265 was to be defended by a policy of anticumulation
that rigorously excluded commercially exploited designs of useful arti-
cles.266 Every temptation of the unity of art thesis to which individual
Register Fisher may not have gone this far, however, or having gone this far, may have
deemed it prudent to pull back. See FisherAddress, supra note 107, at 208 ("I think here is where
we should wrestle with improvement of the legislation"). Professor Latman argued that the paint-
ing applied to a tray was not the "design of a useful article," because "use as a tray would not be
the intrinsic function of the painting." Latman, supra note 169, at 280 (emphasis added).
261. The Register of Copyrights opposed registration of drawing board designs without actual
manufacture of the object portrayed, to avoid harassment of manufacturers. Design Protection
Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 63 (testimony of Arthur Fisher); see Latman, supra note 169, at
282.
262. S. 2075 § 29, supra note 158. If the design had no copyright protection in this period, it
would look to the common law. Latman, supra note 169, at 282, 285.
263. S. 2075 §§ 27, 29, 32, supra note 158; Latman, supra note 169, at 282, 285. This was called
a "terminable copyright." Waldheim, Don't Maim, supra note 201, at 160-61. Bogsch applauded
this concept. Bogsch, supra note 106, at 10; see also Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at
141. After the expiration of design protection, the proprietor would lose his exclusive rights to the
design of the useful article under both copyright and design laws. "His trademark and unfair
competition rights may, however, be significant," and in any event the proprietor continued to
enjoy the full term of copyright protection "against unauthorized appropriation of the work in any
non-useful application (e.g., use as a drawing or in a motion picture)." Latman, supra note 169, at
285.
264. See supra note 253. "I suggest that the very shortness of the term may become an impor-
tant protection to industry from excessive damage claims in future design suits." Fisher Address,
supra note 107, at 209; cf infra notes 374-76 and accompanying text (effects of four-year term in
Italian design law prior to 1977).
265. See Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at 140; Bogsch, supra note 106, at 10 (the
Willis Bill "permitt[ed] no restrictive 'categories' with the difficulties of definition and jurisdic-
tional demarcation"); cf Pdrot-Morel, Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 390, 393 (fundamental
problem of specific design legislation in all national judicial systems is its relation to copyright).
266. "[The stretching of the copyright law to cover ornamental designs of useful articles is
rapidly developing an attitude of vested interest in long-term rights of an undesirable nature in a
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judges might succumb in dealing with particularly appealing designs or
particularly grievous acts of misappropriation was thus precluded as a
matter of law.
To its supporters, this scheme could reconcile the different needs
of different categories of users by allowing them to choose the kind of
design protection that best suited their interests without necessarily
submitting to the rigors of industrial property law and without any pos-
sibility of obtaining the long duration of copyright law.267 In effect,
S. 2075 had unified the treatment of industrial art within a coherent
legal framework by eliminating many of the inconsistencies that other-
wise accrued from the distinction between copyrightable "applied art"
and noncopyrightable "industrial designs." The subject matter that the
Berne Convention had artificially divided between copyright law and
design law at Brussels in 1948268 would be reunited within a two-
pronged American regime that operated outside the copyright system.
An ad interim "separability" test would no longer discriminate in favor
of two-dimensional designs or three-dimensional kitsch;269 borderline
items that had crept into copyright law after Mazer v. Stein, such as
jewelry, dolls and toys, might be rejected;270 and discredited or "de-
monstrably unreliable" legal criteria that emphasized the intentions of
the author or the number of copies to be produced or, above all, the
aesthetic value of the work in question were to be avoided.271
diversity of articles and industries." Design Protection Hearings 1960,supra note 115, at 57 (state-
ment and testimony of Arthur Fisher); see supra note 257.
267. S. 2075 § 28, supra note 158. "S. 2075. . . should give creative designers and the indus-
tries they serve, particularly the smaller and medium-sized firms. . . the short-term protection
they are entitled to ... . [it should [also] relieve the copyright law and the Copyright Office
from an increasingly difficult and undesirable burden. ... Design Protection Hearings 1960,
supra note 115, at 57 (statement of Arthur Fisher).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 97-104.
269. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
270. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 20 (letter from L. Quincy Mumford,
Librarian of Congress). The aim of expelling costume jewelry can be inferred from the general
policy of repulsing "vested interests." See, e.g., supra note 266. But Bogsch, then at the Copyright
Office, thought otherwise: "Most items ofjewelry, for example, such as a necklace or an ornamen-
tal pin, portray only their own appearance and having no utilitarian or functional purpose would
remain protectible by the present copyright law. But a cufflink performing a useful function...
would probably fall under the new design law." Bogsch, supra note 106, at 10. The willingness of
courts to find jewelry a "useful article" as defined in S. 2075 thus could not be taken for granted
even then. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 326-27, 375-77.
271. Latman, supra note 169, at 280. Despite introduction of the separability test, which offi-
cially entered United States law for the first time with Regulation Section 202.10(c), June 18, 1959,
see supra note 199, the Register conceded, under questioning, that ornamental designs were in fact
subject to a test of aesthetic value before being accepted for registration. See Design Protection
Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 83 (testimony of Arthur Fisher).
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Critics of the scheme set forth in S. 2075 found it open to attack on
a number of grounds. Any line of demarcation based on the nature of
the material support derogated from the fundamental concept of the
"work" and seemed to reinstate the old dichotomy of art and utility.272
Dissatisfaction with attempts to separate designs and models from ar-
tistic property had led to the unity of art position in France and later to
the compromise at Brussels. Viewed from this perspective, the Ameri-
can proposal embodied in S. 2075 could be, and was, compared to re-
gimes antedating the effective recognition of applied art by the Berne
Union in 1948. For this and other reasons, the bill was criticized as out
of line with the prevailing international position.
273
Another ground of attack was that S. 2075 "maimed" the concept
of copyright by terminating the protection of subsequent works to
which the originally protectible work had been applied. 274 For exam-
ple, a cartoon character protected in copyright law as a work of art
would cease to be protectible against embodiments of that character in
useful articles once the copyright owner had himself authorized such
an embodiment in a T-shirt or a toy doll, and the period of special
design protection had expired. Critics said such termination maimed
the copyright in the cartoon in derogation of general principles of copy-
right law. 275
272. According to this view, use of the material support as the real basis for exclusion from
copyright law makes decisions concerning protectibility turn on a factor completely exterior to the
creation itself. See, e.g., F. PERu--r, supra note 2, at 242; supra notes 42, 56 and accompanying
text. Nevertheless, proponents of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 117, negotiated
in the 1960's, placed emphasis on the material support. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act,
supra note 65, at 293-97.
273. "Perhaps the drafters of S. 2075 inserted these provisions because it is difficult to define
an exact dividing line between useful articles which embody works of art and those which embody
merely design. So the proponents of this bill resolved the difficulty by erasing the line and by
assuming that art ceases to be art when it becomes part of a useful article." Waldheim, Don't
Maim, supra note 201, at 161, reprinted in Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 25.
Waldheim was counsel to Walt Disney Productions, Inc. Senator Talmadge, sponsor of the op-
posing bill, S. 2852, which Disney Productions favored, introduced Waldheim's article into the
record. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 24 (statement of Senator Talmadge).
The world trend, according to this group, favored the unity of art position. See Design Protec.
tion Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 31, 35 (testimony of Arnall, who relied on material concern-
ing United Kingdom and New Zealand law); supra note 132 (atypical situation in United
Kingdom). A later claim by Finniss, Director of the French National Institute of Industrial Prop-
erty, supra note 52, at 628-29, about a world trend towards the unity of art position was introduced
at the 1965 Hearings by the same group. See Design Protection Hearings 1965, supra note 114, at
48-49 (testimony and statement of Ellis Arnall). For the role of Finniss abroad, see supra notes
114-15.
274. Waldheim, Don't Maim, supra note 201, at 160.
275. Waldheim, Don't Maim, supra note 201, reprinted in Design Protection Hearings 1960,
supra note 115, at 25. The concept of a terminable copyright, however, was a key feature of the
Roscioni Report to the European Community in 1962. See supra notes 115, 260.
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This argument ignored the fact that industrial designs are legal
hybrids that partake both of artistic and industrial property law. Poli-
cies favoring the protection of the design of a useful article qua artistic
work may thus interfere with policies favoring free competition in the
"material supports" in which the self-proclaimed artistic work has been
embodied. Indeed, it is precisely the capacity of works of applied art to
compete in both the market for artistic works and in the general prod-
ucts market that aggravates the design problem; no facile invocation of
general principles of copyright law will make this two-market conun-
drum disappear.276 To say that a copyrighted work of art is normally
protected when transformed into a different artistic medium is not a
sufficient answer to questions concerning the desirability of encumber-
ing trade on the general products market simply because a given prod-
uct also makes use of a copyrighted work.277 It does not seem
unreasonable to limit, on economic grounds, the applicability of artistic
copyrights to useful articles, when useful articles are normally gov-
erned by industrial property regimes that impose stringent precondi-
tions to restraints on free competition.278
For this reason, article 2(5) of the Berne Convention, as revised at
Brussels in 1948, permitted member states to determine the applicabil-
ity of domestic copyright laws to works of applied art as well as the
conditions under which such works should be protected.279 If terminat-
ing the copyright in a doll made from a cartoon character is not a tech-
nique widely used abroad, this is not necessarily because other
countries are as respectful of the "totality of copyright" as is France
under the unity of art theory.280 The trend in foreign law after 1958,
276. See, e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 13 ("Industrial aesthetics, born under the sign of the
most ferocious competition, is devoted to purely commercial objectives.") (trans.); Gaubiac, supra
note 48, at 3.
277. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 56 (testimony of Arthur Fisher); ac-
cord F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 13 (given comparable technical quality and resale prices, the
appearance of the product may become determinant, especially when supply exceeds demand);
infra text accompanying note 286 (quoting Register Fisher); see also 1 M. NiMMER, supra note 1,
§ 2.08[B], at 2-96.1 (two-market discussion).
278. See. e.g., Bogsch, supra note 106, at 5; Denicola, supra note 20, at 723-27; Note, supra
note 10, at 1527, 1532-34. Within copyright law itself, there is a relationship between the nature of
the subject matter and the strength of the copyright protection to be granted. A. LATMAN, supra
note 160, at 29; see, e.g., Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 132
(1979)(copyright in a management training program is said to be "thin").
279. See supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text. Supporters of S. 2075 could also claim
that it conferred copyright protection, not patent-type protection, and that both the Berne and
Geneva Conventions permitted member countries to limit the duration of protection accorded
applied art. See supra notes 27, 101 and accompanying text.
280. A statement by Finniss endorsing "the principle of 'totality of copyright,"' see Finniss,
supra note 52, at 629, was introduced at the 1965 Hearings by the group that had opposed S. 2075.
See Design Protection Hearings 1965, supra note 114, at 48-49 (testimony and statement of Ellis
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contrary to assertions made at that time, was away from the unity of art
position and toward regimes of partial cumulation.281 These regimes
tend to admit a limited number of exceptional designs to copyright law
while relegating the rest to special design laws of varying degrees of
efficacy.282 Accordingly, these regimes have little need for a "termina-
ble copyright. 2
8 3
The decision of the drafters of S. 2075 to use the useful article to
demarcate between copyright and design protection law was not rooted
in the notion that ornamental designs of useful articles were "less valu-
able aesthetically or culturally than 'works of fine art,'" whatever the
United States position had been in the past.284 Instead, they chose this
line of demarcation primarily because "the impact of long term statu-
tory protection upon the consuming public and the national economy is
much greater in the field of useful commodities than. . in the area of
fine arts" and because "articles. . . bought for use have much greater
economic significance than those. . bought solely for display."2 85 As
Arnall, Counsel to Walt Disney Productions); see also id at 23 (statement of Senator Tal-
madge)(commendable goal to preserve "the totality of copyright protection").
281. After the Lisbon Revision of the Paris Convention in 1958 the "movement for absorption
of industrial designs and models into the law of artistic property seems to have spent itself." S.
LADAS, supra note 2, at 837 (who otherwise appears sympathetic to the unity of art position). The
judge-made regime of partial cumulation in the Federal Republic of Germany remains the oldest
and most characteristic exemplar of this system within the European Community. P6rot-Morel,
Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 383. The latest converts in Western Europe to legislated at-
tempts at partial cumulation include the Nordic Countries, that is, Finland, Denmark, Norway,
and Sweden, and the Benelux Countries, that is, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. See
supra note 117; Ptrot-Morel, Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 385-86. For the recommendation
of the Commission of European Communities in 1977 that regimes of partial cumulation should
be adopted, see Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 68-69. For the view that the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has installed a regime of partial cumulation in the United States, see generally
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65.
282. Under such circumstances, the demand for full copyright protection for designs of useful
articles can turn out to mean very little protection in practice because few designs meet the courts'
elevated subject matter requirements. See, e.g., V. von Pilgrim, supra note 7, at 118. But see S.
LADAS, supra note 2, at 840-41. Ladas made too much of a 1954 decision in the Federal Republic
of Germany thought to open a liberal phase in copyright law. This decision was atypical in what
otherwise continued to be the most restrictive regime in the European Community other than
Italy. See, e.g., E. ULMER, supra note 7, at 148; Reimer, supra note 91, at 44-45.
283. Arguably, the need for a "terminable copyright" decreased despite endorsement by the
Roscioni Report itself, see supra notes 115, 260 and accompanying text, because the leading Euro-
pean Community countries already were, or would soon become, so heavily committed to the
industrial property paradigm in the field of design protection. P6rot-Morel, supra note 126, at 146.
It therefore became increasingly difficult to obtain a copyright in the design of any useful article in
the first instance. See generally Reichman,After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 283-97 ("The
Benelux Experience"), 333-40 ("Partial Cumulation in the German Manner").
284. Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at 140. Register Fisher stressed the artistic va-
lidity of contemporary design, including the work of American designers. Design Protection Hear-
ings 1960, supra note 115, at 58, 81-82 (testimony of Arthur Fisher).
285. Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at 140.
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Register Fisher put it in 1960: "The appearance of the container may
turn out to be the single most important fact in the marketing, sale, and
distribution of the commodity, with corresponding need of protection
to the company that develops the new appearance so the design will not
quickly be stolen and copied." 286
The breadth of protection accorded applied art in countries fol-
lowing the unity of art thesis magnified these economic concerns. Reg-
ister Fisher warned against
misapplying the copyright law that was developed for totally differ-
ent purposes, with its long term and a whole series of different for-
malities, to the broad scope of American industry in which design
today is a simple fact and where no more than a short 5- to 15-year
term is appropriate.2
87
The drafters of S. 2075 did not drive works of applied art into a design
law based on the patent-law paradigm, as had many European re-
gimes.288 The American proposal attempted to relegate applied art to a
mini-regime of copyright law, which would coexist with a stricter re-
gime of design patent law, in return for a shortened period of protec-
tion. At a time when copyright protection abroad was being cut back,
because of what were widely perceived to be the excesses of the copy-
right approach, the United States scheme, as originally proposed,
sought to expand the protection available for ornamental designs to a
very broad base of users. 289 This scheme sought to provide short-term
protection, against copying only, to virtually all producers of both two-
and three-dimensional designs, including artisans and small industrial
users, instead of long-term copyright protection to a few privi-
286. Fisher Address, supra note 107, at 207.
287. FisherAddress, supra note 107, at 209. In 1961, the new Register of Copyrights, Abraham
Kaminstein, declared:
We do not believe... that it would be appropriate to extend the copyright law to indus-
trial designs as such. In this area there is a delicate balance between the need for protec-
tion on the part of those who originate and invest in a design, and the possible effect of
protection, if overextended, in restraining competition.
REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 13.
288. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 366-73.
289. The American proposal in S. 2075, while allowing patent protection for a few exceptional
designs, gave most designs a form of copyright protection they could not generally acquire abroad,
albeit at the price of a short term of duration. See Bogsch, supra note 106, at 9; cf. V. von Pilgrim,
supra note 7, at 118 ("my proposal to remove applied art from copyright law and to protect it
under a separate law is intended to improve the legal status of these works in theory and in
practice .... [An adequate legal protection of applied design. . . currently does not exist, de-
spite the existence of two laws, owing to the demarcation lines drawn by the case law.") (trans.
Reinhardt Sonnenberger). Only the unity of art position gave more protection. See supra notes
70-78 and accompanying text.
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leged users or certain sectors of industry and short-term,
patent-type protection to manufacturers of exceptional designs. 290
The solution proposed by the committee of experts in 1959 suf-
fered from being ahead of its time29' rather than from the regressive
tendencies attributed to it by a powerful lobby.292 Far from "maiming"
copyright law, the reforms embodied in S. 2075 would have checked
the drift toward giving "too few designs. . . too much protection" that
followed Mazer v. Stein .293 The late Arthur Fisher, who as Register of
Copyrights had championed S. 2075, explained its importance in a pro-
phetic statement shortly before his death:
It isn't a matter of doing nothing and then finding that the prob-
lem has taken care of itself. If nothing is done, the problem will in-
crease in complexity and without the protective features that have
been carefully worked out here. And I believe that this is not only
the experience here in the United States but in the world at large. I
think ... the matter has become so urgent that we should deal with
it promptly before we find vested interests in different industries, as
we have found in other situations, and where it will be much more
difficult in a few years to deal with the matter effectively.
294
290. See, e.g., Duchemin, supra note 71, at 184-85; Duchemin, supra note 2, at 73-77 (criticiz-
ing the bias against artisans and the small- and medium-sized producers under most current re-
gimes); supra note 288.
291. See infra text accompanying notes 610-12, 624; see also Z. 0. ALGARDI, stra note 61, at
351-52; Duchemin, supra note 2, at 82; supra note 289 (view of von Pilgrim). For the view that the
Willis Bill (forerunner of S. 2075) was in the mainstream of national and international reforms,
see Bogsch, supra note 106, at 11-15 (he is now Director General of the World Intellectual Prop-
erty Organization (WIPO)).
292. The Justice Department and certain industries registered formal objections to the reform
of design protection as an unnecessary restraint on trade. See Design Protection Hearings 1960,
supra note 115, at 19 (letter from Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General). Id at 85-88
(address by Mayers, counsel to General Electric Co.).
The motion picture industry, and especially Walt Disney Productions, organized the effective
lobby against S. 2075. Spokesmen for Disney included Franklin Waldheim (whose articles are
cited supra at note 201) and Ellis Arnall, former Governor of Georgia, President of the Society of
Independent Motion Picture Producers of California, and Regular Counsel for Walt Disney Pro-
ductions; see supra notes 273, 280. Herman Talmadge, U.S. Senator from Georgia, introduced an
opposition bill, S. 2852, which became the basis for the compromise bill, S. 1884, accepted by the
Copyright Office in 1961. See infra text accompanying notes 295-332; see also Design Protection
Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 29-30 (personal appeal from Walt Disney to the Committee).
The Register of Copyrights recognized three sources of opposition in 1960: 1) "confirmed
and irresponsible design pirates"; 2) "certain large firms whose business is not traditionally related
to designs or who 'shop' the creations of their smaller and often more original competitors, trust-
ing to their greater selling power, size, and trade names ... to protect their interests"; 3) "a few
concerns who would like... to have their cake and eat it, that is, to have the benefit of a new sui
generis design law where appropriate but at the same time to retain the unrestricted long term of
the present copyright law." Id at 58 (testimony of Arthur Fisher).
293. See Latman, supra note 169, at 284-85.
294. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 66 (testimony of Arthur Fisher).
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4. A Continuing Theory of Dissociation. The Copyright Office
wanted a design bill enacted without delay; to achieve this end, it was
willing to compromise with the critics of S. 2075.295 New bills intro-
duced in Congress in 1960 attempted to "provide for effective and equi-
table design legislation but [to] do so without maiming copyrights.
296
Under these bills, typified by S. 1884, an ornamental design of a useful
article would not automatically be subjected to the design law and pre-
cluded from copyright law.297 Proprietors could still invoke the separa-
bility criterion of the 1959 regulation to qualify a design as a work of
art protectible under section 5(g) of the Copyright Act of 1909.298
The bold attempt of S. 2075 to make "a clean break" 299 was thus
modified by official endorsement of the Italian principle of dissociation,
despite the misgivings this principle had earlier engendered °.3 ° As a
result, if it were possible to dissociate the concept of art in the design
from the industrial character of the article, the design would not neces-
sarily be subject to the pending design bill, S. 1884, and would remain
295. See, e.g., Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 22 (letter from Mumford),
80-81 (testimony of Latman), 65-66 (testimony of Fisher). A deal had already been struck with
the garment industry, which was excluded from the design bill. This deal was considered indis-
pensable to early passage of the bill. See, e.g., REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 13;
REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, at 22.
296. Latman, The New Design Protection Proposals Before Congress, 8 BULL. COPYRIGHT
Soc'y 356, 356 (1961). The bills, now known as the Hart Bill, were S. 1884, 87th Cong., Ist Sess.
(May 16, 1961) (Hart-Wiley-Talmadge Bill); H.R. 6776, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 3, 1961) (Flynt
Bill); H.R. 6777, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 3, 1961) (Ford Bill). REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra
note 45, at 13.
297. S. 1884 § 27(b), Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 8.
298. This was never established in a written provision of S. 1884. Instead, it was accomplished
by statements of the interested parties, such as Register of Copyrights Abraham Kaminstein and
Ellis Arnall, representing Walt Disney, to the effect that Mazer v. Stein as interpreted in the past
by the Copyright Office would continue in full force after the adoption of the design bill. Because
Regulation Section 202.10(c), as amended in 1959, was said officially to interpret Mazer v. Stein,
the deal that the opposition thought it was making was essentially to retain the status quo as to
copyright law. See, e.g., Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 153 (statement of
Register Kaminstein); id at 24 (statement of Ellis Arnall, representing Disney); id at 163-64 (testi-
mony of George D. Cary, Deputy Register). This principle was reiterated in REGISTER'S REPORT
1961, supra note 45, at 13-15.
The 1965 Register's Report declared only that "copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural
work will not be affected if the work is employed as the design of a useful article." SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPY-
RIGHT LAW, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1965), reprinted in 4 Omnibus Copyright Revision
Legislative History (1976)(prepared for the House Committee on the Judiciary) [hereinafter cited
as REGISTER'S REPORT 1965]. No further mention of the separability doctrine is made in the 1965
report. To the extent that the Copyright Office had acquiesced in the separability criterion after
1961, its acquiesence was implemented only in the continuation of Regulation Section 202.10(c) as
amended in 1959. See infra text accompanying notes 615-20.
299. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 80 (testimony of Alan Latman).
300. See REGISTER'S REPORT 1961,supra note 45, at 13-15; Waldheim, New Design Bill, supra
note 201, at 359; supra text accompanying note 233.
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entitled to full copyright protection even if embodied in a useful arti-
cle.30 ' Only if a work of art subsisting in copyright were embodied in a
useful article and then voluntarily registered under the proposed design
law would its copyrightability terminate as against other useful articles
by virtue of the substitute scheme.30 2
This strategic retreat in 1960 was accompanied by a series of de-
fensive measures that could have diminished the magnitude of the
compromise the Copyright Office had been obliged to accept. One
measure, quickly discarded, would have excluded many designs from
copyrightability by elevating the standard of originality required of all
works to "an appreciable amount of creative authorship. ' 30 3 A second
measure was the decision that useful articles should no longer be ac-
ceptable for deposit at the Copyright Office.3°4 In the past, the act of
deposit obliged the Copyright Office to undertake an independent as-
sessment of the copyrightability of the design of a useful article claimed
to be a work of art.305 In the future, those seeking to copyright orna-
mental designs of useful articles would have to submit the request for
registration in two-dimensional, "disembodied" form, that is, in the
301. Waldheim, New Design Bill, supra note 201, at 359.
302. S. 1884 § 32, Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21 (which proposes amend-
ments to the Copyright Act of 1909).
303. Regulation Section 202.10(b) had always required that "in order to be acceptable as a
work of art, the work must embody some creative authorship in its delineation or form." See
supra note 199. The Register's Report of 1961 attempted to make the standard for all works of
authorship more stringent. REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 9. This elevation of the
originality standard to a point nearer the novelty standard of patent law (as desired by Justice
Douglas in Lee v. Runge, 441 F.2d 579 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 887, 890 (1971)(Douglas,
J., dissenting)) was out of step with the United States copyright tradition of Justice Holmes, see
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903), and Judge Jerome Frank, see
Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951).
The Register's "creation" clause did not reappear in PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT, issued by the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 20, 1964), reprinted in 3
OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1964 [hereinafter cited as CLR PRELIMI-
NARY DRAFT AND COMMENTS 19641. But see 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)("works of authorship");
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 297-350 (partial cumulation in the Second
Circuit).
304. S. 1884, Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, proposed the following amend-
ment to the Copyright Act of 1909: "a useful article shall not be accepted for deposit in the
Copyright Office even if it embodies a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, but nothing in this
subsection shall preclude deposit and registration of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works that
portray useful articles or that are intended for utilization in the designs of useful articles." Id
§ 33(a); see also REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 65.
305. "Expansion of administrative jurisdiction to art, including commercial and industrial art,
has resulted not only in the deposit of cumbersome items but in difficult interpretative questions.
It is generally believed that the Copyright Office should not be called upon to determine these ques-
tions." Latman, supra note 296, at 357 (emphasis added).
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form of drawings, sketches, or photographs portraying the articles in
question.3
06
The Copyright Office then tried to use a line of cases devolving
from Baker v. Selden 30 7 to erect another barrier to full protection under
the 1909 Act. Under these cases, the copyright in a sketch or photo-
graph of a useful article protected only the sketch or photograph, not
the manufactured version of the article it portrayed.30 8 This maneuver
would have forced courts, rather than the Copyright Office, to make
decisions concerning copyrightability, but only after an alleged in-
fringement of the design of the useful article portrayed in the deposited
photograph or drawing had occurred.30 9 Such decisions would have
306. The definition of a useful article became critical because the proposals denied deposit to
useful articles. The definition in section l(b)(2) of S. 1884 is essentially the same as that of S. 2075,
although more clumsily drafted. See S. 1884, Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 2;
see also supra note 249.
The Preliminary Draft of 1964 retained the broad definition of S. 2075 and refined the provi-
sion as a whole in § 9(b):
A useful article is an article which in normal use has an intrinsic utilitarian function that
is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information. An
article which normally is a part of a useful article shall be deemed to be a useful article.
CLR PRELIMINARY DRAFT AND COMMENTS 1964, supra note 303 (emphasis added).
Under this definition the Copyright Office did not have unlimited power to ordain deposit of
designs and models by means of pictures or drawings. But neither the two-dimensional fabric
design onfabric nor the Balinese dancer with an electric socket on it were directly depositable, even
if works of art, because they were useful articles. Latman, supra note 296, at 357.
307. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
308. REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 14; Latman, supra note 296, at 357; see also
REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 298, at 48 (citing cases through 1964). This line of cases
included: Pie Design Corp. v. Sterling Precision Corp., 231 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); De Silva
Constr. Corp. v. Herrald, 213 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Fla. 1962); Kashins v. Lightmakers, Inc., 155 F.
Supp. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Fulmer v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1021 (Ct. Cl. 1952); Muller v.
Triborough Bridge Auth., 43 F. Supp. 298 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Jack Adelman, Inc. v. Sonners &
Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1934); National Cloak & Suit Co. v. Standard Mail
Order Co., 191 F. 528 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); Lamb v. Grand Rapids School Furniture Co., 39 F. 474
(W.D. Mich. 1889).
Another line of cases (mainly protecting dolls modeled after comic strip characters) also ex-
isted. This other line of cases included: Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralpha Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d
276 (2d Cir. 1934); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533 (2d Cir. 1924); Jones Bros.
Co. v. Underkoffier, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936),final decree entered, 24 F. Supp. 393 (M.D.
Pa. 1938).
There had been no attempt to create by design legislation "'any additional rights or protec-
tion' under the Copyright Law." Latman, supra note 296, at 357. Hence the sketch of a dress or
an automobile and the photograph of a lamp would afford no protection to the article portrayed.
Id; REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 13-15.
309. The evidence as of 1961, although not unequivocal, suggests that the Copyright Office
would have interpreted the definition of useful article expansively so as to force as many deposi-
tors as possible to use photographs or drawings. See Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note
21, at 152 (statement by Register Kaminstein); but see id at 163-64 (testimony of Deputy Register
Cary).
Failure to adopt S. 1884, including section 32, left the Copyright Office in the position of
determining whether three-dimensional models offered for deposit were "works of sculpture," and
therefore directly depositable, even if useful articles. Indeed, the Deputy Register eventually
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rested initially, not on an assessment by the Copyright Office of
whether the design in question was a work of art, but rather on the
precedents that declined to protect useful articles manufactured from
copyrighted catalogues or drawings. The policy underlying these cases
was to prevent manufacturers from circumventing patent law; courts
citing them could avoid distinguishing art from non-art at all.310
The Copyright Office now claimed that the legal rule for which
this line of cases stood was obscurely expressed. 311 Accordingly, the
Register formulated his own interpretation of the rule in what later be-
came section 9(a)(1) of the Preliminary Draft of the General Revision
of Copyright Law in 1964: "Copyright in a work that portrays a useful
article as such, such as a drawing, model, or photograph of the article,
shall not include any right to prevent the making, distribution, or exhi-
bition of useful articles of the design so portrayed." 312
The broad language of this provision, put forward as a clarifica-
tion of existing law, could well have strengthened the exclusionary ef-
fects of the precedents on which it formally rested. Certain subject
matter categories recently accorded copyright protection as "works of
art," including dolls, toys, and costume jewelry, might now be "useful
articles" within the broadened definition of this term in section 9(b) of
the Preliminary Draft.313 If so, these objects would fall within the new
agreed, under pressure, that the Office would have some discretion to accept direct deposits of
useful articles that were also works of art. See Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at
162 (testimony of Cary); see also S. 776 § 32, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), reprintedin 109 CoNO.
Rlc. 23,653 (1963) (permissive language of the Hart and Talmadge Bill).
310. See cases citedsupra note 308. But see, e.g., King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F.
533 (2d Cir. 1924); Jones Bros. Co. v. Underkoffier, 16 F. Supp. 729 (M.D. Pa. 1936)("the other
line of cases," supra note 308).
311. Although the policy behind these cases seemed clear, the Supreme Court in Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1880), had expressly excluded works of art from the scope of its
decision. Professor Latman reads the main line of exclusionary cases derived from Baker v. Sel-
den as standing for the idea-expression dichotomy. Latman, supra note 9, at 284. Even this dis-
tinction as applied in the cases was "not easy to explain and will undoubtedly continue to be
explored in the context of graphic and sculptural works" in view of the exception for dolls made
from comic strip characters. Id; see supra note 308.
Analysis of these cases, at least as they bear on applied art, suggests that, if a work such as a
comic-strip figure is copyrightable in its two-dimensional representation, it does not forfeit this
copyrightability when transposed to another medium, such as a three-dimensional doll, so long as
works in the new medium have not been denied copyrightprotection on other grounds. The represen-
tation in two-dimensional form of an item that would not normally be copyrightable as a three-
dimensional model will not succeed in securing a copyright valid against reproduction in three-
dimensional form of the model thus represented.
312. CLR PRELIMINARY DRAFr AND COMMENTS 1964, supra note 303, § 9(a)(l), at 7 (part
III).
313. The result was not certain under the changed definition of "useful article."
[I]s a doll which is used to quiet a crying baby something which has an intrinsic utilita-
rian function? Do not doll manufacturers propose to attempt registration of their designs
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rule of the Copyright Office that prohibited direct deposits of "useful
articles. '314 When indirectly deposited in the form of drawings, sketch-
es or photographs, the designs of useful articles became subject to sec-
tion 9(a)(1) of the Preliminary Draft, which denied "any right to
prevent the making, distribution, or exhibition of useful articles of the
design so portrayed." Moreover, the broad language of section 9(a)(1)
as drafted allowed for no exceptions. 315 Given the expected adoption
of a special design law and the avowed policy of forcing as many de-
signs of useful articles as possible to seek protection there, the Copy-
right Office could by this means quite plausibly have persuaded courts
to cut back on the copyrightability of borderline subject matter.
316
Such narrowing of copyright protection violated the spirit of the
concessions made earlier.3 17 If the Register's proposed section 9 stood
as drafted, and if it were interpreted to overrule the decisions protect-
under the design bill? How would this affect dolls? For that matter, does a watch do
nothin& more than convey information?... We say this definition of "useful article"
has serious problems.
Testimony of Rep. Levitas, TRANSCRIPT OF MEETING ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: DISCUSSIONS OF SECTIONS 9 THROUGH 13, April 11, 1963 [hereinafter
cited as CLR DISCUSSIONS OF SECTIONS 9-13, 1963] in CLR PRELIMINARY DRAFT AND COM-
MENTS 1964, supra note 303, at 191; see supra note 270; infra note 341 and accompanying text.
314. See supra text accompanying notes 304-06.
315. There was no express exception even for cartoon characters, much less for ornamental
designs "addressed to the taste," an exception acknowledged in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103
(1880). The exception recognized in Baker v. Selden, however, begs the question posed by modem,
functional design, which exerts pressure on the border with patent law.
316. Limiting the copyrightability of subject matter that had crept into copyright law before
the Copyright Office had begun to develop its position in 1956 would have been consistent with
the policy stated by Register Arthur Fisher in 1960. See Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra
note 115, at 61, 63, 66 (testimony and statement of Arthur Fisher). The acquisition of copyright
protection for borderline items immediately after Mazer gave industries that had been seeking
special design protection more than they had asked for. Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 993
(testimony of Latman).
317. Opponents were quick to point this out. At a meeting in the Library of Congress to
consider the Preliminary Draft, Mr. Levitas, who was representing Walt Disney Productions, de-
clared: "we question whether or not the attempt in Section 9(a) and particularly in 9(a)(1), actu-
ally carries out the Register's Report [of 1961]." The Register's Report, as Ms. Ringer read it,
expressly said that the revision "should not alter the existing case law." CLR DISCUSSIONS OF
SECTIONS 9-13, 1963, supra note 313, at 190. Levitas also stated:
[Allthough we are in complete accord with the principle expressed in the Register's Re-
port, we are opposed to the embodiment of that principle and the way it is attempted in
section 9(a)(l). Section 9(a)(1) in effectproposes a cut-back on the scope of the copyright in
a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work and it attempts to do it by a definition which, we
think, involves difficult language, and which could be subjected to many interpretations
by the courts.
Id at 189 (emphasis added).
Ms. Ringer's disclaimer on behalf of the Copyright Office is not convincing. See id at 193.
Disney's representatives may have correctly surmised the thrust of § 9(a)(1) and § 9(b).
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ing the "Betty Boop" and "Sparkplug" doll designs,318 then competi-
tors of Walt Disney Productions might have been able to manufacture
their own three-dimensional models from an original two-dimensional
comic strip character, although they might not have remained free to
copy Disney's three-dimensional models. Even it this result were
avoided by an interpretation of section 9 favorable to Disney,319 man-
ufacturers of dolls, toys, jewelry, and other items risked uncertainty
and very possibly a diminished scope of protection when S. 1884 or its
successor was finally combined with the General Revision of Copyright
Law. With life plus fifty years to be the normal duration under this
law, and with the Copyright Office trying to hold its line, public policy
might seem to favor the redirection of the maximum number of designs
of useful articles to the law affording the shorter term of protection.320
Although manufacturers could avoid the uncertainties of copyright
protection by directly registering their designs under the pending de-
sign laws,321 the protection obtained there would lapse after five or, at
most, ten years.322 Voluntary registration under the design law would
318. See, for example, the line of cases upholding the exclusive right of the proprietors of
copyrighted cartoon strips to make three-dimensional dolls from the characters portrayed, such as
Fleischer Studios, Inc. v. Ralpha Freundlich, Inc., 73 F.2d 276, 278 (2d Cir. 1934)(BettyBoop) and
King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 533, 538 (2d Cir. 1924)(parkplug). These cases are
difficult to reconcile with the main line of cases cited supra note 308. At the Design Protection
Hearings of 1961, Disney's representatives had taken it for granted that the Sparkplug and Betty
Boop exceptions would continue to be respected. See supra note 298 and accompanying text.
319. If Disney succeeded in registering its own models as "sculptural works" on the theory
that the "separated" two-dimensional Mickey Mouse had simply been incorporated within the
doll, Disney could, in principle, have protected its own model in copyright law. At the 1963 meet-
ing, the Copyright Office obliquely suggested that this route was open. CLR DIscussIoNs O
SEcTIONs 9-13, 1963, supra note 313, at 193 (comment of Ringer); see also REGISTER'S REPORT
1961,supra note 45, at 14. If a competitor had invoked section 9(a)(1) to copy the two-dimension-
al figure because it resembled useful articles in commerce, Disney might have replied that the
deposited cartoon did not portray a useful article as such, hence it was expressly excluded from
section 9(a)(1) (because it was not the design of a useful article). See CLR DIscUssIoNS OF SEC-
TIONS 9-13, 1963, supra note 313, at 193 (comment of Ringer).
320. See infra text accompanying notes 596-624.
321. Manufacturers seeking to avoid the snares of section 9(a)(1) could contend that their
works were not designs of useful articles at all, or that, if useful articles, the artistic elements of the
designs were separable and capable of independent existence within the meaning of Regulation
Section 202.10(c). Manufacturers who failed to register under the design law in the hope of ob-
taining copyright protection on the basis of "separability," however, would run the risk of forfeit-
ing all protection, as occurs in Italy. See infra text accompanying note 411.
322. The term of the 1959 proposal was five years, see S. 2075 § 5, supra note 158; S. 1884
proposed an inital term of five years plus a renewal term of five years, see S. 1884 § 5, supra note
296. Duration was not a major issue in the United States (although Register Fisher had preferred
a term of five years only); but a duration of fifteen years became the norm in the European Com-
munity after the otherwise unsuccessful revision of the Hague Arrangement of November 28,
1960. Duchemin, supra note 71, at 181. This was the result of "an international compromise"
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have terminated any claim to copyright protection, notwithstanding the
"anti-maim" rule accepted in 1960.323
The subtlety of these defensive measures did not catch the opposi-
tion off guard. As new pressures were exerted against section 9(a)(1) of
the Preliminary Draft,324 the Copyright Office found it expedient to
compromise once again. Still optimistic that a special design bill could
be enacted promptly if serious opposition were forestalled,325 the Reg-
ister, in 1965, reiterated that "copyright in a pictorial, graphic, or sculp-
tural work will not be affected if the work is employed as the design of
a useful article, and will offer protection against unauthorized repro-
duction of the work in useful as well as non-useful articles. ' 326 The
design bills then pending in Congress were revised to embody the same
principle, and the Copyright Office was "in full accord with it."'327 Re-
sponding to criticism of section 9 in the Preliminary Draft, the Register
acknowledged that attempts to restate "the rather difficult theoretical
concepts" of the Baker v. Selden precedents in statutory language had
proved "abortive. '328
In theory, the Register might still have reformulated his earlier
restatement to define and limit an express exception to the principle of
section 9(a)(1) for designs that "appealed to the taste" or that otherwise
constituted "works of art." But this would only have reopened the
rather than a reasoned decision. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 21, at 25; cf. infra text accompanying
notes 374-76 (effects of four-year term in Italian design law).
323. S. 1884 § 32, supra note 296 (proposing amendments to the 1909 Act).
324. See supra note 317.
325. RFGISTER's REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 7. Passage of the design bill was expected
during the 87th session of Congress. CLR DISCUSSIONS OF SECTIONS 9-13, 1963, supra note 313,
at 194 (comment of Levitas). After hearings in 1960 and 1961 on earlier versions of the design
bill, the full Senate Judiciary Committee had reported it favorably on July 12, 1962; this bill (S.
1884) passed the Senate on July 23, 1962. In the 88th Congress, the Senate, without further hear-
ings, passed the bill (now S. 776) on December 6, 1963. The House Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights of the House Judiciary Committee held a hearing concerning this bill
(H.R. 5523, H.R. 769, H.R. 323 [S. 776]) on December 12, 1963. Unfortunately, the transcript of
these important hearings was never reprinted. See REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note
36, at 13 (testimony of Latman). An earlier "hard-won compromise" concerning the exclusion of
the shape of wearing apparel from the design bill was later said to have been the reason "why
there has been no opposition to the bill since 1969, other than the traditional opposition of the
Department of Justice." REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 22. But see
Statement of the Nat'l Retail Merchants Ass'n on the Subject of S. 776, now Before the Sub-
Comm. of the House Judiciary Comm., Jan. 14, 1964, reprinted in Dulin, supra note 16, at 365-70
(1965). The NRMA became a powerful opponent.
326. REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 298, at 47-48.
327. Id This was embodied in the 1965 Revision Bill, § 111(a), id at 202. The pending de-
sign bills were H.R. 450 (Ford), H.R. 3366 (Flynt), and S. 1237 (Talmadge and Hart), 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965). See, e.g., S. 1237 § 32, Design Protection Hearings 1965, supra note 114, at 8-9.
328. REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 298, at 48 ("we have been unable to find any statu-
tory formulation that would express the distinction satisfactorily"). See the formulation suggested
supra at note 311.
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question of what is or is not a "work of art" under the rule governing
three-dimensional useful articles manufactured from copyrightable
two-dimensional drawings or photographs. This in turn might have
undermined the settled, if imperfectly rationalized, precedents that
guarded the line of demarcation between copyright law and patent law,
with the paradoxical result that the reformulated copyright law might
have protected more articles manufactured from works that portray
useful articles than had been possible in the past.
329
For this and other reasons, the Copyright Office preferred to ab-
stain from further attempts to restate the principle embodied in section
9(a)(1) of its Preliminary Draft. Announcing that "the real need is to
make clear that there is no intention to change the present law with
respect to the scope of protection in a work portraying a useful article
as such,"330 the Copyright Office accordingly agreed under pressure to
replace the bold language of section 9(a)(1) with section 111 (a) of the
1965 Revision Bill, an avowed attempt to freeze the law:
This title does not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that
portrays a useful article as such, any greater rights with respect to the
making, distribution, or exhibition of the useful article so portrayed
than those afforded to such copyrighted works under the law in effect
on December 31, 1966.331
To drive the point home, the Register pointed out that "the distinctions
in this area emerge from two lines of cases," all of which he duly pro-
ceeded to list.3 32
329. For a startling illustration of how a slight revision of copyright law allowed similar prece-
dents to be undermined in the United Kingdom, see supra note 132. Another problem was that
the proposed design law and the copyright law, once revised, were to share a common definition of
"useful article." See infra note 331. It was counterproductive to allow the question of determin-
ing the nature of a protectible work of art to be reopened precisely at the delicate juncture where
the two laws were to mesh. The United States authorities held on to settled law.
330. REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 298, at 48.
331. 1965 Revision Bill § 11 l(a), REOISTER's REPORT 1965, supra note 298, Comparative Ta-
ble, App. B. Compare § 113(b) of the 1976 Act, 90 Stat. 2541, 2560 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 113(b)
(1982)). The suggestion to freeze the law was launched by Disney's representative at the 1962
meeting. See CLR DiscussIoNs OF SEcTIONs 9-13, 1963, supra note 313, at 189-90 (comment of
Levitas).
The Register also adopted the "carefully drafted and thoroughly considered definition of
'useful article'" incorporated in the pending design bills: "an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information."
REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 298, at 47. Compare 1965 Revision Bill § I 1 l(b), Ralos-
TER's REPORT 1965, supra note 298 with S. 1237 §§ l(b)(1), 32(e),Design Protection Hearings 1965,
supra note 114, at 2and § 101 of the 1976 Act, 90 Stat. 2541, 2544 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101
(1982)). The copyright revision bill and the design bills thus continued to mesh by means of a
shared definition of useful articles.
332. R oIsTrR's REPORT 1965, supra note 298, at 48 n.*; see also supra note 308. Professor
Brown termed the solution adopted in § 111, the forerunner of the present § 113, a "cop out." B.
KAPLAN & R. BRowN, supra note 245, at 162.
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The new compromise did not destroy all of the advantages offered
by S. 2075 in 1959. Even with the "anti-maim" rule and the criterion of
separability, which would presumably continue to govern
copyrightability under Regulation Section 202.10(c), the modified re-
gime could afford more protection to more designs than the law as it
had evolved since 1909. The proposed scheme also recognized that
some ornamental designs of useful articles could be works of art, in
contrast to S. 2075, which would have kept commercially exploited or-
namental designs out of copyright. The new scheme thus ended the
prospect that the United States would adopt an isolated (if, perhaps,
rather advanced) position on design protection and meant instead that
the United States would fall in line with one of the three basic positions
taken by members of the Berne Union, and the European Community,
since 1948.
333
The package deal of 1965 traded short-term protection of all crea-
tive designs of useful articles for the "illogical" results that followed
when the criterion of scindibii' was used to distinguish between copy-
rightable works of art granted long-term protection and ornamental de-
signs to be given only short-term protection.334 Regulation Section
202.10(c) would continue to discriminate between modern industrial
art, in which form followed function, and traditional industrial art, in
which embellishments were added to the useful article.335 Copyright
registration would remain available for Mickey Mouse printed on a T-
shirt, and for the design of a spoon handle in the shape of the Eiffel
Tower, but not for unornamented shapes of spoon handles, lamps, or
chairs.336
Administering the separability doctrine of the modified proposal
presented other difficulties. Any three-dimensional design of a useful
article could be sent for registration as a sculptural work, and rejection
333. See supra notes 127-35, 258-73 and accompanying text. In a 1961 article, Waldheim cor-
rectly identified the separability test with the formal position of Italian law. See Waldheim, New
Design Bill, supra note 201, at 359. The article neglected to mention, however, that Italian courts
were unwilling to recognize designs actually embodied in useful articles, including most two-
dimensional designs, as legally separable. See infra text accompanying notes 403-12.
334. See supra text accompanying note 233. But see Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra
note 115, at 22 (letter from L. Quincy Mumford, Librarian of Congress)(Mumford considered the
separability test workable).
335. For the curious turn of events that finally induced Barbara Ringer, as Register of Copy-
rights, to persuade Congress to write the separability criterion into the Copyright Act of 1976, see
infra text accompanying notes 625-38.
336. REGIsTER's REPORT 1961,supra note 45, at 13-14; Latman, supra note 296, at 357; Present
Design Protection, supra note 48, at 139-40.
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by the Copyright Office could be challenged in the courts. 337 Indeed,
the Copyright Office expected that controversial claims in the design
area would "continue to grow," 338 especially after the Sears-Compco
decisions of 1964, which attempted to eliminate protection under the
misappropriation doctrine of state unfair competition law.339 Another
problem, barely perceptible during this period, was the doctrine of
"conceptual separability. '340
More immediate administrative problems were raised by border-
line subject matter that the Copyright Office had failed definitely to
exclude under either S. 2075 or section 9(a)(1) of the General Revision
as first drafted. Designs of costume jewelry and toy dolls given copy-
right protection afterMazer v. Stein might or might not become designs
of "useful articles" after 1965 depending on the interpretation courts
would give this term.34' If courts held three-dimensional designs of
dolls and jewelry to be "useful articles" subject to the separability crite-
rion, such designs might be found "separable" and "capable of in-
dependent existence. '3 42 If inseparable, two-dimensional drawings of
the same items might still be deposited. By analogy to the precedents
that protected dolls made from cartoon characters, these three-dimen-
337. This had presented the "principal administrative problem" in the past. REGISTER's RE-
PORT 1961, supra note 45, at 13. By the time of the 1965 General Revision Bill, supra note 331, the
Copyright Office had agreed to consider accepting direct deposits of some designs of useful articles
once again if they might qualify for protection under the separability test of Regulation Section
202.10(c). See the permissive language in S. 1237, § 32, Design Protection Hearings 1965, supra
note 114, at 8-9.
338. REGIsTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 12.
339. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 237 (1964); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231-32 (1964); see Letter from Sylvan Gotshal, Design Protection
Hearings 1965, supra note 114, at 67-68 (the Sears-Compco decisions had made "sharp inroads on
the scope ofjudicial protection ... offered to the victims of the design pirate"). Professor Deren-
berg believed that, after Sears-Compco, passage of the pending design bills had become "impera-
tive." Derenberg, in Product Simulation: A Right or a Wrong, 64 COLUM. L. Rv. 1178, 1192, at
1200 (1964); see infra text accompanying notes 532-37.
340. See supra note 218. The doctrine of conceptual separability can pose hard questions for
dissociation theory in individual cases. See infra notes 407-11, 546-47 and accompanying text; see
also Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 324-33 ("The Two Sides of Conceptual
Separability").
341. Asked whether "a borderline area" would continue to exist "between works of art...
covered by copyright and useful articles that will be covered by design," a spokesman for the
Copyright Office answered in the affirmative. "Take dolls, or. . .jewelry, for example. Jewelry
may be a work of art or... some pieces of jewelry might well be useful articles. Or... even
... a nonfunctional piece of jewelry may be a useful article by its very nature. . . . It depends
upon your outlook. I think these are borderline areas." Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra
note 21, at 163 (testimony of George D. Cary).
The Copyright Office and the courts continued to treat designs of toys, dolls, and jewelry as
copyrightable "works of art" while the design bills were pending. For the situation after 1976, see
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65.
342. See infra notes 467-70, 520 and accompanying text.
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sional designs could qualify for long-term copyright protection under
section 111(a)(1) of the General Revision Bill of 1965,343 although
other highly creative functional designs could obtain only ten years of
protection as a result of the main line of cases devolving from Baker v.
Selden.344
By 1965, the Copyright Office had thus succeeded in completing
steps one and two of its original timetable345 but at the cost of major
concessions to the protectibility of ornamental designs in copyright law,
made despite the economic arguments against such concessions. 346
Moreover, administrative difficulties known to inhere in Regulation
Section 202.10(c) of 1959 would remain. 347 On the positive side, the
package deal as it stood in 1965 retained the dual regime of design
protection below the line of demarcation with copyright law that was
its most distinctive feature.348 Further, the Copyright Office had man-
343. Courts might have held that the designs of dolls, jewelry, and toys were not designs of
useful articles at all because they lacked any utilitarian function or because their sole utilitarian
function was "merely to portray the appearance of the article." 1965 Revision Bill § 111(b), supra
note 331. Compare supra note 260 and accompanying text (view of Bogsch) with supra note 341
(view of Cary). For post-1976 judicial interpretations of this definition, see Reichman, 4ter the
Copyright 4ct, supra note 65, at 375-79.
344. 101 U.S. 99 (1880); see supra note 308 and accompanying text.
345. See supra text accompanying notes 228-30.
346. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
347. Two leading scholars, Professors Nimmer and Derenberg, were left dissatisfied by the
current proposals. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAW REvISION, PART 2,
DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963), reprinted in 3 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION, Part 2 [hereinafter cited as CLR DIscus-
SIONS AND COMMENTS 1963]. Professor Nimmer declared: "I am concerned that your limitation
of 'works of art' to works which are 'nonutilitarian in themselves' might deny protection to a
sculptured work if in itself it is capable of a utilitarian use, for instance, as a lamp base or as a
saltcellar." CLR DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 1963, supra, at 372.
Equally distressed, for other reasons, was Professor Derenberg:
I am one of those who had never been happy with the change in the definition of'works
of art,' which later resulted in the Stein case and which has resulted in a degradation of
the concept of copyright and some rather untenable efforts to distinguish between artistic
and nonartistic features of utilitarian articles.
CLR DISCUSSIONS AND COMMENTS 1963, supra, at 275.
Compare the following remarks of Barbara Ringer, then representing the Copyright Office at
the proceedings:
I would say that most of the people who commented on this part of the Report agreed
with the recommendations....
One person argued, as a matter of principle, that the Copyright law should be ex-
tended to cover all industrial designs-that this distinction between useful articles and
non-useful articles should be dropped entirely. This is the concept of unity of art that
some countries follow. Another felt quite the opposite--that under no circumstances
should the copyright lawprotect any commercial or industrial application of a work of art;
that these should be dealt with in a separate act.
CLR PRELIMINARY DRAFT & COMMENTS 1964, supra note 303, at 188 (testimony of Barbara
Ringer)(emphasis added); see supra note 44.
348. REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 14. In other words, the United States propo-
sal would have rendered a high threshold for protectibility in the design law inconsistent with the
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aged to "hold the line" by keeping most three-dimensional designs of
useful articles out of copyright law while the pending design bills
moved forward to the point at which legislative enactment became
feasible.
349
The latest compromises should have paved the way for quick pas-
sage of the bills themselves. In 1964, the House Subcommittee on Pat-
ents, Trademarks and Copyrights, after hearings in late 1963, reported
the design bill favorably to the full House Judiciary Committee. In
1966, after a hearing before its own Subcommittee on Patents, Trade-
marks, and Copyrights, the Senate passed an amended version of the
bill, but no corresponding action emerged from the House.350 Then, in
late 1969, in an "historic docking, '351 the Senate's Hart Design Bill was
joined with the copyright bill in a new, integrated proposal.352
This proposal would have established a sui generis regime of de-
sign protection and ended the increasingly isolated position of the
United States with respect not only to its OECD trading partners, but
also to most of the world's industrialized countries and to leading de-
veloping countries as well.353 Moreover, prompt enactment of the de-
sign bill, now Title III of the copyright bill, would have provided the
high standard of nonobviousness in the design patent law, with which it would function as an
integrated system of design protection. Nevertheless, the exact standard of protectibility set by
§§ 2 and 3 of S. 2075 and its progeny was and remains uncertain. See infra text accompanying
notes 582-600.
349. See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying notes 492-96,
Nevertheless, a "great many of the slumbering members of the bar" were now "alerted... to the
fact that they could get 56-year protection by copyright if they could get in as a work of art."
Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 85-86 (testimony of Giles Rich).
350. RFGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 13; see supra note 325; see
also Design Protection Hearings 1965, supra note 114, at 14-23 (describing the supporters of the
design bill including former opponents now appeased). Only the Department of Justice and the
National Retail Merchants Association openly opposed the design bill during this period. Deputy
Register Cary blamed the Merchants Association for the failure of the House to pass a design bill
in 1963, despite approval of S. 776 by the Senate. Id at 21; see also id at 54-62 (statement of
Latman, National Committee for Effective Design Legislation).
351. Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 992 (testimony of Alan Latman).
352. Id See generally REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRE-
SENTATIES, H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5659-801 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 1476 (1976)]. The bill, as re-
ported by the Senate Subcommittee, was S. 543, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (Dec. 10, 1969). The design
bill, incorporated in the general revision bill as Title III, later became Title II when the provisions
pertaining to the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) were removed to a separate title. REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch.
VII, at 13.
353. See supra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. The United States' isolated position was
attributable in part to the unwillingness of the appellate courts to uphold design patents. See
supra notes 140, 244-46 and accompanying text. More generally, the role of intellectual property
in international trade had been insufficiently addressed in the United States. See Mossinghoff,
The Importance of Intellectual Property in International Trade, reprinted in 26 PAT. TRADEMARK &
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Copyright Office with a statutory basis for defending the restrictive in-
terpretation of Mazer v. Stein it had established in the 1959 regula-
tion.354 Although devised only as a temporary measure to inhibit
access to copyright law pending enactment of the 1959 design bill, Reg-
ulation Section 202.10(c) was in fact mediating between copyright pro-
tection under the 1909 Act and patent protection under the Design
Patent Law of 1842.355 The longer the legislative process dragged on,
the longer the Copyright Office was forced to defend an anticumula-
tionist model of the Italian type without any functional equivalent of
the special design law that is the fulcrum of the Italian system.
B. The "Unity of Art" Heresy: Its Spread and Vigorous Repression.
1. Separability Italian Style. The most striking feature of the
Italian system of design protection, to the American observer, is the
extent to which the Italian Design Law of 1940356 succeeds in fulfilling
its goals while adhering more closely to the patent law paradigm than
any other sui generis regime within the European Community.
35 7 Arti-
cle 5 of this law confers absolute protection in the patent sense on new
ornamental designs or models capable of giving "special ornamenta-
tion to specific industrial products, either by means of their form, or the
particular combination of lines, colors or other elements. ' 358 Designs
meeting the prerequisites of novelty and qualitative originality incorpo-
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 546-51 (1983)(remarks of Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Commissioner of Patents
and Trademarks).
354. See supra text accompanying notes 197-203.
355. Act of August 29, 1842, ch. 263, § 3, 5 Stat. 543;seesupra notes 227-30 and accompanying
text.
356. Supra note 96; see supra text accompanying notes 208-13.
357. Article 1 of the Italian Design Law of 1940, supra note 96, expressly applies the require-
ments of the patent law of June 29, 1939, to both utility models and ornamental designs and
models, except as otherwise expressly provided in the rest of the design law itself. The design law
as a whole governs "the legislative dispositions pertaining to patents for industrial models," as the
title of the Royal Decree of 25 August 1940 proclaims. 1d; Duchemin, supra note 2, at 40-41.
"Industrial models" are then separated into "utility models," given protection under article 2 and
"ornamental designs and models" protected under article 5. The general dispositions of the de-
sign law (articles 9-17) apply across the board to both utility models and ornamental designs and
models. Id at 40-41. See generally G. SENA, supra note 205, at 431-49, 454-67; Benussi, supra
note 48, at 115-24.
This attempt to include both utility models and ornamental designs and models within a
single framework governed by a common legal regime accounts for the structural rigidity of the
Italian law. Id; G. SENA, supra note 205, at 444. The Italian law remains quite rigid in relation to
the other European Community laws. See Duchemin, supra note 71, at 175-81.
358. Italian Design Law of 1940, art. 5, supra note 96.
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rated by reference from patent law359 may qualify for a single term of
protection that now lasts fifteen years.360 The Italian Design Law also
provides for administrative screening through which compliance with
substantive as well as formal prerequisites may be determined.
361 It
tolerates no divulgation prior to deposit, whether in Italy or abroad,
362
and, alone among the relevant European Community laws, mandates
forfeiture if rights granted are not promptly exploited.
363
In practice, flexible judicial administration has tempered the struc-
tural rigidity of the Italian Design Law as applied to ornamental de-
signs of useful articles.364 The novelty requirement, although strict
with regard to prior divulgation, is otherwise satisfied by a relative
rather than an absolute measure of differentiation from the prior art.
Italian case law acknowledges that industrial art necessarily draws
upon preexisting design elements and caters to exigencies of contempo-
rary style and fashion. Hence the form of an ornamental model seek-
ing protection must differ from forms that have already been applied
and exploited industrially, but not from all forms considered in the ab-
stract.365 Courts then assess novelty in relation to the overall aesthetic
effect of the object; novelty may not be defeated by disaggregating the
design into components or combinations of components anticipated by
prior art.366 Even the simplification or further stylization of forms or
styles in the public domain will reportedly satisfy the novelty standard
if adapted to modem tastes and not previously divulged.
367
359. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 86-99, 104-09; M. FABIANI, Sspra note 96, at 52-57; sqora
note 357. The requirement that a candidate design be new is also expressly stated in article 5 of
the Italian Design Law of 1940, supra note 96.
360. Italian Design Law of 1940, art. 9, supra note 96; Benussi, supra note 48, at 116. The
original term of protection lasted only four years; this was changed in 1977. See supra note 215.
361. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 22-23.
362. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 104. This follows by analogy to the patent law. Id ; see
supra note 357. The government was concerned that others, besides the author, might produce the
same design. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 105. As the level of creativity in commercial de-
signs diminishes, this becomes a major concern of foreign design law. See, e.g., Ljungman, supra
note 147, at 123.
363. The deposit must be followed by actual exploitation within one year from the date of
filing, as is the case with regard to utility patents. Duchemin, supra note 2, at 22-25. Duchemin
reports that "case law has proved strict in this regard." Id at 24-25.
364. Franzosi, supra note 211, at I10. "All the legislative prerequisites for the protection of
ornamental designs and models correspond to those required for inventions and utility models,
but the commentators have shown that in fact these prerequisites become differentiated in certain
respects." Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 85-86 (trans.); see M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 53
(flexibility in regard to ornamental designs), 49-50 (absolute novelty in time and spice required
for utility models in Italy as in the Federal Republic of Germany).
365. M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 53-55.
366. Id at 53. An ordinary observer test is used. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 109.
367. M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 55; see supra note 362. The novelty standard under the
Italian design law is thus roughly comparable to the novelty standard under the United States
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Similarly, the requirement of qualitative originality, which can be
read as a test of inventive achievement like that governing utility pat-
ents, is applied less rigorously to ornamental designs than to inven-
tions.368 According to Algardi,
a rigid concept of originality would not fulfill the need to protect
industrial products ... and would in effect negate the value of the
protection for ornamental models. . . . Ornamental models rarely
constitute creations in the true and proper sense, they are rarely orig-
inal in an absolute sense, because they generally make use of preex-
isting elements. 369
This relatively less stringent standard of creative content obliges the
candidate design to produce a "new aesthetic effect" in the eyes of a
qualified designer working in the specific product area.370 The orna-
mental design or model need not be characterized by a marked individ-
ual or artistic imprint; an increase in the appeal of the designer's
product or "a formal innovation even of a modest aesthetic impact"
will suffice.371 Combination designs, modifications of existing designs,
even reproductions from nature, can all meet the requirement of quali-
tative originality if their novel aesthetic effects result from a minimum
degree of personal elaboration.
372
This deliberate judicial softening of the rigidities in the Italian
statute of 1940 serves to implement the legislator's protective mandate
design patent statute of 1952, §§ 171-173, as judicially interpreted. See 1 D. CHISUM, PATENTS
§ 1.04[2][e], at 1-127, 1-128 (1983); Pretty & Durant, Protection for the Appearance of UsefulArti-
ces Under a Patent Approach, reprinted in 1982 ABA-SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND
COPYRIGHT LAW, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 196.
368. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 90-91; see supra note 364. Originality in the patent-law
sense is also referred to as "intrinsic novelty" (inventive achievement) as opposed to "extrinsic
novelty" (distance from the prior art). See M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 49-51 (utility models),
53-57 (ornamental designs).
369. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 91 (trans.); accord Franzosi, supra note 211, at 110.
Compare the flexibility shown by courts in the Federal Republic of Germany as reported by H.
HUBMANN, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHU-Z 199-201 (4th ed. 1981). But see Englert, supra note
96, at 779 (argues for strong requirement of creative achievement).
370. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 90-93, 95; M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 56. Without
this flexibility, the requirement of qualitative originality derived from patent law (analogous to
"nonobviousness") could constitute a formidable barrier to protectibility. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra
note 61, at 90-91.
371. Z. 0. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 92-93. Sena speaks generically of a creative contribu-
tion, however. G. SENA, supra note 205, at 460. Prior use, in other product groups or trade areas,
of the shape sought to be protected reportedly constitutes no bar to its "originality," if the shape
gives A different aesthetic result when applied to a new product. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at
90, 92.
372. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 93-99; M. FABIANI, supra note 96, at 55-57. But modifi-
cations and combinations must be more than trivial and not simple reproductions of known forms
or mere functional juxtapositions of commonplace objects. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 95; M.
FABIANI, supra note 96, at 55-57.
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concerning industrial art.373 Two ancillary factors may have furthered
this goal: the very short term of protection granted by the Italian De-
sign Law as drafted in 1940, and the possibility of protecting utility
models within the general legal framework it established.
The protection that articles 2 and 9 of the 1940 design law origi-
nally afforded ornamental designs lasted for a single, nonrenewable
term of four years, to be computed from the date of filing for registra-
tion.374 It seems plausible to relate the flexibility shown by the judici-
ary in implementing the substantive requirements of the Design Law to
the knowledge that such indulgence actually protected little more than
lead time. Users who complied with the strict formal requirements of
registration and deposit 37 5 may have elicited a certain judicial willing-
ness to uphold exclusive rights once granted, in part because the un-
availability of protection in copyright law376 meant that would-be
infringers had only four years to wait before they could legally exploit
even the most innovative design.
Of greater importance was the decision in 1940 to combine the
protection of ornamental designs with that of utility models within a
single statutory scheme.377 Utility models have been defined as "prod-
ucts of human activity and creative effort which have the characteristics
of invention but do not rise to the level of technical progress or inven-
tive height required for the grant of a patent. ' 378 In effect, countries
that protect utility models mitigate the strictness of the requirement of
considerable technical progress as a condition to a regular patent.
379
373. See supra note 369 and accompanying text. The paucity of litigated cases raising the
issues of novelty or qualitative originality attests to the receptivity of the Italian design law as thus
interpreted. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 95.
374. The brevity of this term, which was conditioned by the decision to protect utility models,
may, over time, have restricted the contribution that Italy's expanding design industries could
make to the national economy. G. SENA, supra note 205, at 444; Benussi, supra note 48, at 124.
For the extension of the period of protection to the European Community norm of fifteen years in
1977, see supra notes 215, 360. The duration for utility models was extended to ten years. Z.O.
ALGARDI, supra note 61, addendum.
375. See supra notes 361-63 and accompanying text.
376. Article 5, para. 2 of the Italian Design Law of 1940, supra note 96, states expressly that
the "provisions concerning copyright do not apply to the said designs."
377. This decision had "a profound effect" on the overall approach to designs and models in
Italian law. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 89-90.
378. S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 949. Utility models, also known as "small inventions" or
"petty patents," are protected in only a few countries, notably the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, and Japan. See generally F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 188-234; S. LADAS, supra note 2, at
949-56; Perret, supra note 48, at 147-53.
379. S. LADAs, supra note 2, at 949; see 1982 ABA SEC. PAT. TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT
L., 105 [hereinafter cited as ABA-PTC, Proposed Law on Petty Patents] (describing the need for
"a new form of intellectual property which is not subject to the vicissitudes ofjudicial application
of Section 103," namely 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1982)(requiring "nonobviousness" for patentable inven-
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The scope of this derogation from patent law is ostensibly regulated by
linking the technical utility function seeking protection as a utility
model to "a new design arrangement or device," that is, to a specific
functional innovation of shape or form. In theory, this focus on design
eliminates "inventions of processes and of substances" as well as non-
technical aesthetic designs.380 In practice, the true scope of the deroga-
tion depends, first, on the extent to which the protected elements of
shape are permitted by the legal system indirectly to affect other techni-
cal features of the product in question; and, second, on the level of
innovation required in order to obtain protection for a specific utility
function.38'
Article 2 of the Italian Design Law of 1940 protects as utility mod-
els those novel features of form, configuration, arrangement, or combi-
nation of parts that enhance the utility, efficiency, or functionality of
industrially reproducible machines, or of tools or instruments, or of
other similar useful objects.382 Although the text of this provision
could be construed broadly, it is settled-with some dissent-that the
institution of the utility model in Italy "aims at a creation of form in
the sense that the inventive activity is expressed in the external shape of
a useful object and not in the technical idea that governed its incep-
tion. ' 383 Italian law thus attempts to distinguish utility models from
patentable inventions by emphasizing the design component. 384 Article
tions); see also 27 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 634, 645-48 (1984)(bills to protect
semiconductor chip designs as "mask work").
380. S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 950.
381. Compare S. LADAS, supra note 2, at 949-52 (claims that protection of utility models in
Federal Republic of Germany emphasizes the technical effect produced by a given shape) with
Perret, supra note 48, at 147 (claims courts in the Federal Republic have broadened subject matter
by not insisting on novel effect produced by specific exterior shape). According to Perret, protec-
tion in the Federal Republic extends beyond the registered form "to all the equivalent configura-
tions on the technical or utilitarian plane," including cases in which a third party is prevented
from obtaining the same technical effect by dint of a different exterior design. Id The element of
shape, used to justify protection for an industrial design, may thus simply disguise a technical
invention given de facto patent protection without satisfying the substantive prerequisites of the
patent law. The true justification is expedience. F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 225-34.
ABA-PTC, Proposed Law on Petty Patents, supra note 379, could go even farther by dispens-
ing altogether with any requirement of design as the protectible subject matter. It would instead
protect "novel commercial products" as such, but only against copying. Id at 105-06. An evalua-
tion of utility models as an institution is beyond the scope of this study.
382. See Italian Design Law of 1940, art. 2, supra note 96.
383. Perret, supra note 48, at 147-48 (trans.); accord G. SENA, supra note 205, at 431-32, n.2
(trans.)(emphasis added) ("the objects of 'a patent for utility models' are essential~lfunctional cre-
ations ofform that render a given article particularly effective or convenient to use or apply, while
the 'patent for ornamental designs and models' concerns aesthetic forms meant to give industrial
products a special ornamental effect, or more generally, a particular formal appeal").
384. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 90; Perret, supra note 48, at 147-48. The industrial
designer, in seeking to reconcile technological exigencies, consumer psychology, and considera-
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2 may be viewed as protecting innovative features of shape or appear-
ance that are dictated by functional considerations 385 and that, for this
reason, would not normally be protected as ornamental designs or
models within the meaning of article 5.386
Inclusion of the utility model rendered the Italian design statute
structurally more rigid than one that protected ornamental designs
alone.387 Nevertheless, so long as Italian courts remain willing to ad-
just the patent-law paradigm downwards in order to accommodate in-
dustrial art, as the evidence suggests they routinely do,388 the
availability of an alternative form of protection under article 2 of the
Italian statute may actually have reinforced the protection of ornamen-
tal designs under article 5. The interdependence of form and function
in modern industrial art tempts manufacturers to try to circumvent the
patent laws by using deposits of ornamental designs to protect technical
features that might not otherwise qualify as patentable inventions.
tions of cost effectiveness with his available raw materials may produce a new and more func-
tional shape of a useful article at a lower cost than his predecessors had been able to do. This
shape, if sufficiently novel, is precisely the kind of utility function that article 2 of the 1940 design
law is said to protect. G. SENA, supra note 205, at 448-49.
385. Most countries that protect aesthetic or creative designs under a special design law ex-
clude designs in which the functional or technical component is deemed excessive. See, e.g., Uni-
form Benelux Designs Law, supra note 117, art. 2(1). Similarly, under the United States design
patent law, "a design that is dictated by considerations of function is not a proper subject for a
design patent," in part because not sufficiently "ornamental" and in part because "allowance of a
design patent may grant in effect a monopoly on functional features that does not meet the normal
requirements for a utility patent on a product or process." I D. CHISUM, supra note 367, § 1.0412],
at 1-124 to 1-125. But see Nordic Design Laws, supra note 117; Smith, Droit Scandinave, reprinted
in PARis SYMPOSIUM, supra note 27, at 183, 185 (Nordic design laws permit protection of techni-
cally necessary features but literature denies that utility models are protected).
386. Article 2 attempts to clarify the line between utility models and patents for inventions at
the cost of blurring the line between utility models and ornamental designs protected under the
design law. Perret, supra note 48, at 148; M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 91.
387. Some observers condemn the institution of utility models as an unwarranted derogation
from the patent law in the interest of expedience that will not withstand theoretical analysis. See,
e.g., F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 189-234. Nevertheless, utility models have proved to be of great
commercial value to those countries-including Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany-
that have been willing to protect this form of innovation.
Disregarding the validity of utility models in theoretical terms, their technical nature led to
their assimilation with the patent law. Ornamental designs were dragged along in the wake. But
the technical nature of utility models may render them incompatible with a legal regime that also
seeks to protect industrial art. Those who believe utility models are incompatible with such a
regime claim that different legal imperatives govern the two subject matter categories. They stress
the tensions that arise when formal and substantive prerequisites geared to technically dictated
design features are also used to determine the protectibility of aesthetic designs. See M.A. PEROT-
MOREL, supra note 2, at 89-91 (citing Italian authorities). Arguably, the decision to yoke technical
and aesthetic designs together under a single, necessarily rigid, legal framework could thus have
resulted in a formula for treating neither subject matter category in a satisfactory manner. Id at
91.
388. See supra notes 364-73 and accompanying text.
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Outside Italy, courts seeking to defend the line of demarcation with
patent law may resist these pressures by excluding much industrial art
from the design laws on the ground that ornamental features of shape
are inseparable from functionally significant features.389 This in turn
only serves to increase the pressures on copyright law.
390
When utility models are linked to ornamental designs, as under
the Italian Design Law of 1940, it may become easier to insulate both
patent and copyright law from encroachment by industrial designs
391
because both aesthetic and technical designs can aspire to an amalga-
mated form of sui generis protection. Within this sui generis regime,
which governs both utility models and ornamental designs, fears that
aesthetic designs may conceal significant functional effects are largely
dispelled by the capacity of the utility model to acquire protection in its
own right on softer terms than patent law would otherwise tolerate.
392
Moreover, Italian practice allows the owner of a design to seek both
"an ornamental design patent" and "a utility model patent" at the time
of registration, and to exploit the two "patents" concurrently in the
same design.393 Even if the technical features of the utility model were
to be invalidated, the ornamental features of the same design could
remain protected.394 This fluidity in the Italian regime arguably in-
389. G. SENA, supra note 205, at 449; Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 2-3; Perot-Morel, supra note
69, at 67-74. "This is why French law (like most legislations. . .) anticipating this risk, has made
the law on patents prevail when the creation of form cannot be separated from the invention." Id
at 67 (with reference to ornamental designs otherwise protectible either in French design law or in
copyright law under unity of art doctrine).
For similar tendencies in United States design patent law, see, for example, Nimetz, supra
note 18, at 116-21. See also I D. CHISUM, supra note 367, § 1.0412], at 1-123 to 1-127. The utility
model in disguise may be at issue in some of the double patenting cases under the United States
design patent law. "Where design and utility patents cover the same invention in the same article
... the later patent will be invalid under the doctrine of double patenting." Pretty & Durant,
supra note 367, at 198.
390. See, e.g., Perot-Morel, supra note 69, at 72-73 ("hexagonal form of the head of a car
lubricator," "a folding luggage rack on a scooter," and "door hinges," held copyrightable under
unity of art thesis in France); see supra note 132 (routine protection of nonartistic utilitarian de-
signs in United Kingdom copyright law).
391. On the importance of this objective in general, see Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 2-3; for its
priority in Register Arthur Fisher's original scheme, see supra text accompanying notes 263-71.
392. See supra notes 377-86 and accompanying text.
393. G. SENA, supra note 205, at 449. The two "patents" must be applied for simultaneously
and not successively. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 94.
394. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 93-94. The existence of a single mode of design
protection, or of two mutually exclusive modes, could bar the result discussed in the text, id, and
force the design owner to make difficult choices of legal routes at his peril. This in turn would
increase the very pressures on patent and copyright laws that special design laws are meant to
relieve.
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creases the scope of protection for ornamental designs by decreasing
the fear of illicit protection for functional design features.395
Although the theoretical validity of the utility model has been
challenged,396 practical advantages flow from the decision to "encom-
pass all the aspects of form or external appearance that bear on the
value of industrial products" within a single regime dedicated to the
protection of industrial models.397 Articles 2 and 5 of the Italian De-
sign Law, taken together, deliver an impressive amount of short-term
design protection to those proprietors willing and able to register prior
to launching their products on the market.398
It is with this larger protectionist framework in mind that one must
interpret the Italian decision of 1941 to protect ornamental designs of
useful articles as works of applied art in copyright law "only if their
artistic value is separable [scindibile] from the industrial character of
the product with which they are associated." 399 Italian courts attempt-
ing to administer this criterion without contradictory results construe
"separability" to exclude most three-dimensional models from copy-
right law 4° on the ground that their ornamental aspects, although pos-
sessed of aesthetic value, necessarily constrain the expressive freedom
395. Presumably, fears of illicit protection were decreased even more when protection for
either subject matter category could not exceed a bare four years of lead time. See supra notes
374-76 and accompanying text. The Italian law of unfair competition normally reduces pressure
on the border with patent law by permitting manufacturers otherwise ineligible for statutory pro-
tection to seek redress against misappropriation in a variety of cases that typically involve slavish
imitation. But the law against slavish imitation in Italy is reportedly closed to aesthetic designs,
which must obtain protection, if at all, in the design law. G. LAVILLA, IMITAZIONE SERVILE E
FORME Di MERCATO 8 (1976); Sena, supra note 212, at 173-74; see infra note 428.
396. See supra note 387. If the analysis in the text holds true, Professor Perret's defense of
"separability" as determining a universally valid line of demarcation for purposes of copyright
law may be weakened by his powerful critique of the utility model, which acts to stabilize the
Italian system as a whole. Compare supra notes 220-26 and accompanying text (Perret's view of
separability) with supra note 387 (Perret's view of utility models).
397. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 90; see also id at 91, 93 (although utility models are
"second-class inventions," the Italian regime "is not so devoid of interest as may appear at first
glance")(trans.).
398. See supra text accompanying notes 361-63. But see Duchemin, supra note 71, at 184-85
(many designers cannot comply).
399. Italian Copyright Law of 1941, art. 2(4), supra note 200 (as translated at supra note 209).
Because the doctrine ofscindibilit in article 2(4) of the 1941 Copyright Law, supra note 200, was
codified after the Italian Design Law of 1940, supra note 96, some commentators contend that the
copyright law has tacitly overruled article 5, paragraph 2 of the design law, which expressly for-
bids cumulation between the copyright law and the design law. The courts, however, continue to
heed the noncumulationist mandate in article 5 of the design law. Benussi, supra note 48, at 121-
22.
400. This avoids the zig-zag course otherwise likely to occur. M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note
2, at 103; Benussi, supra note 48, at 120; see supra note 226.
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of authorship within self-assumed, practical, and impersonal limits. 40 1
The theoretical possibility that aesthetic elements of the design might
so transcend the useful object as to constitute a conceptually separable
work of art capable of independent existence is thus virtually nil in
practice.402 On this approach, an Italian court recently denied
copyrightability to the two-dimensional design of a lady's scarf by a
renowned designer on the grounds that its aesthetic qualities were ap-
preciable only as a function of their practical utility.40 3
The ambiguity inherent in the doctrine of separability induces
some courts to attach undue importance to such factors as the nature of
the material support, the scope of the artist's creative purpose, and the
intended use of the creative work. To the extent that such factors do
influence decisions, scindibit tends to become a euphemism for the
destination or purpose test tried and rejected in earlier Italian case law
and in France.4°4 When, instead, serious claims to copyrightability
based on conceptual separability are advanced, courts and commenta-
tors insist that conceptual separability results from a high degree of
artistic value.405 Yet such covert reliance on artistic value cannot read-
401. For the view that the normal function of industrial design is to combine aesthetic and
useful qualities into an indivisible whole, see G. SENA, supra note 205, at 451. Accord F. Perret,
supra note 2, at 264-67; see also supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text.
402. See Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 71, 73, 77 (discussing 1974 cases involving modern-
istic chairs and tables); Benussi, supra note 48, at 110 (agreeing as to shapes of useful articles);
supra notes 220-21 and accompanying text. But see Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 76 n.66
(citing 1974 decision of Milan tribunal upholding copyrightability of a series of plastic toy figures
based on original models created by a sculptor because they "communicate feelings and
emotions").
403. Sena, supra note 212, at 172-73; see supra notes 217, 225 and accompanying text. Older
decisions admitted paintings of flowers on seed packets, advertising posters, printed scarves, and
sculptured candelabras to Italian copyright law as applied art. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at
71; see also infra note 410.
404. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 76-77; Franzosi, supra note 211, at 110; Perot-Morel,
Pavia Conference, supra note 87, at 384-85; see also supra note 220. But see F. PERRET, SUpra note
2, at 260-68 (judicial aberrations do not impinge upon the validity of dissociation theory). For the
destination test in France, see supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
405. See, e.g., G. SENA, supra note 205, at 453 (citing Auletta). Ascarelli also approves of
testing conceptual separability in terms of artistic strength. These and other Italian authors sug-
gest "high and remarkable" artistic value would be a primary or even necessary determinant of
dissociation. Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 56-57. Fabiani once suggested that Italian courts actually
work in reverse: "having recognized the creative value of the work of applied art, they acknowl-
edge, in general, the ideal dissociability from the industrial product" necessary for copyright law.
M.A. PEROT-MOREL, supra note 2, at 203 (quoting Fabiani). Gaubiac believes that, in such cases,
artistic value is the determining factor. Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 56-59; cf. Reichman, After the
Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 329-33, 347-50 (discussing recent Second Circuit decisions).
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ily be distinguished from overt tests of artistic value used in the Federal
Republic of Germany and, more recently, in the Benelux countries.406
Critics like to point out that scindibilft, even when amplified by
the doctrine of conceptual separability, leads to results no less arbitrary
than those obtained by adopting less "formally unexceptionable" crite-
ria.40 7 If the Italian criterion of separability were too literally applied,
purpose or destination tests would govern, despite doctrinal protesta-
tions to the contrary.408 If the criterion were applied too liberally, by
means of an expansive reading of "conceptual separability," the con-
trolling factor would be merit and a de facto regime of partial cumula-
tion would ensue.40 9 Between these two extremes lies a potential for
metaphysical excursion that is obviated by the judicial expedient of
holding three-dimensional designs of useful articles to be inseparable
as a matter of law in almost all cases.410
This judicial expedient causes "separability" to function as a chan-
nel that leads unerringly to the special regime of design protection.
Under the Italian Design Law of 1940, if a manufacturer fails to regis-
ter promptly, in the hope that a given creation may later turn out to be
a separable work of applied art, he exposes himself to the risk of prior
divulgation, which destroys novelty and casts the design into the public
domain.411 A restrictive doctrine of separability thus encourages man-
ufacturers to use the broad range of protection provided for both orna-
mental designs and utility models, and helps to keep industrial designs
from encroaching upon either patent or artistic property law.
Theoretical shortcomings of the Italian noncumulationist model
must therefore be weighed against its functional objectives. Unlike re-
406. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 293-97, 327-40, 380-82; see also
infra note 430. Sena accepts the logical consequences of this position, namely, that the criterion of
conceptual separability, as governed by a test of artistic value, would approximate a regime of
partial cumulation based on a similar test of artistic value. G. SENA, supra note 205, at 453.
407. See supra note 226.
408. See the recent example mentioned by Benussi, supra note 48, at 119, and the admonitions
of F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 259.
409. See most recently, Gaubiac, supra note 48, at 56-57. Algardi is less sweeping: although
many designs of useful articles may be said to possess "an autonomous aesthetic value, not all the
difficulties that arise from the application of the criterion [of conceptual separability] have been
overcome." Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 76 (trans.). Algardi cited only one recent case find-
ing conceptual separability. See supra note 402. Franzosi and Benussi are more scathing. Benussi
declared that "the criterion of ideal dissociability [i.e., conceptual separability], is not false but
certainly illusory." F. BENussI, LA TUTELA DEL DISEGNO INDUSTRIALE 145-46 (1975)(trans.);
accord Franzosi, supra note 211, at 110.
410. See supra notes 220-23, 402 and accompanying text. The case law illustrating instances
of "separable" works of applied art, as reviewed by Benussi in 1975, dates back to the 1920's and
1930's. F. BENussi, supra note 409, at 144-45. During this period the theory of dissociation was
being formulated in reaction to a short-lived codification of the unity of art thesis. See supra notes
210, 403.
411. See supra notes 362, 398 and accompanying text.
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gimes of total cumulation, the Italian model prevents designs with low
creative content from gaining copyright protection. Unlike regimes of
partial cumulation, the Italian system does not subject designs seeking
copyright protection as applied art to a direct test of creative value on a
case-by-case basis. What enables the Italian system to operate, despite
the weaknesses of the separability criterion,4 12 is the existence of a fully
developed regime of special design protection coupled with a systemic
determination to consign three-dimensional designs and models to this
regime.
2. Separability American Style. Congress continued to delay
passage of a sui generis design law. From 1960 on, the United States
Copyright Office was therefore obliged to administer a doctrine of sep-
arability without the regime of special design protection that buttressed
the Italian system. Manufacturers of ornamental designs excluded
from copyright law by the separability test in Regulation Section
202.10(c) could fall back only on the design patent law or the law of
unfair competition.
Under the design patent law, the standard of nonobviousness was
applied rigorously to industrial art.413 Most United States courts, espe-
cially those at the appellate level, insisted on an exceptionally large
"inventive" step, sometimes acting upon a virtually conclusive pre-
sumption that combination designs were obvious as a matter of law.
414
Other courts reached a similar result by allowing patented designs to be
disassembled into their component parts and attacked on grounds of
obviousness by piecemeal application of the prior art, usually without
412. See supra notes 404-09 and accompanying text.
413. In 1952, Congress codified the invention requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 103 in terms of non-
obviousness; section 103 applies to designs because of the provision in 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1982)
"that design patents are 'subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.'" 1 D. CHISUM,
supra note 367, § 1.0412], at 1-129. At the time of the Patent Codification Act of 1952, the design
patent law had briefly appeared more receptive. See, e.g., Glen Raven Knitting Mills v. Sanson
Hosiery Mills, 189 F.2d 845, 849 (4th Cir. 1951). Soon, however, the standard of nonobviousness,
which had been substituted for the "flash of genius" test of invention, was applied strictly to
industrial art, perhaps even more strictly than to utility patents. See supra notes 140, 245 and
accompanying text; see also Dulin, supra note 16, at 359; Comment, Design Protection-Time to
Replace the Design Patent, 51 MINN. L. REv. 942, 952-55 (1967). Yet an extremely high standard
of nonobviousness for aesthetic designs is neither more nor less mandatory in the United States
than under Italian law. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 524-26, 531 (1872); see I D.
CHisum, supra note 367, § 1.04[2], at 1-130 ("courts openly admit that any assessment of the obvi-
ousness of the solution is necessarily subjective"); Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note
65, at 311-13, 333-36 (reporting favorable trend in design patent law).
414. See, e.g., G.B. Lewis Co. v. Gould Prods., 436 F.2d 1176, 1178 (2d Cir. 1971); Rains v.
Niaqua, Inc., 406 F.2d 275, 279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 909 (1969); Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Sandee Mfg., 286 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 963 (1961). But see
Rains v. Cascade Indus., 402 F.2d 241, 246-47 (3d Cir. 1968).
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regard to commercial success.4 15 Still other courts routinely found
modem functional designs wanting in ornamentality or excessively in-
fluenced by technical factors.416 Taken together, these approaches re-
flected a judicial hostility toward the existing design protection law41 7
that was very different from the flexible attitude of Italian courts to-
ward the Italian Design Law of 1940.418
United States unfair competition law provided little protection for
ornamental designs of useful articles before the 1950's.419 Although
manufacturers sought registration as marks for certain product configu-
rations even before the decision in Mazer v. Stein, neither courts nor
practitioners during this period seriously regarded section 43(a) of the
415. See, e.g., Hadco Prods. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1273 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1023 (1972); Blumcraft of Pittsburgh v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 407 F.2d 557, 559 (4th
Cir. 1969); Trimble Products v. W.T. Grant Co., 404 F.2d 344, 345 (2d Cir. 1968). But see In re
Laverne, 356 F.2d 1003, 1006 (C.C.P.A. 1966)(ordinary observer standard substituted for that of
ordinary designer). See generally Michaelson, Design Patents and Obviousness-Obviousness to
Whom?, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 620 (1970); Comment, supra note 413, at 952-55.
416. See, e.g., Barofsky v. General Elec., 396 F.2d 340, 342-44 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1031 (1969); Payne Metal Enters. v. McPhee, 382 F.2d 541, 546 (9th Cir. 1967); Bentley v.
Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 359 F.2d 140, 145-46 (9th Cir. 1966); Blisscraft of Hollywood v.
United Plastics Co., 294 F.2d 694, 696 (2d Cir. 1961); see also Nimetz, supra note 18, at 113-21.
417. See supra note 245 and accompanying text. These approaches were also opposed to the
flexibility introduced by the Supreme Court in both Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511,
524-26, 531 (1872) and Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I (1966), aft'g 333 F.2d 529 (8th Cir.
1964). But courts such as the United States Courts of Appeals for the Second and Third Circuits
resisted the implications of Deere for design patents, including the Supreme Court's willingness to
consider secondary factors, and sometimes cited instead Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermar-
ket, 340 U.S. 147 (1950). See, e.g., Hadco Prods. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265, 1269 (3d
Cir. 1972).
For the improved situation after 1974, see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65,
at 311-13, 333-36.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 364-73.
419. See, e.g., Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930); see also Derenberg, supra note 17, at 772-73. Commercial designs could be
protected against misrepresentation or "palming off," provided the design or configuration had
obtained secondary meaning and nonfunctional features had been copied. Dulin, supra note 16,
at 343-46. Even so, the definition of functional features could be extremely broad. See, e.g.,
Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952); J.C. Penney Co. v. H.D. Lee
Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1941). See generally 3 R. CALLMANN, UNFAIR COM-
PETON, TADmAR ,s AND MoNoPoLIES, § 19.35, at 148-53 (4th ed. Supp. 1983). As regards
misappropriation, however, United States law did not officially recognize slavish imitation alone
as a tort. Derenberg, supra note 17, at 772-73, 782-83; see infra note 428. Its application to com-
mercial designs prior to the 1950's was largely negated by Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp. See
Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 70 (statement and testimony of Philip T. Dal-
simer, New York Patent Law Association).
Private efforts in the United States to prevent design piracy through guild sanctions were
reportedly effective, but the methods contravened the antitrust laws. Fashion Originators' Guild
of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 463 (1941); see also Millinery Creators Guild v. FTC, 109
F.2d 175, 176 (2d Cir. 1940), a f'd, 312 U.S. 469 (1941); Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra
note 21, at 102 (statement of Nat Abelson).
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Lanham Act as capable of protecting unregistered designs.420 As state
courts changed their course in the 1950's and increasingly extended
common law concepts, including misappropriation, to commercial de-
signs,421 the emerging trend deflected the attention of the practicing bar
away from the deeper implications of Mazer itself.4 22 When, therefore,
the Sears-Compco decisions of the United States Supreme Court in
1964 sought to preempt state actions sounding in misappropriation for
unpatentable designs of useful articles,423 the shock provoked a former
Chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee for the Pro-
tection of Industrial Designs to exclaim, "We have come to the end of
the road.
'424
420. Owners of unregistered designs had sought access to § 23 of the Lanham Act as regards
configurations of goods, but mainly by probing the limits of sections 44(h) and (i). Derenberg,
supra note 17, at 630-36; Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Dec-
ade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue, 32 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1029, 1031 (1957) [hereinafter
cited as Derenberg (1957)].
The Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982), prohibits "false designation of origin, or
any false description or representation." Shapes and configurations that are capable of indicating
source have been allowed to register with the Patent and Trademark Office since In re Minnesota
Mining & Mfg., 335 F.2d 836, 837 (C.C.P.A. 1964). Section 43(a), as currently interpreted, covers
claims for infringement of unregistered marks, including designs that function as trademarks. Di-
amond, Current Protection of Designs of UsefulArticles Under the Law of Trademarks, reprinted in
1982 ABA-SEcTION PATENT TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT LAW 204-05. In recent years, section
43(a) has also been used to deter various forms of unfair competition; the scope of federal protec-
tion provided by this section is expanding. Id at 205-06.
421. See, e.g., Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 431-35, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443, 451-55 (Sup. Ct.)
(which relied expressly on International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)),
af§'d, 2 A.D. 2d 878, 156 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1956); Dulin, supra note 16, at 347-48. Courts dealing with
slavish imitation in this period were increasingly disposed to create a presumption of secondary
meaning in the presence of a minimum showing of a likelihood of confusion. See, e.g., Master-
crafter's Clock & Radio v. Vacheron Le Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 467 & n.7 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 832 (1955); f Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches Inc. v. Benrus
Watch Co., 155 F. Supp. 932, 936 (S.D.N.Y. 1957)(finding that the plaintifi's design had not ac-
quired a secondary meaning), modjed, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 184-96. "While unfair competition was originally applied to the palming off of one's
goods as those of a rival trader ... this limited view has been considerably broadened in recent
years, particularly in the State of New York, to include what is an unfair course of dealing, even
without proof of an established secondary meaning." Flint v. Oleet Jewelry Mfg. Co., 133 F.
Supp. 459, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); see also Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, 283
F.2d 551, 554 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1960)(trade dress); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Adanta Novelty Corp., 223 F.
Supp. 866, 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Federal courts in these cases were applying state law.
422. "Now, [Mazer v. Stein] was a revolutionary decision, but it took a while for people who
had been headed off in another direction to realize what it had to offer them." Hearings 1975,
supra note 169, at 1856-57 (testimony of Barbara Ringer, Register of Copyrights); see also Ringer,
supra note 233, at 29-30 (doctrine of misappropriation then a disquieting "speck on the horizon").
423. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Compco v. Day-Brite
Lighting Inc., 376 U.S. 234, 238 (1964); see Diamond, supra note 420, at 212-14.
424. Dalsimer, supra note 90, at 173. He continued:
We have come to the end of the road. . . .This is a complex area. The complexity of
this area, of what is trademark, what is design, what is functional, what is nonfunctional,
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The Copyright Office thus found itself in a delicate position. If it
slackened its determination to "hold the line" against copyright protec-
tion of ornamental designs of useful articles, then vested interests Reg-
ister Fisher had sought to ward off before his death might multiply.425
There would be less interest in changing the status quo and a new de-
sign protection law could become more difficult to obtain. If its resist-
ance, based on separability, gave rise to inconsistent results, at either
the administrative or the judicial level,426 such results might provoke a
"unity of art" reaction leading to broad copyright protection for indus-
trial art.427 If designs excluded by the Copyright Office were routinely
copied by slavish imitators,428 courts might attempt to use state or fed-
eral unfair competition law to grant protection of indeterminate length
on the basis of standards that spokesmen for the Copyright Office had
has indicated to me the wisdom that the law of unfair competition should be left open
and developing, not foreclosed as the Supreme Court appears to have done.
Id at 173-74. A leading scholar was equally shocked: "[Tihe Sears-Compco decisions of 1964
. . . wiped out a hundred years of common law unfair competition law which had prohibited the
simulation of non-functional shapes which were likely to confuse buyers." 1 J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 7.24, at 190 (1973). Dulin, instead, immediately (and
correctly) predicted the expansion of Lanham Act § 43(a) if a design bill was not enacted. Dulin,
supra note 16, at 358-59; see also supra note 420; Reichman,Afier the CopyrightAct, supra note 65,
at 379-80, 386 (post-1976 tendencies).
425. See supra notes 194-95, 294 and accompanying text; Kaminstein, Fisher Memorial, supra
note 26, at xiii.
426. This is the sense in whicn Professor Nimmer asks how it is possible to know when "the
sole intrinsic function" of a work was to be found in its utility or when its artistic features were to
be "identified separately" and "capable of existing independently" as a work of art. I M, NIM-
MER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-89 and 2-90; Vf Desbois, supra note 60, at 74 (quoted supra note
81).
427. See supra text accompanying notes 79-88. Energetic resistance would also expose the
Copyright Office to direct attacks on its authority to act as art critic, a question also hinted at in
Vacheron. See, e.g., Crowley, The Register of Copyrights as an Art Critic, 11 COPYRIGHT L. SYMp.
(ASCAP) 155, 161-69 (1962); Reed, The Role ofthe Register of Copyrights in the Registration Pro-
cess: A CriticalAppraisal of Certain Exclusionary Regulations, 18 COPYRIGHT L. SYmp. (ASCAP)
1, 5-10, 17-27, 31-38 (1970).
428. The use of a competitgr's product as a pattern might be described as copying by
duplication, as opposed to copying by imitation. Duplication, like photocopying, results
in a nearly exact copy. But imitation can also produce a very close copy. Both methods
of producing nearly indistinguishable copies are. . . referred to as "slavish" copying.
The term "Chinese" copy, sometimes heard, is synonomous.
IA R. CALLMAN, supra note 419, § 4.60, at 92 n.1. Also synonomous are the terms "slavish imita-
tion" and "servile imitation," used in both domestic and foreign literature. See, e.g., E.J. KASE,
DICTIONARY OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY-LEGAL AND RELATED TERMS 53 (1980); Derenberg,
supra note 17, at 773 (complains that doctrine of misappropriation, despite "hopeful beginnings,"
could not be used to repress slavish imitation of works of applied art after Cheney Bros. v. Doris
Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 728 (1930)). Derenberg observed that
"the general law of unfair competition in most civil law countries reflects a much broader and
more flexible approach toward unfair trade practices." Id at 782; see, e.g., Ulmer, Unfair Compe-
tition Law in the European Economic Community, 4 IIC 188, 197 (1973)("Slavish imitation...
presents problems that are familiar and particularly difficult to solve."); see also supra notes 419-
24 and accompanying text.
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earlier termed "virtually nonexistent." 429 An hypothesis suggested by
foreign law is that the longer Congress delayed in passing the design
bills, the more the United States faced a choice between overprotection
in copyright law, on the French and Belgian models, or overprotection
in unfair competition law as had occurred in the Netherlands, which,
prior to 1975, had also tried to exclude most designs from copyright law
without the safety net of a special design law.
430
An often-cited article published by law students at the University
of Chicago in 1971 provides a framework for examining this hypothe-
sis.431 The authors asserted that Mazer v. Stein had opened a "brave
new world of copyright law" by extending the scope of protection be-
yond "the normal concepts of works of fine art" and by indiscrimi-
nately admitting mass-produced two- and three-dimensional objects,
including many that belonged in the public domain.432 The Chicago
Critics claimed that cases dealing with applied art during the 1960's
had undermined settled principles of copyright law. For example, the
requirement of originality had been so vitiated that it failed to exclude
public-domain matter seeking protection as applied art.433 The idea-
expression dichotomy had also failed to exclude commonplace designs
from copyright protection. 434 Courts had virtually ignored even the
notice requirement.435 These failings were exacerbated by judicial ap-
plication of the law of infringement, especially the "overall impression"
test, which the Chicago Critics said discouraged "close examination to
detect disparities" and made expert testimony suspect.
436
429. See supra notes 242, 424 and accompanying text; Jackson, Unfair Competition by Product
Simulation v. Copyright Protectionfor Designs, 45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 422, 424 (1963).
430. In the Netherlands, courts anxious to avoid the breadth of protection under the unity of
art doctrine as implemented in Belgium elevated the requirement of creativity for copyright pro-
tection of applied art to a height inferior only to the standards in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many. But the Federal Republic possessed a design law, whereas the Netherlands did not. Broad
exclusion of aesthetic designs from copyright law by Netherlands courts then led to broad protec-
tion of designs of useful articles in the law of unfair competition, and this in turn put pressure on
the legislature to enact a design law. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 283-
97.
431. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 807. For important cases citing this article, see infra
note 500.
432. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 807 & n.7, 822.
433. Id at 812.
434. Id at 812, 814-16; see also Note, supra note 28, at 1532.
435. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 808.
436. Id at 813. An earlier, more balanced study had observed that the "absence of substantial
variation among objects of a given functional character maximizes the difficulty of determining
the fact of infringement." Note, supra note 28, at 1532. The "overall impression" test was actually
the result of a judicial attempt to narrow the breadth of protection that ensued from the practice of
counting dissimilarities at the infringement stage. See infra notes 478-81 and accompanying text.
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The Chicago Critics concluded that "eliminating appropriation or
commercial piracy has become an end in itself," and that copyright law
risked degenerating into a version of the common law of unfair compe-
tition, contrary to the preemptive spirit of Sears- Compco.437 In effect,
this amounted to a claim that the United States, during the 1960's, had
been according as much protection to designs of useful articles under
copyright law as countries embracing the unity of art theory.
4 38 It
would also mean that separability had failed as an exclusionary crite-
rion, and that the entire anticumulationist fortress erected by Arthur
Fisher in the late 1950's had collapsed. These critics even challenged
the wisdom of the Supreme Court's decision to allow applied art to be
protected by copyright law in the first instance.439
There are a number of preliminary problems with these asser-
tions.440 The authors' disavowal of Mazer v. Stein ignored the long and
successful campaign within the Berne Union to break down those "nor-
mal concepts of works of fine art" from which the Supreme Court
strayed in 1954.441 How, after 1948, Register Fisher could have
bridged the gap between the Berne Union countries and the Geneva
Convention countries without official United States recognition of the
category of applied art is not readily understood.442 Nor did recogni-
tion of applied art inherently lead to broad copyright protection for
mass-produced commercial products, as the Chicago Critics seemed to
believe.443 On the contrary, courts in most other countries whose offi-
437. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 818.
438. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (positions of France and pre-1975
Belgium).
439. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 807 n.7, 822 ("the logic of the situation demands. . . a
complete reevaluation of the Mazer decision itself").
440. At first glance, the Chicago Critics' conclusions tally with predictions that seem logical on
the basis of experience under foreign law. See supra text accompanying note 430. But see infra
notes 482-99 and accompanying text.
441. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 807 n.7;see supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
442. See supra notes 22-34, 138 and accompanying text. Had Fisher's design bill, S. 2075,
supra note 158, not been supplanted by S.. 1884, see Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note
21, the Copyright Office might eventually have faced this same question at the international level.
The answer might have suggested that S. 2075 conferred a form of copyright protection and that
even the Berne Convention expressly permitted its members to limit the duration of protection
accorded applied art in domestic copyright laws. See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
Here, as elsewhere, retention of the design patent law along with the sui generis design law served
varied and subtle ends.
443. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 807 (title). Once it had recognized applied art in Mfa-
zer v. Stein, the United States had either to protect all aesthetic designs in copyright law or adopt
some exclusionary criterion of its own. The Chicago Critics conceded that the distinction between
"mass-produced products" and "normal concepts of works of fine art" was "not self-defining,"
particularly because many mass-produced works of so-called fine art having little or no artistic
value, such as decorative paintings, had also to be accounted for. Id at 807 n.7. But these critics
offer no criterion of their own for singling out works falling within the "normal concept" of art
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cial positions concerning applied art differed widely had all found
means of absorbing their domestic analogues of Mazer v. Stein without
succumbing to the unity of art temptation.
4 4"
Even if the United States had entered a unity of art phase during
the 1960's, as may be inferred from the Chicago Critics' article, allow-
ance must still be made for the scope of protection afforded by the
Copyright Act of 1909 as compared with that of the Berne Convention
of 1948. The copyright paradigm underlying Mazer v. Stein, with its
formalities of publication with notice, registration, and deposit, its rela-
tively short duration, and its lack of moral rights, seems closer in spirit
to the special design laws enacted abroad than to the copyright para-
digm of the Berne Union.445 Copyright protection on American terms,
even if routinely granted, was arguably not excessive by world stan-
dards, especially after the Paris Industrial Union, to which the United
States belongs, had itself mandated the protection of industrial de-
signs.446 Given an invalidation rate of one hundred percent for design
patents at the appellate level,44 7 upholding copyrights in "applied art"
provided the only consistent evidence that the United States was meet-
ing its obligations under the Paris Convention during this period.
This appraisal thus suggests that the most drastic conclusions of
the Chicago Critics did not necessarily follow from their findings;
moreover, the validity of these findings is itself questionable. Decisions
validating the copyrights of most subject matter reviewed during the
period 1959-1969 were not radical departures from precedent, except
for those concerning fabric designs, which immediately benefited from
the Copyright Office's need to reconcile separability with Mazer v.
Stein .448 The chimpanzee doll, upheld even before the 1956 version of
that would not contradict Bleistein; and they do not disassociate themselves from the discredited
views of an earlier age that "art" and "utility" were intrinsically antithetical.
444. See supra note 200 (Italy); supra note 430 (Netherlands); Reichman, After the Copyright
Act, supra note 65, at 283-97 (Benelux group), 333-40 (Federal Republic of Germany). Italy did
in fact succumb to the unity of art doctrine for a brief period, but courts and commentators quick-
ly reversed the situation. See supra notes 210, 410.
445. See supra note 166 and accompanying text.
446. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12.
447. See supra note 413.
448. See, ag., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir.
1960); Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 334, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1960);
Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants, 173 F. Supp. 625, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Professor Latman
considered that the status of fabric designs in this period had improved dramatically. Latman,
supra note 9, at 281. A Swiss observer agreed. See H. SECRETAN, supra note 45, at 128-29.
Separability as such was not treated in these decisions, which seem to have followed the lead
of the Copyright Office in regarding fabric designs as two-dimensional paintings applied to tex-
tiles. See Regulation § 202.10(b) (1959), supra note 199. The Copyright Office, in turn, was self-
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the regulation," 9 was followed by other dolls, 450 by plastic banks
shaped to resemble pet dogs,451 and by a hobby horse.452 Similarly, the
cases that routinely found designs of costume jewelry copyrightable be-
tween 1955 and 1958453 were followed by decisions upholding designs
of "garish trinkets,"454 and of an ornamental jewelry box. 455
These cases were significant both for the number of items allowed
into copyright law and for the minimal artistic values tolerated;45 6 but
consciously implementing Mazer v. Stein, which, after the Vacheron decision in 1958, could not be
emptied of meaning. See supra text accompanying notes 184-96, 224-25. Another two-dimen-
sional design admitted in this period concerned a pattern for dinnerware. Syracuse China Corp.
v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 180 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
The main issues that fabric designs raised in this period concerned originality, e.g., Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Acadia Corp., 173 F. Supp. 292, 299-300 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), and notice (a copyright
notice could be cut off the selvage of a fabric and elicit a claim of publication without notice), e.g.,
Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Wiener Corp., 274 F.2d at 488-90. These issues were now usually
resolved in favor of plaintiffs. See, e.g., Latman, supra note 9, at 283. But see, e.g., H.M. Kolbe
Co. v. Armgus Textile Co., 279 F.2d 555, 556-57 (2d Cir. 1960)(requiring notice to be repeated on
wide designs).
449. Rushton v. Vitale, 218 F.2d 434, 435 (2d Cir. 1955); see supra text accompanying note
159.
450. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 624 (2d Cir. 1962)(but see
dissent of Judge Clark); Mattel, Inc. v. S. Rosenberg Co., 296 F. Supp. 1024, 1025 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). Some of the dolls upheld looked like popular musicians or combat soldiers. See, e.g.,
Hassenfeld Bros. v. Mego Corp., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 786, 788-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Remco Indus.,
Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 898, 899 (E.D.N.Y. 1964).
451. Royalty Designs, Inc. v. Thrifticheck Serv. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 702, 704 (S.D.N.Y.
1962)(copyright on plastic bank in shape of dog valid). But see L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536
F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir.)(en banc)(copyright on plastic copy of antique "Uncle Sam" bank invalid
for lack of "substantial originality"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
452. Blazon, Inc. v. Deluxe Game Corp., 268 F. Supp. 416, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)(design of
model horse is copyrightable). But see Uneeda Doll Co. v. P. & M. Doll Co., 241 F. Supp. 675,
677 (S.D.N.Y.) (abstract idea not copyrightable), af'd, 353 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1965)(per curiam)(in
which misgivings were expressed). The copyrightability of scale-model airplanes was upheld in
1971. See Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 448 F.2d 284, 285 (6th Cir. 1971),
a'd on appeal after remand, 492 F.2d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974).
453. See supra notes 158, 184-96 and accompanying text.
454. Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Novelty Jewelry Co., 309 F.2d 745, 746 (2d Cir. 1962). Also upheld
were the designs of a jewel-encrusted turtle pin, Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt,
428 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir. 1970), and of a jewelled pin in the shape of a bee, Herbert Rosenthal
Jewelry Corp. v. Grossbardt, 436 F.2d 315, 316 (2d Cir. 1970). But see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry
Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738,742 (9th Cir. 197 I)aewelled bee pin mere idea not protectible in
copyright).
455. Dan Kasoff, Inc. v. Gresco Jewelry Co., 204 F. Supp. 694, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aft'd, 308
F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1962)(per curiam).
456. "The courts have been forced to grapple here, more than in other contexts, with the con-
sequences of immaterial variations in the works in question." Latman, supra note 9, at 282 (citing
Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. United Merchants, 173 F. Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1959)).
Secretan was similarly struck by the minimal levels of creativity tolerated by United States
courts in this period; like Arthur Fisher in 1960, he predicted an expansive phase, given the pre-
vailing standard of originality. H. SECRETAN, supra note 45, at 128-3 1. But see Gardenia Flow-
ers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776, 781-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Florabelle Flowers,
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they dealt mainly with borderline subject matter protected by United
States copyright law before the copyright authorities had fashioned any
official response to Mazer v. Stein. When Bailie v. Fisher overtly raised
the banner of "art in the historical sense" in 1958, the status of toys,
dolls, and jewelry may indeed have been threatened.457 These items
might have been definitively denied copyright protection if Congress
had enacted S. 2075, which attempted to insulate copyright law from
ornamental designs embodied in useful articles.458 After the "anti-
maim" compromises of the period 1961-1964, however, the Copyright
Office could not maintain that the "sole intrinsic function" of toys,
dolls, and jewelry was their utility when the utilitarian character of
such objects remained uncertain under either the general revision bill
or the pending design bills.4 59 Most of the three-dimensional designs
dealt with in these cases seemed closer to the traditional, figurative
statue in Mazer v. Stein than to the modern, functional designs that
were of paramount concern to the copyright authorities. Even if bor-
derline designs of toys, dolls, and jewelry were henceforth to be viewed
as designs of "useful articles" subject to the test of separability, most of
them should have passed the test.460 The opinions rarely mention tech-
nical issues of separability and utilitarian function, an omission consis-
Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304, 305 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (invalidating copyrights
in designs of artificial flowers for insufficient creativity and originality); Reichman, After the Copy-
rightAct, supra note 65, at 271-76 (discussing these cases), 276-83 (discussing Hubmann's theory
of the creative work).
457. 258 F.2d 425,426 (D.C. Cir. 1958)(per curiam); see supra notes 189-91 and accompanying
text.
458. See supra notes 255-71 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 295-302, 313, 330-44 and accompanying text. The criterion of separability
adopted by the Copyright Office in 1958 was quickly interpreted as follows: "Excluded from
copyright registration as a 'work of art'. . . is an article whose 'sole intrinsic function is its utility,'
even if it is 'unique and attractively shaped.'" Present Design Protection, supra note 48, at 139.
On its face, this language simply restates one of the basic tenets of Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
102 (1880), that prevents manufacturers from using copyright law to circumvent the patent law.
The author of the Note on Present Design Protection, in seeking to explain that the test of
separabilty excludes purely functional designs of useful articles, seems to have conveyed the im-
pression that the "sole intrinsic function" language also constituted the definition of useful articles
thereafter to be applied by the Copyright Office; this, indeed, is the conventional assumption of
the literature. If true, few ornamental designs would necessarily have been subject to the test of
separability. The Copyright Office's preferred definition of useful articles (cast in terms of "an
intrinsic utilitarian function") had been pending since the 1959 design bill, however, and was
maintained in all the general revision bills. In the meantime, the evidence suggests that the Copy-
right Office was actually employing its own practical definition or rules of thumb that were not
widely perceived by the profession. See COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACrICEs 2-274
(1973); supra note 341; infra notes 513-16 and accompanying text.
460. See REGISTER'S REPORT 1961, supra note 45, at 12-13.
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tent with the interest of the Copyright Office in not arousing opposition
to the design bills from quarters already pacified.
46'
The Chicago Critics' claim that the period 1959-1969 was charac-
terized by an uncontrolled expansionist trend thus rests on the admis-
sion of artificial flowers beginning in 1962;462 of a stand-up, stuffable
Santa Claus decoration that same year;463 and of a pencil sharpener
disguised as an antique telephone in 1966.4 64 But these decisions can
be rationalized in terms of material separability, which, in the absence
of a special design law, necessarily tolerates a buffer zone of protec-
tibility for designs with an affinity to the statuettes upheld in Mazer v.
Stein .465 The Santa Claus decision was the most dubious, not because
of a deviation from the doctrine of separability, but because the court
may have erred in protecting the stand-up mechanism, a utility model
in disguise.46
6
The pencil sharpener case-7TedArnold Ltd v. Silvereraft Co. 467-
reinforced the defense of the copyright fortress in this period. Al-
though the district court in TedArnold upheld the copyright in the de-
sign, it squarely acknowledged the need for ornamental designs of
useful articles to satisfy the test of separability at a time when most
cases, dealing with traditional borderline categories, ignored this is-
sue.468 The court demonstrated the exclusionary power of the doctrine
by applying it retroactively to the modernistic watch-face design denied
461. REGISTER'S DRAFT RFPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 22; Hearings 1975, supra note
169, at 993 (testimony of Alan Latman).
462. See Prestige Floral, S.A. v. California Artificial Flower Co., 201 F. Supp. 287, 291
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); see also Fristot v. First Am. Natural Ferns Co., 251 F. Supp. 886, 887-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1966). But see Florabelle Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304, 305
n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(commonplace design not copyrightable); Gardenia Flowers, Inc. v. Joseph
Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 771, 781-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(commonplace design not copyright-
able); Rico, Ltd. v. Hub Floral Mfg. Co., 206 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)(not infringed);
Prestige Floral, S.A. v. Zunino-Altman, Inc., 203 F. Supp. 649, 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)(not in-
fringed), aff'd, 301 F.2d 286 (2d Cir. 1962)(per curiam).
463. Doran v. Sunset House Distrib. Corp., 197 F. Supp. 940, 944 (S.D. Cal. 1961), aTd, 304
F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1962).
464. Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
465. Material separability was expressly discussed in the case of the pencil sharpener disguised
as an antique telephone. Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F. Supp. 733, 736 (S.D.N.Y.
1966). Professor Perret cites this United States decision as illustrating the "universal appeal" of the
theory of dissociation. F. PERRET, supra note 2, at 264 n.258; see supra notes 402, 409-10.
The acceptance of artificial flowers was derived by analogy from the two-dimensional floral
pattern of the fabric design upheld in Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Candy Frocks, Inc., 187 F. Supp,
334, 336 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). See Prestige Floral, S.A. v. California Artifical Flowers Co., 201 F.
Supp. 287, 290-91 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). But this result was challenged on other grounds in 1968. See
authorities cited supra note 456.
466. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-89 n.97.1, 2-90 n.100.1.
467. 259 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
468. TedArnold, 259 F. Supp. at 734-35.
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registration under the first post-Mazer regulation of 1956.469 The ear-
lier result was ratified, in dicta, on the ground that the design of the
watch face, although capable of being identified separately, was inca-
pable of independent existence "apart from the rest of the watch."470
The Ted Arnold court's insistence on rationalizing the Vacheron
decision in terms of the posterior criterion of separability was but one
indication of subtle judicial resistance to applied art that even tradi-
tional borderline categories continued to encounter throughout the
1960's. In 1962, for example, Judge Clark of the Second Circuit at-
tacked the practice of sustaining "a monopoly of unique and disturbing
character" in a case upholding the copyrightability of a doll: "what the
plaintiff could not get under the patent law (as it in effect concedes by
its course of conduct) it has succeeded in getting in three-to-five fold
measure under the copyright law."471 Plaintiffs "most natural appeal
would be for a design patent," but as Judge Clark observed, "it is well
known that manufacturers have been disippointed in this law, since
almost no design patents have stood up in the courts, facing as they do
the twin barriers of a showing of a novel design and of infringe-
ment. '472 He deplored the shift to copyright law after Mazer v.
Stein, 473 which made a fifty-six year monopoly available in an appro-
priate case.474
Other courts in this mood resorted to standard technical devices in
order to limit the scope of protection afforded those subject-matter cat-
469. See Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches v. Benrus Watch Co., 155 F. Supp. 932
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), maodfed, 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958); see supra notes 184-91 and accompanying
text.
470. TedArnold, 259 F. Supp. at 734-35.
471. Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 625-26 (2d Cir. 1962)(Clark, J.,
dissenting).
472. Id at 626. Judge Clark exaggerated the difficulties of both. The real obstacle was nonob-
viousness or "qualitative originality." See supra notes 413-18 and accompanying text.
473. Ideal Toy, 302 F.2d at 626 (Clark, J. dissenting). It did not occur to Judge Clark that his
own hostility to the design patent, apparently shared by the Second Circuit as a whole, was in part
to blame for the "shift to copyright law." See supra note 178; see also supra notes 413-18 and
accompanying text; Reichman, After the CopyrightAct, supra note 65, at 303-08 (discussing district
court cases hospitable to a patent approach).
474. Ideal Toy, 302 F.2d at 625-26 (Clark J., dissenting); see Note, supra note 28, at 1523-24,
1526. Unlike patent law, however, copyright law confers protection only against copying or illicit
appropriation of an author's expression, as distinct from his ideas, and protection is not forthcom-
ing where a second work was demonstrably created by independent effort. Suggesting that a copy-
right is a "monopoly" is both misleading and harmful. Jackson, supra note 429, at 425-26;
Umbreit, supra note 14, at 932. Copyrights can be used by monopolies and oligopolies to further
their market power, but this is a different question from the incentive to create and disseminate for
which copyright protection is the reward. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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egories recognized as copyrightable under Mazer v. Stein.475 Courts
frequently invoked the idea-expression dichotomy for this purpose,
sometimes in a heavy-handed manner.476 Tests for infringement could
be restrictively applied even to fabric designs, which were generally in
favor during this period. For example, identification of public domain
elements in a plaintiffs design might exonerate a defendant who had
not independently resorted to the public domain matter.477 More often,
courts simply declined to see the requisite amount of "substantial simi-
larity" in the allegedly infringing designs, at times by a process of
counting dissimilarities. 478 But the practice of counting dissimilarities
at the infringement stage in design cases could backfire when a com-
mon style trend made the corresponding count of similarities almost
475. For a time, some courts continued to speculate that three-dimensional designs and mod-
els might not be "writings of an author" in the constitutional sense, an issue raised prior to Mazer
v. Stein. This resistance may have reflected "perhaps subconsciously. . . the earlier hostility of
courts towards protection for useful articles." Latman, supra note 9, at 279. The issue of "writ-
ings" was pronounced dead in Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 448 F.2d 284,
287-88 (6th Cir. 1971), a'd on appeal after remand, 492 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
843 (1974). The phrase was removed from the copyright act in the General Revision of 1976, 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a) (1982)(works of authorship).
476. See, e.g, Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1960)(fabrics);
Uneeda Doll Co. v. P. & M. Doll Co., 241 F. Supp. 675, 677 (S.D.N.Y.)(doll on a pole in a display
box), afl'd, 353 F.2d 788 (2d Cir. 1965); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Adanta Novelties Corp., 223 F. Supp.
866, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Condotti Inc. v. Slifka, 223 F. Supp. 412, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y.
1963)(fabrics); Clarion Textile Corp. v. Slifka, 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 340, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(fabrics); Elekes v. Bradford Novelty Co., 183 F. Supp. 730, 732-33 (D. Mass. 1960). But see, e.g.,
Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 296 F. Supp. 736, 738 (S.D.N.Y.), rey'd, 409
F.2d 1315 (2d Cir. 1969). See also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738,
741-42 (9th Cir. 197 1)(commercially successful jewelled bee pin considered merely the idea of a
bee wedded to a modicum otexpression). This court may have thought the design commonplace,
in which case it was in part grappling with the problem of the degree of creative content. See
Reichman, After the Copyright Act,supra note 65, at 271-350 (evoluton of the doctrine of substan-
tial creativity).
The idea-expression doctrine "has been put to its most severe test in the area of design."
Latman, supra note 9, at 284.
477. See, e.g., Millworth Converting Corp. v. Slifka, 276 F.2d 443, 445 (2d Cir. 1960). "Since
the design was in the public domain ... the court applied a stricter test of infringement." Chi-
cago Critics, supra note 142, at 817; see also Mattel, Inc. v. S. Rosenberg Co., 296 F. Supp. 1024,
1026-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)("Kiddle Kolognes" dolls, a "well-plowed field"); Manes Fabrics Co. v.
The Acadia Co., 139 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 339, 339-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). This defense, if carried too
far, begs the question of why the commercially successful variation from a known style trend was
worth stealing in the first place.
The real issue is not the presence of a public domain element in both designs nor even the
magnitude of this element. The first question is always whether the defendant copied from the
public domain or from the plaintiff's own design. A second question, typically raised in foreign
cases dealing with applied art, concerns the distance that must separate the plaintiff's so!-disant
original design from the public domain version in order to retain or sustain its protectibility. See
generally Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65.
478. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360 F.2d 1021, 1022-23 (2d Cir. 1966); Rico
Ltd. v. Hub Floral Mfg. Co., 206 F. Supp. 192, 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)(artificial flowers).
1234
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certain to prevail.479 This practice was so favorable to plaintiffs that
Judge Clark soon insisted that courts should adopt an overall impres-
sion test instead.480 Although the suggestion was favorably received, a
finding of substantial similarity was readily forthcoming even on this
test.481
What the Chicago Critics really saw in the cases under review was
in fact a tendency for slavish imitation at the infringement stage,
482
combined with modest requirements of creativity and originality at the
subject matter stage, to confer a high degree of protection on those sub-
ject matter categories that had already achieved recognition as applied
art.483 This is consistent with the nature of design innovation, which
normally develops through small variations on preexisting style
trends.484 Within the stream of new designs launched onto the market
each year, the commercial success of any single variation is virtually
impossible to predict in advance; the costs of design development must
be recouped from the few that do succeed.485 Time pressure in market-
479. Note, supra note 28, at 1532; Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 817. In principle, count-
ing dissimilarities runs contrary to established copyright norms. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note I,
§ 13.03[B], at 13-36. But see Warner Bros. v. ABC, COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) T 25,584 (2d Cir.
Oct. 6, 1983)(emphasis on dissimilarity in copyright infringement actions).
480. See, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623, 627 (2d Cir. 1963). In Ideal
Toy, Judge Clark, in dissent, said that "reproduction should be apparent on inspection and not be
based upon a counting of similarities which do not institute or leave a total impression of copy-
ing." Id at 627; see also Mattel, Inc. v. S. Rosenberg Co., 296 F. Supp. 1024, 1026-27 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (the Jewelry Kiddie dolls).
481. See, eg., Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970);
Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textiles, 409 F.2d 1315, 1316 (2d Cir. 1969); Peter Pan
Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 1366, 1368-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Fristot v. First
Am. Natural Ferns Co., 251 F. Supp. 886, 887-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)(artificial flowers); Key West
Hand Print Fabrics, Inc. v. Serbin, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 287, 292 (S.D. Fla. 1965).
482. See supra note 428.
483. "The originality requirement is extremely minimal. Most courts ask only that the 'artist'
contribute something more than trivial to his work. Frequently, all that is required of the copy-
righted work is that it not be an exact duplicate of another article." Chicago Critics, supra note
142, at 812. Overt resistance to this doctrine developed in 1968. See authorities cited supra note
456.
484. A "characteristic distinguishing many, if not most.. . [objects of utility] from the con-
ventional subjects of copyright, and presenting a severe challenge to any scheme of protection for
designs, is the limited range of variation possible in objects of a given functional type." Note,
supra note 28, at 1532; accord Latman, supra note 9, at 282-83; see supra text accompanying note
369; see also Crouwel,A Designer's View of Plagiarism, AMSTERDAM SYMPOSIUM, supra note 21,
at 161-62.
If undercurrents of judicial resistance to applied art proved less effective than Judge Clark
desired, see supra text accompanying notes 471-74, it was largely because ornamental designs
slipped too easily through the nets usually employed to restrict the scope of copyright protection in
single cases.
485. See, ag., Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 1005 (statement of Latman); id at 166-67
(testimony of Tegymeyer); Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 52-53 (statement of
Pile); id at 105-06 (statement of Blitzer); Dulin, supra note 16, at 322; Nimetz, supra note 18, at
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ing short-lived products appealing to fancy or taste invites slavish imi-
tators who avoid the costs of preparing their own designs and who can
undersell the original designer while obliterating his indispensible lead
time.486 A judicial response that protects the miniscule variation thus
appropriated need not necessarily result in protection of the preexisting
style trend or other public domain matter.487 By protecting even a thin
stratum of original matter added to that in the public domain, courts
shift the burden of establishing independent creation to the manufac-
turer who has slavishly imitated.488
To ask whether copyright law is an appropriate form of protection
for aesthetic designs489 is not the same as asking whether copyright law
has functioned properly with regard to designs admitted to
copyrightability. The Chicago Critics complained that the "obvious
course of conduct for potential copyists. . . is not to be lazy." 490 Yet
this was precisely the point that much of the case law had been trying
to make. Obliging competitors to develop even miniscule design varia-
108-09, 130-3 1; THE DESIGNER, No. 185 (April 1975)(issue dedicated to the "knock otf"); National
Committee for Effective Design Legislation, Protection for Designs, February, 1959 (unpub-
lished); accord Duchemin, supra note 71, at 184-85; Franel & Gaubiac, supra note 123, at 11-12,
24-25.
486. Nimetz justifies a "copyright approach" to design protection on these grounds. Nimetz,
supra note 18, at 130-3 1. See also van der Put & Komarnicki, Cooperation Between the Industrial
Designer and the Lawyer Within an Enterprise, AMSTERDAM SymposIuM, supra note 21, at 194
("The market in Western Europe and other countries is inundated with [plagiarized] designs cost-
ing half the price of the Phillips' models,. . . [yet] the reason for the low price is... that the
development costs are for Phillips. This is ... a bad form of 'development aid.' ").
487. See generally ReichmanAfter the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 297-350 (partial cumu-
lation in the Second Circuit).
488. See, e.g., Kepner-Tregoe, Inc. v. Carabio, 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 124, 130-31 (E.D. Mich.
1979)(thin copyrights). During the period under review, most courts were equal to the task of
differentiating expression from ideas, even within the range of miniscule variations characteristic
of commercial design. Latman, supra note 9, at 282-83; see, e.g., Ideal Toy Corp. v. Adanta Nov-
elties Corp., 223 F. Supp. 866, 868-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)(dolls). Nevertheless, the propensity of
infringers to imitate slavishly or to make "lazy copies" inclined these same courts, given copy-
rightable subject matter, to find that the defendants must necessarily have taken any quantum of
protectible expression, however thin, along with the unprotectible ideas. For extreme cases in
which any quantum of protectible expression is hard to imagine, see Remco Indus. v. Goldberg
Doll Mfg. Co., 141 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 898, 899 (E.D.N.Y. 1964)(Beatle dolls) and Hassenfeld Bros.
v. Mego Corp., 150 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 786, 786-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)(GI Joe Dolls)(criticized by Chi-
cago Critics, supra note 142, at 814). See also Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 295
F. Supp. 1366, 1367-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
Because only original matter is protected at the infringement stage, the troublesome question
in copyright law in dealing with ornamental designs is whether there was any original matter to be
protected or whether there was sufficient original matter from the policy perspective. See
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 365-86 ("Limits of the Copyright
Approach").
489. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 824-25.
490. Id at 816.
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tions on a successful style trend on their own time and at their own
expense is a basic principle of design protection law in all systems that
provide it. What the Chicago Critics described as a degeneration of
copyright law into unfair competition law was often judicial insistence
that followers seeking access to the same crowded market segment
should be fair.
491
A tendency to protect small variations in designs falling within
recognized categories of applied art, although not without drawbacks,
can hardly be equated with the protection of new subject matter cate-
gories under the expansionist trend reported by the Chicago Critics.
This trend, at least with reference to the period 1959-1969, cannot be
independently verified. On the contrary, the period seems remarkable
for the relative impregnability of the copyright fortress to the assault of
"applied art," especially in view of the defenders' lack of modem legal
weapons. Adhering as best it could to the Italian theory of dissociation,
but without a special design law or some functional equivalent, the
Copyright Office admitted few major new categories of subject matter
that had not previously been recognized as copyrightable, at least by
implication.492 Before 1970, virtually every design held copyrightable
could have withstood a test of material separability without recourse to
the more abstract and expansive doctrine of conceptual separability.
493
Moreover, the overall results, coherent within a framework that was
concededly hard to administer, reveal a surprising absence of those ar-
491. Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 77 (testimony of P.T. Dalsimer); id at
159-60 (testimony of G.D. Cary).
In this context, the term "fair followers" is used to describe a design that is "the same in
general style and idea as a protected design, but which differs in detail to such a degree that it
cannot be said that it reproduces the design to a substantial extent. In other words, fairfollowers
copy, indeed they represent, the trend" D. JOHNSTON, DESIGN PROTECTION: A GUIDE TO THE
LAW ON PLAGIARISM FOR MANUFACTURERS AND DESIGNERS 30 (1978)(emphasis added). In gen-
eral, fair followers (who create their own variations) are both legitimate and welcome in the field
of industrial art. Id; Crouwel,.rupra note 484, at 155, 161-63; van der Put & Komarnicki, supra
note 486, at 198-206.
492. These categories were limited mainly to toys, dolls, and jewelry plus two-dimensional
designs. Before adoption of the separability criterion in the late 1950's, and after it first opened
the door to applied art in 1948, the Copyright Office had accepted a motley array of articles for
registration. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B][3], at 2-89. Assessment of the Copyright
Office's registration policy as regards any single object, however, must be tested against the regula-
tion then in force and the policy objectives being pursued at the time.
493. See supra notes 456-70 and accompanying text. During the same period, not a single case
involving the overall shape of a modem functional design, true "industrial designs" in the sense
that the Register used this term in his 1961 Report, see supra note 287, seems to have reached even
the litigation phase in the cases reported; few, if any, penetrated the copyright fortress. The most
cited critical commentary to take the opposite view is, of course, the 1971 article by the Chicago
Critics, supra note 142. See infra note 496 and accompanying text.
1237Vol. 1983:1143]
DUKE LAW JOURMrV4L
bitrary and inconsistent decisions concerning applied art 494 that pro-
vide supporters of the unity of art thesis with their most powerful
ammunition.49
5
The Chicago Critics' attack on the excesses of the copyright ap-
proach in the United States thus seems premature and exaggerated.
496
The feeble barriers to copyrightability of ornamental designs, manned
with success from 1959 to 1969, did not give way, nor did the expansive
phase reported for this period actually occur until the 1970's. 497 Mean-
while, because the Copyright Office had contrived to defend its fortress,
by means that remain to be explored,498 a United States special design
law, had it been passed prior to the 1970's, could still have kept most
ornamental designs out of copyright law by means of a strict doctrine
of separability not yet riddled with serious exceptions. Fifteen years
after Mazer v. Stein, the most accurate assessment of the situation was
still that of Professor Latman, who observed that the copyright law was
affording "too few designs with too much protection.
'499
Ironically, when the courts of the United States, like many of their
foreign counterparts, later reacted by elevating the threshold standards
of creativity and originality in copyright law, it was the Chicago Critics'
1971 article that was repeatedly cited as authority for the need to cut
back upon copyright protection for industrial art.5°°
3. The Unity ofArt Heresy. Although the Copyright Office had
succeeded in defending the American copyright fortress against the
unity of art forces that had been its foe all along,501 the weakness of the
494. Accord Latman, supra note 9, at 281-84. But see I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B][3),
at 2-88 to 2-90.
495. See supra notes 426-27 and accompanying text.
496. The Chicago Critics may have intended their criticism of the copyright approach to prod
Congress toward enacting the design bill; at least they appeared to endorse such a solution. Chi-
cago Critics, supra note 142, at 824-25.
497. The Chicago Critics were in time to report one of the first cases that portended future
developments. See, e.g., Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 283 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 928 (1970).
498. See infra text accompanying notes 533-62.
499. Latman, supra note 9, at 284-85; cf. supra note 430 (situation in the Netherlands).
500. See, e.g., L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 857 (1976); see also Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 999 (2d
Cir. 1980)(Weinstein, J., dissenting); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 804 & n.26 (D.C. Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979). See generali, Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra
note 65.
501. See S. LADA, supra note 2, at 859 (Ladas considers defense against the unity of art thesis
to have been the purpose of Regulation § 202.10(c) of 1959). The opposition of the United States
authorities to the French position dates back to 1925, at least. Id at 836; see supra note 91.
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Office's position was clear.502 By 1971, the legal profession had been
alerted to the possibility that Regulation Section 202.10(c) was analyti-
cally unsound. As drafted in 1959, this regulation disqualified even a
"unique and attractively shaped" article from copyright protection as a
work of art if its "sole intrinsic function . . . is its utility. ' 50 3 Yet, as
the Chicago Critics pointed out, "there are no two-dimensional works
and few three-dimensional objects whose design is absolutely dictated
by utilitarian considerations. ' ' 504 In order to ward off new mandamus
actions likely to raise questions about the Copyright Office's practices
in this period,50 5 the Office redoubled its efforts to win legislative ap-
proval of a special design law. Action during the ninety-second and
ninety-third Congresses, in 1974, resulted in the Senate's approval of
the pending design bill for the fourth time,50 6 but no corresponding
action ensued in the House. As Congress tarried, the position that the
Copyright Office had maintained for over a decade came under attack
and grew untenable.
In a number of decisions, courts had already begun to note the
ambiguities of the separability criterion. In 1970, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found copyright registration of
"a [twelve-inch square] architectural metal casting unit intended for
use . . . [as] a decorative screen or room divider" valid and in-
fringed.507 In 1972, the Second Circuit simply assumed that the design
of a flower pot--"an octagonal planter, which is a stylized
container"-was copyrightable subject matter within section 5(g) of the
502. In 1969 Professor Latman declared that the difficulty of administering the current regula-
tions was "one of the reasons for the support by the Copyright Office of specialized legislation
protecting designs." Latman, supra note 9, at 282. He added: "It would appear that in the absence
of another such form of [design] protection. . . [t]he predictable result would be coverage of an
increasing number of works within a scheme of protection that fits only imperfectly." Id at 285;
see also REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 12.
503. See supra note 199.
504. Chicago Critics, supra note 142, at 812. This assumed that Regulation Section 202.10(c)
contained the operative definition of a useful article for purposes of determining copyrightability
under the separability criterion. But the Copyright Office did not seem to share this assumption.
See supra note 459; infra notes 513-16 and accompanying text.
505. See COMPENDIUM OF COPYRiGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, supra note 459, at 2-274.
506. 120 CONG. REc. 30,477-30,516 (1974); REGIsTER's DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36,
ch. VII, at 21. In 1969, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee had first reported an amended version
of the design bill as Title III, later Title II, of the general revision bill. The design bill that the
Senate passed in 1974 was Title III of the general revision bill. See Kadden, Copyright Law, in
1978 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW 593, 595; supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
507. Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 280 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
398 U.S. 928 (1970). Defendants had copied by using the unit to make a mold and market the
identical product.
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1909 Act.50 8 In 1973, the Second Circuit also affirmed the validity of a
registration certificate acknowledging "castings for fixtures, pedestals,
lamps, and furniture" to be copyrightable subject matter.50 9 None of
these cases asked why registration had been granted in the first place.510
One explanation is that the Copyright Office may have grown
more discriminating in the use it made of the "sole intrinsic function"
test set out in section 202.10(c).5 1 1 The flower pot and the room divider
arguably possessed some nonutilitarian functions. They might qualify
as works of art within one reading of the express terms of the regula-
tion because they were also "unique and attractively shaped.
'512
A better explanation is that, in the early 1970's, the Copyright Of-
fice followed its own internal definition of a "useful article" and not the
definition that the practicing bar thought section 202.10(c) con-
tained. 513 According to the 1973 revision of the Compendium of Copy-
right Office Practices, the Copyright Office was distinguishing between
copyrightable "ornamental articles" and "useful articles" subject to the
test of separability. Ornamental articles included "all decorative arti-
cles designed primarily to beautify"; useful articles included "all arti-
508. Hub Floral Corp. v. Royal Brass Corp., 454 F.2d 1226, 1227 (2d Cir. 1972). The only
issue of law regarded publication; the court accepted the fact that the subject matter had been
copyrighted as a work of art.
509. L. & L. White Metal Castings Corp. v. Cornell Metal Corp., 353 F. Supp. 1170, 1171
(E.D.N.Y. 1972), aft'd, 177 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (2d Cir. 1973). The district court, rejecting a
defense based on originality, said: " k1 the castings have been examined with care and it is con-
cluded that all of the plaintiffs castings were properly copyrighted." Id at 1173; accord L. & L.
White Metal Casting Corp. v. Joseph, 387 F. Supp. 1349, 1352 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)(metal castings
used as components in lamps and lighting fixtures); see also S.K. Potteries & Mold Co. v. Sipes,
192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537 (N.D. Ind. 1976)(certificate of registration issued for molds for ceramic
Christmas ornaments; validity not determined).
510. For the breadth of protection that the Second Circuit afforded applied art from 1970 to
1976, see generally Reichman, Afier the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 298-303 ("Excesses of the
Copyright Approach").
511. See supra note 199.
512. This could be true, if the first sentence of Regulation Section 202.10(c) is assumed to be a
de facto definition of useful articles, which is a big assumption, see supra note 459; or if this first
sentence is read to mean that if the sole intrinsic function of an article is not its utility, [then] the
fact that it is unique and attractively shaped will qualify it as a work of art. Professor Nimmer
may have doubts about this reading. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note I, §2.08[B][3], at 2-94; see also
id at 2-96.2.
Moreover, if such reasoning is attributed to the Copyright Office in regard to cases at this
period, it would mean that the Register had accepted voluntarily the very argument she contested
a few years later, in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796
(D.C. Cir. 1978). On the contrary, even after the district court in Esquire interpreted the regula-
tion as suggested above, the Register claimed a discretionary right to ignore this "gap" in her
defenses pending remedial legislative action. See infra note 557 and accompanying text.
513. See supra note 459.
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des designed primarily to serve a utilitarian function." 514  The
Compendium suggests that the second category was denied
copyrightability as a matter of course. An attempt to distinguish be-
tween primarily "ornamental" or primarily "useful" evokes a criterion
that courts in Germany used prior to the Second World War to admin-
ister their regime of partial cumulation on the basis of a prevalence of
artistic over functional elements.5 15 Use of such a "prevalence" or
"aesthetic surplus" test by the Copyright Office could explain some ap-
parently inconsistent registrations, but would depart from the theory of
dissociation, which officially governed in Regulation Section 202.10(c).
The Copyright Office had returned to a more orthodox use of dis-
sociation by 1975.516 Another explanation for the registrations in ques-
tion may be that the Copyright Office had begun to rely on the doctrine
of conceptual separability in addition to the test of material separabil-
ity that had sufficed in the 1960's.517 Conceptual separability can result
from the possibility of appreciating a work independently of the object
in which it is embodied.5 18 If the copyrightability of the flower pot, the
room divider, and castings of sundry useful articles is tested by concep-
tual separability, none of them would seem capable of existing inde-
pendently as works of art when separated from their functional,
material supports.519 If, nonetheless, it be assumed that such designs
514. COMPENDIUM OF COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, Supra note 459, at 2-274; see also Nor-
ris Indus. v. ITT Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 921-23 (1lth Cir. 1983)(acknowledging Compendium).
515. For many years German courts distinguished noncopyrightable industrial designs from
works of applied art according to "a greater or lesser degree of aesthetic content." Reimer, supra
note 91, at 40-42. This is the "aesthetic surplus" or prevalence test, criticized by Ulmer as a
misleading concept. E. ULMER, supra note 7, at 147. A similar test was used in French law prior
to the triumph of the unity of art doctrine. See supra note 57. See generally Reichman, After the
Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 337-3 8.
516. Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 1857 (testimony of Ringer, who mentions conceptual
separability, but not the practice used in 1973); see supra note 340.
517. "[A]II original two-dimensional designs for useful articles. . . were subject to copyright
registration. The same was true of those three-dimensional designs that can be conceptually sepa-
rated and are capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article embodying
them.... ." REGISTER's DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 12 (emphasis added).
The 1975 Report seems to be the first in which the Copyright Office speaks officially of "concep-
tual separability" and not just separability.
518. See supra notes 218-21 & 404-10 and accompanying text.
519. In 1975, the Register gave no precise definition of conceptual separability, except to opine
that "as it later evolved," the doctrine might cover "very abstract designs, but it still can be identi-
fied as something that is designed rather than the shape of the article [as] such." Nevertheless,
"three-dimensional designs that can be conceptually separated" must also be "capable of existing
independently of the utilitarian aspects of the article embodying them." Hearings 1975, supra
note 169, at 1857 (testimony of Barbara Ringer).
If the castings qua castings could not exist independently as works of art, see supra notes 467-
70 and accompanying text, they might still portray useful articles and thus seek registration on the
same terms as drawings and photos of useful articles or as plastic works of a technical character.
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could exist separately and independently as works of art, then the re-
fusal of courts to regard the "troughs, waves and lines" used by a fa-
mous designer in a distinctive shoe design as also producing a
conceptually separable artistic effect seems contradictory.5 20 The de-
sign of the room divider could also be viewed as materially separable
from its casting and despositable in two-dimensional form. But in this
event, the "troughs, waves and lines" of the shoe design would seem
equally susceptible of this rationalization. Furthermore, if all of the
items mentioned above-and eventually ornamental ceramic molds of
Christmas decorations as wel 52'-were consistent with a theory of dis-
sociation now grown "metaphysical" indeed,5 22 then it seems inconsis-
tent, and even arbitrary, to deny protection to other designs no less
utilitarian in character,5 23 such as a furniture design,5 24 a typeface de-
In this event, the castings might indeed be copyrightable under section 5(i) of the Copyright Act of
1909. But the useful articles manufactured from them-according to the precedents devolving
from Baker v. Selden-should no more be protected than any other useful article manufactured
from a copyrighted two-dimensional drawing or photo that had been deposited prior to manufac-
ture. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880); see supra notes 307-08, 330-32 and accompanying text.
These well-settled precedents were frozen into law, after the compromise of 1963, by section 111
of the pending revision bill, which became section 113 of the 1976 Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. § 113
(a), (b) (1982).
520. SCOA Indus. v. Famolare, Inc., 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). "It is con-
cluded, in agreement with the Copyright Office, that the troughs, waves, and lines which appear
on the shoe sole cannot be identified and do not exist independently as works of art." Id at 218.
On what was then a very shaky alternative ground, but is now a better reason-in the Second
Circuit--than that given, the court found that the design "lack[s] even the minimum originality
needed for copyright." Id; see L. Batlin & Son v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir.)(en
banc), cert. denied 429 U.S. 857 (1976); Reichman, After the CopyrightAct, supra note 65, at 312-
21 ("Farewell Alfred Bell").
Famolare's quest for some form of legal protection for his design appears from the following
cases: Famolare, Inc. v. Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 373, 381 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
afl'd without opinion, 618 F.2d. I11 (7th Cir.)(design patent invalid), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 984
(1980); USM Corp. v. Famolare, Inc., 202 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 127, 128-29 (D. Minn. 1978)(design
patent not infringed even if valid); Famolare, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 472 F. Supp. 738, 747 (D.
Hawaii 1979)(mark invalid for functionality, no passing off, misappropriation rejected); Famolare,
Inc. v. Edison Bros., 525 F. Supp. 940, 948 (E.D. Cal. 1981)(design patent invalid).
Contrast the finding of the Patent Examiner, who held this design to be "nonobvious" in
issuing the design patent, with the finding of the District Court for the Southern District of New
York, supra, which held that it lacked the minimum originality (creativity?) for copyright pur-
poses. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 303-08.
521. S.K. Potteries & Mold Co. v. Sipes, 192 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 537, 537 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
522. Latman, supra note 9, at 282.
523. The 1959 Regulation, section 202.10(c), "offered no ready answer to the linedrawing
problem inherent in delineating the extent of copyright protection available for works of applied
art." I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-89.
524. See Gustave v. Zuppiger, 24 Ariz. App. 557, 540 P.2d 176 (1975). In discussing the scope
of common law copyright for a work of art, this court rejected the separability test employed by
the Copyright Office as inconsistent with Mazer v. Stein. Id at 559, 540 P.2d at 178; see Latman,
Copyight Law, in ANNUAL SuRvEY OF AMERicAN LAW 638-39 (1976).
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sign,5 25 or the design of an outdoor lamp.5 26
An attempt to protect outdoor lighting fixtures under the design
patent law had proved abortive when the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, in 1972, endorsed the strict standard of nonobviousness
that the Second Circuit had continued to apply to combination design
patents even after Graham v. John Deere.5 27 A few years earlier, the
Supreme Court's Sears-Compco decisions had prevented unpatentable
lamp designs from obtaining protection under the misappropriation
doctrine of state unfair competition law.5 28 Only copyright law seemed
to provide a defense against predators in an industry in which plagia-
rism was endemic.5 29 When the Copyright Office declined to register a
three-dimensional design of a modem outdoor lighting fixture--devoid
of ornamentation-as a sculptural work of art, the manufacturer sued
the Register in the now famous case of Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer.
530
The Register framed the issue in terms of section 202.10(c) by in-
sisting on the utilitarian character of the lamp, designed to illuminate
parking lots. The Copyright Office disqualified the lamp from protec-
525. Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198, 200-01 (E.D. Va. 1976), a f'd on other
grounds, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978); see Kadden, supra note 506, at 595-99.
In Italian law, some question arises as to whether typeface designs are to be considered two-
or three-dimensional designs; under the prevailing view it is the two-dimensional aesthetic effect
that controls. Z.O. ALGARDI, supra note 61, at 261; M. FABiANI, supra note 96, at 45. Neverthe-
less, Italian courts have prevented protection of typeface designs in copyright law on the grounds
that their artistic values are inseparable (inscindibile) from the industrial product with which type-
face designs are associated. Z.O. ALoARDI, supra note 61, at 262. Typeface designs are protectible
as ornamental designs under the Italian Design Law of 1940. Id at 261-62.
An International Convention for the Protection of Typeface Designs was negotiated at Vi-
enna in 1973, at the end of a diplomatic conference on the protection of industrial property spon-
sored by WIPO. Id at 262-65.
526. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C.
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979).
527. 383 U.S. 1 (1966); see Rains v. Niacqua, 406 F.2d 275, 276-77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 909 (1969); Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Lighting Corp. of Am., 312 F, Supp. 1173, 1185 (E.D. Pa.
1970), vacatedsub nona Hadco Prods., Inc. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 462 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir.) (invali-
dated for obviousness), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972). The Third Circuit's decision in Hadco
closed a brief but interesting flirtation with design patents. See, e.g., Rains v. Cascade Indus., 402
F.2d 241,247 (3d Cir. 1968). The design treated with some sympathy in this decision was rejected
out of hand by the Second Circuit in Rains v. Niacqua. This decision was then invoked in Hadco.
See upra notes 413-17 and accompanying text.
528. See supra notes 423-24 and accompanying text.
529. In our industry.. . design piracy is not unusual and seems to be on the increase. As
one instance of the cynical attitude.. . in some quarters I might mention the remarks of
the president of one of the largest lighting fixture manufacturers . . . . When asked
about the size of his company's design staff he replied that they employ very few design-
ers because there is a lot of plagiarism in the industry.
Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 105 (statement of W.F. Blitzer); see supra notes
292 (views of Fisher), 424 (possible uses of Lanham Act § 43(a)).
530. Esquire, 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. de-
nied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); see supra note 188.
DUKE LAW JOURM4L
tion under the 1909 Act as interpreted by the regulation because its
aesthetically appealing features could not be separately identified as a
work of art distinct from the shape as a whole.531 Esquire contended
that its design qualified as a work of art within the meaning of section
5(g) of the 1909 Act and that it had been excluded solely because of its
utilitarian purpose in contravention of Mazer v. Stein.532
Judge Gesell brushed aside the doctrine of scindibilt&, invoked by
the Register, as an "elusive semantic dispute."5 33 This obliged the Reg-
ister to expose the principles actually being used to implement the crite-
rion of separability. The Register's official answer was bold. In 1976,
after nearly twenty years without a design law, the principle still con-
trolling the copyrightability of applied art in the United States was said
to be exactly what it had been from 1910 to 1958: "art in the historical
and ordinary sense. ' 534 According to the Register, this principle ac-
counted for the continuing exclusion of "shapes and forms of. . . use-
ful articles," a result that avoided "trade restraints of up to 56 years in
industrial designs of everything from automobiles to bathtubs to
dresses." 5
35
The Register's deceptively simple answer ignored the different
meanings that "art in the historical and ordinary sense" had acquired
over time. Until 1948, this phrase connoted the dichotomy between
beauty and utility.536 In the mid-1950's, it signified an object that was
"clearly a work of art in itself."537 By the 1960's, the phrase appeared
to mean art materially separable from the utilitarian article with which
it was associated. 538 Sometime in the 1970's, it had come to mean "art
that was physically or conceptually separable, 5 39 a more elastic
formula consistent with the theory of dissociation as fully developed in
Italian case law and literature.540 The Register's reference to "art in
the historical and ordinary sense" in 1976 thus obscured the question of
531. Esquire, 414 F. Supp. at 940. So the issue was framed in 1976 under Register Ringer; but
under the 1973 Compendium of Copyright Office Practices the lamp design may have been per se
noncopyrightable, as defendant claimed. See supra notes 513-15 and accompanying text.
532. See Note, Copyright Law, 25 WAYNE L. REV. 923, 929 (1979)(quoting Plaintifi's Brief at
4).
533. Esquire, 414 F. Supp. at 941.
534. 1d; see supra notes 15-18, 179-80 and accompanying text.
535. 414 F. Supp. at 941.
536. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
537. See supra notes 172-73, 182-83, 194-95 and accompanying text.
538. See supra notes 199, 462-66 and accompanying text.
539. But see supra notes 513-15 (period of prevalence test).




what the Copyright Office now understood by "conceptual
separability."
Instead of dismissing separability out of hand, Judge Gesell might
have asked Register Ringer why she deemed Esquire's lamp less con-
ceptually separable than other nontraditional subject matter permitted
registration in the 1970's.5 4 1 A decade and a half earlier, Register
Fisher, who had introduced the separability requirement in 1958,542 an-
swered a question no less pertinent to the present inquiry. When asked
during the Design Protection Hearings of 1960 whether the Copyright
Office used "a test which does apply esthetic value" in determining the
copyrightability of ornamental designs, Fisher replied: "We are doing
that now. It is an impossible situation, but I agree with you that it is
now on our shoulders.
'543
Register Fisher sought to mitigate the impact of this answer by
mentioning the need for works of art to meet a de minimis standard of
creativity. 544 Quite apart from legitimate concern with the de m s
rule, use of a test of artistic value to distinguish designs rising to the
level of works of art from lesser, noncopyrightable designs remained an
"impossible situation. 5 45 In 1960, some two years after the introduc-
tion of scindibilt& into United States copyright law, the Register was
still using a test that appears more consistent with the "clearly a work
of art" standard of the 1956 regulation.546 Leading Italian commenta-
tors regard a test of artistic value as consistent with the doctrine of
conceptual separability. Indeed, most observers of the Italian system,
whether native or foreign, believe that a finding of conceptual separa-
541. The district court in Esquire did consider that the Register's past practice in registering
household lamps and candlesticks was inconsistent with the denial of registration to this lamp.
414 F. Supp. at 941. But this follows from too quick a dismissal of the separability criterion as
mere semantics. See supra text accompanying note 533.
542. See supra notes 197-99 and accompanying text.
543. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 83.
544. Technically, this could bring the matter under Regulation Section 202.10(b), see supra
note 199, which requires "some creative authorship." In this context, Fisher also attempted to
rationalize Bailie v. Fisher (which denied protection to a five-pointed star) in terms of the de
minimis standard. But both Baiiie and Vacheron arose under the 1956 regulation ("clearly a work
of art" standard), and the exclusion of the high-styled watch face design in Vacheron was obvi-
ously not due to the de minimis rule. See Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 82-
83; supra text accompanying notes 173-78, 184-88. Fisher was obliged to admit that other catego-
ries of copyrightable subject matter were not subjected to a "de minimis" standard that directly
assessed artistic value. Design Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 82-83.
545. Design Protection Hearings 1060, supra note 115, at 83. Since S. 2075, supra note 158,
attempted to exclude ornamental designs embodied in useful articles from the copyright law alto-
gether, the inference was that Fisher could be relieved of his "impossible situation" by passage of
S. 2075. This assertion was undoubtedly true. See supra text accompanying notes 264-71.
546. See supra text accompanying notes 181-82.
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bility means that a given ornamental design exhibits a high degree of
artistic intensity.54
7
Fisher's 1960 statement suggests that conceptual separability, in
the United States as in Italy, depended largely on the degree of aes-
thetic value manifested by the design in question. Nontraditional de-
signs admitted in the 1970's should therefore have reflected a high
degree of artistic intensity if their acceptance for registration turned on
conceptual separability.548 Yet cases litigated during this period never
mention the issue, despite knowledgeable application of the material
separability criterion in at least one major decision.549 Such discussion
might have explained why Esquire's outdoor lamp design was less con-
ceptually separable than the designs of the flower pot, room divider,
and castings that did obtain registration certificates.
If the Register excluded Esquire's lamp design because it was in-
tended for a utilitarian purpose, as Esquire contended, the Register's
decision was inconsistent with its own regulations and with Mazer v.
Stein, although not necessarily with the anomalous Compendium of
Copyright Office Practices of 1973.550 If the Register rejected Esquire's
design because it lacked sufficient artistic value to be considered "con-
ceptually separable," the Copyright Office had distinguished Esquire's
lamp design from other designs admitted in the 1970's on the basis of
subjective value judgments lacking either statutory or judicial author-
ity.551 Finally, if the Register excluded Esquire's lamp because the
Copyright Office claimed a discretionary right to deny registration to
modernistic shapes and forms of useful articles as inherently insepara-
ble from their material supports, this amounted to a conclusive pre-
sumption that such designs could never attain the degree of artistic
intensity needed to qualify as true works of applied art.5 52 Yet flower
pots, room dividers, and castings for household goods seem, by infer-
ence, to have possessed such qualities.
547. See supra notes 405-10 and accompanying text.
548. At least one such design did reflect a high degree of artistic intensity--the design of a belt
buckle-although litigation did not arise until after the 1976 Copyright Act. Kieselstein-Cord v.
Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 991-94 (2d Cir. 1980); see Reichman, After the Copyright
Act, supra note 65, at 324-40.
549. See supra notes 467-70 and accompanying text.
550. See supra note 459, notes 513-16 and accompanying text.
551. See Gustave v. Zuppiger, 24 Ariz. App. 557, 559, 540 P.2d 176, 178 (1975)(furniture de-
signs). This court rejected the federal regulation as leading to "a subjective inquiry into the defini-
tion of art," contrary to Mazer v. Stein. Id at 559, 549 P.2d at 178; see supra text accompanying
note 186 (Judge Clark's dissent in Vacheron).
552. In essence, this argument proved successful on appeal, but only after Congress had incor-
porated the separability doctrine into the new definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works
in the 1976 Act (17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)). See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 803 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Reichmnan, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 350-
65 (noncumulation in the District of Columbia Circuit).
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It seems undeniable that the Copyright Office subjected Esquire's
lamp to an in camera proceeding, without expert witnesses and without
a record, in which administrative value judgments about either the de-
sign in question or a disfavored category of designs defeated registra-
tion.5 53 The result is hard to reconcile with other decisions of the same
period even if the Register's decisions about art were invested with a
presumption of validity. 554 Here at last were the inconsistent deci-
sions-"discouraging for their subtlety" 555-that plague foreign re-
gimes of noncumulation and partial cumulation alike. Holdings of this
apparently arbitrary nature have induced even French commentators
skeptical of the unity of art thesis to prefer overprotection of industrial
art in copyright law under a system of total cumulation to the inequi-
ties seen in competing regimes within the Berne Union.
5 56
The Register demanded the right to implement Regulation Section
202.10(c) with the same discretion as before "while the [design] bills
wend their way through the legislative process. '557 Judge Gesell re-
jected her demand. Because the "outdoor lights serve both to decorate
and to illuminate" and were "exclusively decorative" during the day,
their "sole exclusive function" could not be utility. Every attractively
shaped useful article has the additional function of being decorative.
558
On this reasoning, the "sole intrinsic function" test was eliminated as a
barrier to copyrightability of aesthetic designs.
5 59
553. See, e.g., Reed, supra note 427, at 42; Reichman,Afier the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at
373-86. In Berne Union countries, there is no registration process and the issue of copyrightability
only arises as a defense to an infringement action.
554. Judge Clark, in Vacheron, had criticized the Copyright Office for assuming "judicial or
discretionary functions such as has the Commissioner of Patents," whose decisions to issue a pat-
ent are entitled to a presumption of validity. See supra notes 186-88 and accompanying text; I D.
CHItSUM, PATENTS ,supra note 367, § 5.06[2]. These presumptions, however, are routinely ignored
in the design patent cases. See, e.g., Frantz Mfg. Co. v. Phoenix Mfg., 457 F.2d 314, 326 (7th Cir.
1972); see also Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 373-86 (discussing 17 U.S.C.
§§ 410, 411 (1982), which may have enlarged the Register's discretionary power).
555. Desbois, supra note 60, at 74. Of interest in this connection is the Copyright Office's own
flattering estimate of these same "industrial designs" in its 1975 Supplementary Report to Con-
gress, in which it extolled the "large body offine three-dimensional designs" left unprotected as
"creative works," the products of "a field involving a high degree ofcreativity." REGISTER's DRAFT
REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 12, 21 (emphasis added).
556. See supra text accompanying note 81; Franqon, supra note 27, at 102-03; Gaubiac, supra
note 48, at 62-63, 66-70. Compare I M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-96.3 to 2-96.4:
"[U]nless and until special design legislation is adopted, if the choice is full copyright protection or
none at all, it may be that the former alternative is preferable to the latter." See generally
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 365-86.
557. Esquire, 414 F. Supp. at 941.
558. Id; see 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-91.
559. The belief of the practicing bar that this formulation, as the definition of a useful article,
constituted a barrier was now disabused. The Chicago Critics had pointed out this "gap." Chi-
cago Critics, supra note 142, at 812, in 1971. But this formulation was probably not the operative
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The court then replaced both "separability" and "art in the his-
toric sense" with the broad reading ofMazer v. Stein that had lain dor-
mant since the Copyright Office announced its first official
interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in 1956:560 there "can-
not be and there should not be any national standard of what consti-
tutes art and the pleasing forms of the Esquire fixtures are entitled to
the same recognition afforded more traditional sculpture." 56' Judge
Gesell spoke for an influential segment of the international copyright
community when he declared that the "forms represented by Esquire's
fixtures emphasize line and shape rather than the realistic or the ornate
but it is not for the Register to reject them on artistic grounds . . or
because the form is accommodated to a utilitarian purpose."
5 62
A few months later, the Register's separability criterion was re-
jected again at the district court level, in Eltra Corp. v. Ringer.5 63 The
Copyright Office had denied registration, on grounds of inseparability
under section 202.10(c), to a typeface design developed by a profes-
sional designer at considerable cost.564 The court disagreed: "Type-
faces should no more be denied registration on the theory that the
letters themselves have an underlying function separate from [their] ar-
tistic designs than could registration be denied the statuettes in Ma-
zer." 565 The typeface design was accordingly a work of art within the
meaning of section 5(g) of the 1909 Act, although unprotectible because
definition of a useful article at all, and its demise may simply have underscored the weak legal
foundation on which the Copyright Office stood without a statutory mandate. See supra note 459
and text accompanying notes 513-16.
560. See supra notes 44, 141.
561. Esquire, 414 F. Supp. at 941. Judge GeseU may have sought to narrow his holding by
bringing it within past interpretations of the Copyright Office that allowed registration of "lighting
in combination with sculpture." If so, this effort seems swept away by the broader implications of
the language quoted. See Latman, supra note 524, at 638.
562. Esquire, 414 F. Supp. at 941 (citing Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239 (1903) and Mazer v. Stein); see Kadden, supra note 506, at 598. The remarks of Judge Gesell
are quoted and amplified by Professor Nimmer. See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-
96.2 to 2-96.3. Compare the views of Judge Gesell and Professor Nimmer with the views of Pouil-
let summarized in the text supra, at notes 61-67. Consider also the comments by Nimmer, Deren-
berg, and Ringer, supra note 347.
563. 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198 (E.D. Va. 1976), modified, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978). EItra
was decided on October 26, 1976, a few months after Esquire v. Ringer I (May 5, 1976), 414 F.
Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), which it does not cite.
564. Kadden, supra note 506, at 597. At the time of decision, Congress had just adopted the
1976 Act's definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" (§ 101), "an implicit congres-
sional endorsement of the dividing line drawn in . . .regulation [§ 202.10(c)]." Id at 596; see
infra text accompanying notes 644-47. That the Register ultimately won was therefore not sur-
prising, but the court's reasoning was.
565. Eltra, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 200; see supra note 525.
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Congress had acquiesced in "the long-standing Copyright Office prac-
tice of refusing to register typeface designs. ' 566
This period, in which even the Second Circuit had entered upon a
unity of art phase remarkable for its lack of restraint,567 thus
culminated in two district court decisions that rejected the theory of
dissociation. Although these holdings were to be overruled after enact-
ment of a general revision bill, 568 they temporarily opened the door to
broad protection of ornamental designs of useful articles under the new
United States copyright law, just as Arthur Fisher predicted would oc-
cur if Congress insisted on "doing nothing.
'569
Suddenly, designers and manufacturers in the United States, like
their counterparts in France, stood to gain copyright protection on rela-
tively soft terms for a duration of life plus fifty years.570 If, as the Reg-
ister insisted, this opening of "the floodgates to copyrighting ...
industrial designs" would inhibit competition, the district court's an-
swer in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer was that congressional approval of sui
generis design legislation should be obtained. "In the interim," how-
ever, "the Register cannot avoid the Supreme Court's interpretation of
the copyright law."571
4. Grand Finale all'italiana. The predicament in which the
Copyright Office found itself even before the district court's decision in
Esquire must be carefully assessed. In 1975, the Register reiterated the
Copyright Office's long-standing support for the design bill then pend-
ing as Title II of the general revision bill and urged Congress, by this
means, to rescue the "large body of fine three-dimensional designs"
otherwise denied full copyright protection under existing law.5 72 The
pending bill was essentially the same as that put forward in 1965, sub-
ject to certain interim amendments and clarifications.
573
566. 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 201. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the result but repudi-
ated the lower court's reasoning. The validity of the Copyright Office regulations was upheld;
typeface designs were not works of art under § 5(g) of the 1909 Act. Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579
F.2d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1978); see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 350-65.
567. See Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 298-308.
568. See generally Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 350-65.
569. See supra text accompanying note 294.
570. See Latman, supra note 524, at 639. If registered as a work made for hire under § 302(c)
of the 1976 Act, the duration would be 75 years. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1982).
571. Esquire, 414 F. Supp. at 941; accord Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 194 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 198, 202
(E.D. Va. 1976), modfed, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978). But what, in fact, was the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the copyright law in view of the questions begged in Mazer v. Stein? See
supra text accompanying notes 139-47.
572. REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 12, 21; see supra note 352.
573. REGISTER's DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 12-13; see supra text accom-
panying notes 325-36. Interim amendments had added a renewal term of five years, for a total of
ten years maximum protection. See S. 22, TITLE II (THE DESIGN PROTECTION ACT OF 1975),
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In theory, the proposed legislation implemented the compromise
arrangements of the 1960's, including the anti-maim rule, as a result of
which the criterion of separability would continue to govern relations
between copyright law and the special design law.574 Even before Es-
quire, the efficacy of this package deal had been undermined by the
growing inability of the Copyright Office to sustain the exclusionary
force of its separability criterion without the aid of a design law. The
"constant expansion of the copyright concept of works of art" that en-
sued 575 seriously challenged the noncumulationist premise around
§ 205, IN COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, REPORT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP.
No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 39-47 (1975), reprinted in 13 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY (1977); H.R. 2223, Title II, Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 66-70; Latman,
supra note 296, at 358. A procedure for administrative screening of applications for registration
had also been added and then joined with the opposition proceeding originally made available to
third parties. Id at 358. This was not to be a search of the prior art. Technical language concern-
ing the exclusions from protectible subject matter and the requisite burden of originality had been
refined, id, although these were still not free from ambiguity. See infra text accompanying notes
582-98.
Of more immediate importance was a pending shift in the time that protection was to com-
mence, namely, from the date of publication to the date of registration, which would have substi-
tuted an industrial property concept for a softer, copyright concept. This change had been
requested by the Patent Office in order to move the United States design law more into line with
foreign design laws, which stress certainty and notoriety. Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 167
(testimony of Tegtmeyer); REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 22. But see
Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 1002-03 (testimony of Latman). The foreign norms, which
(except for France) require registration and impose forfeiture for prior divulgation, have been
criticized as too burdensome for artisans and small or medium-sized producers. See Duchemin,
supra note 71, at 184-85; Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 366-73. Other
technical matters pertaining to Title II are discussed in REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra
note 36, ch. VII, at 21-24. For a detailed analysis of a successor to Title II, H.R. 20, which sheds
light on the complexities of Title II, see generally Fryer, supra note 244.
The regime of dual protection, which permitted users to opt for either the "design copyright"
of Title II or a design patent under existing law, was still intact despite the proposal to stiffen the
registration requirement under Title II. REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII,
at 12. See supra notes 253-56. But see REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT
SYSTEM, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPY-
RIGHTS, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. No. 5, February 2, 1967 [hereinafter cited as PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION], at 20 (recommending repeal of design patent statute, or adoption of sui generis
design law). See also Latman, supra note 9, at 285. Had the Congress followed this recommenda-
tion, it could have undermined the effectiveness of the special design law, with its inherent subject
matter ambiguities. But the recommendation to repeal the design patent law was quietly forgotten
and, by 1975, the dual regime was again taken for granted. See, e.g., Hearings 1975, supra note
169, at 995 (testimony of Latman); H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 352, at 54.
574. REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 12-13;seesupra notes 274-78,
295-302, 573.
575. Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 997-98 (testimony of Latman); see also Nolan, supra
note 10, at 216.
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which the United States scheme of special design protection had been
built.
57 6
a. Toward an American regime of partial cumulation. By the
mid-1970's, the Copyright Office thus stood to gain relatively little from
strict compliance with the compromise agreements of the 1960's. 577
The most advantageous solution for the Office would instead have been
the adoption of a regime of partial cumulation.5 78 Such a regime typi-
576. See supra notes 200-01, 330-36 and accompanying text. The Register, aware of this disar-
ray, pointed out in 1975 that some 9600 two- and three-dimensional designs of useful articles had
qualified for copyright registration, in a single fiscal year, compared to 3600 design patents issued
in the same period. REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 12. Compare
supra note 194 (figures for 1959-1960).
577. The Register continued to stress that "there had been no expressed opposition to the
design bill in either House since it was joined to the copyright bill in 1969" aside from the tradi-
tional opposition of the Justice Department, which was offset by the favorable stance of the Com-
merce Department. REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII at 14, 22; see supra
notes 292, 350; Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 352-61. The picture painted
by the Register may have been too rosy. Other sources suggest that there was informal opposition
behind the scenes from major industries, including sectors of the automobile industry, and from
the manufacturers of spare parts. Opposition by the latter group was traditional and had been
expressed at hearings on other design bills. See, e.g., Design Protection Hearings 1965, supra note
114; see also supra notes 292, 351.
Tension between big industry, which may favor a patent-type design law, and small or
medium-sized industry, which may favor a copyright approach in one form or another, is reported
in foreign literature. Compare, for example, a recent survey in the Federal Republic of Germany
showing big industry in favor of a patent-type design law, see B. ENGLERT, supra note 6, at 82;
Englert, supra note 96, at 778-79, with the views of Duchemin, see Duchemin, supra note 71, at
184-85; Duchemin, supra note 2, at 73-77 (which are closer to the views of Arthur Fisher, supra
note 267).
578. The special design law, expected to pass in the late 1950's, had not been enacted by 1975;
quick passage of a design bill was the quid pro quo for the Register's consent to the deals struck
with the opposition. See supra text accompanying notes 295-300, 348-52. The Copyright Office
now risked breaking faith with the limited protectionist legacy of Arthur Fisher in the name of a
compromise tainted by a failure of consideration. See supra notes 257, 266; text accompanying
notes 287-90, 294.
In 1975, the Register drew the attention of Congress to the systemic anomalies that had accu-
mulated after nearly two decades of separability without a design law. Under the General Revi-
sion of Copyright Law that was about to be enacted, privileged items such as "textile designs,
wallpaper, floor tiles, painted or printed decorations, 'certain' lamp bases, carvings on furniture,
costume jewelry, [and] decorator items" could all presumably acquire protection lasting life plus
fifty years. REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 12. Although this parade
of horribles was meant to persuade Congress how unjust it was to leave modem functional designs
altogether unprotected, the argument cut both ways. It was, after all, the Copyright Office that
continued to keep functional designs out while all the rest had got in. Moreover, the design bill as
drafted did not cancel existing privileges unless a copyright proprietor or potential copyright pro-
prietor decided to seek special design protection, in which case the copyright would be forfeited as
to applications of the design to useful articles offered to the public. See supra notes 334-35 and
accompanying text.
To the unity of art school, the logical response was now to let even modernistic designs in,
rather than adopt a law to keep them out. See, e.g., Nolan, supra note 10, at 223-24. In other
words, the design law after the compromises would at the most have exerted pressure towards
eliminating the very long term of protection for categories privileged under Mazer v. Stein, with-
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cally blocks access to copyright law by elevating the threshold subject-
matter standards that industrial art, as distinct from other copyright-
able works, must satisfy.579 The regulation that Register Fisher issued
in 1956 did in fact establish the basis for such a regime in United States
law. But its development was aborted in 1958 when the Vacheron court
implied that Fisher's criterion--"clearly a work of art in itself "-was
incompatible with both Bleistein and Mazer.580 The question is
whether there had occurred any subsequent change in the legal envi-
ronment that made some analogous solution feasible once again in the
1970's.
The answer may be found in the "historic docking" that occurred
when the design bill, heretofore pending as a separate legislative propo-
sal, became an integral part of the general revision bill in 1969.58t The
subject matter requirements of this design bill introduced new technical
premises into the overall scheme. For example, section 202(b) of Title
II, as it stood in 1975, excluded ornamental designs of useful articles
from design protection if such designs were "staple or commonplace,
such as a standard geometric figure, familiar symbol, emblem or motif,
or other shape, pattern or configuration which has become common,
prevalent or ordinary. ' 582 Section 202(c) further excluded from protec-
tion under Title II any designs that differed from the designs excluded
by section 202(b) "only in insignificant details or in elements which are
variants commonly used in the relevant trades." 583 Section 203, how-
ever, allowed protection under Title II when "the design is a substantial
out saving the copyright fortress, unless the Copyright Office had ancillary means of defense at its
disposal not revealed in the 1975 Report. For the view that it did, see infra text accompanying
notes 581-624.
579. See supra notes 131, 279-83 and accompanying text; Reichman, After the Copyright Act,
supra note 65, at 271-97, 333-40, 366-73.
580. See supra notes 173, 186-203 and accompanying text. Had Register Fisher, armed with
this regulation, see supra note 173 and accompanying text, managed to exclude the high-styled
watch face design of the Vacheron case in 1958 without incurring the Second Circuit's displeasure,
afortiori all designs of lesser artistic value, regardless of past privileges accorded to their respec-
tive subject matter categories, could likewise have been excluded from copyright law and rele-
gated to a sui generis design law once enacted. But Vacheron had impeded further development of
a rudimentary regime of partial cumulation on this basis.
581. See supra notes 351-52 and accompanying text.
582. S. 22, Title II, Protection of Ornamental Designs of UsefulArticles, supra note 573. The
same language appeared in Title II, H.R. 2223, supra note 573. In both bills, the crucial links
between Titles I and II were forged by means of § 113 of Title I and of the definition of a useful
article set out in § 101 of Title I and then repeated in § 201(b)(1) of Title II.
583. S.22,supra note 573. Section 202(a) of Title II excluded designs that were "not original";
§ 202(d) excluded designs "dictated solely by a utilitarian function of the article that embodies it";
and § 202(e) excluded three-dimensional designs pertaining to wearing apparel.
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revision, adaptation, or rearrangement" of a design otherwise excluded
by sections 202(b) through (d)-
5 84
These provisions of Title II were, and remain, ambiguous. Most
sponsors and supporters of the design bills insisted that "originality in
the copyright sense" was the primary requirement: the candidate de-
sign must have been created without copying.58 5 Originality in the
sense of independent creation was, however, expressly required by sec-
tion 202(a) of Title II; hence this interpretation renders section 202(b)
through (c) and section 203 superfluous to some extent. 58 6 Some ob-
servers have suggested that sections 202 and 203 amounted to a de facto
requirement of novelty without nonobviousness, 87 a solution that the
drafters of the Uniform Benelux Designs Law favored in 1966.588
584. Id (emphasis added); cf Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1982)(concerning de-
rivative works).
Because § 202(d) excluded designs "dictated solely by [a] utilitarian function," the broad re-
habilitative language of section 203, which on its face applies to all of § 202, including § 202(d),
could have opened the door to protection of utility models. Fryer, supra note 244, at 168 (discuss-
ing a later version of the design bill (H.R. 20)); Pretty & Durant, supra note 367, at 201. This
ambiguity appears to have been an oversight in the drafting process, and Professor Fryer's inter-
pretation provides a workable solution. Fryer, supra note 244, at 168. Compare the effects of an
analogous oversight upon the copyright law of the United Kingdom, supra note 132.
585. See, e.g., supra notes 244,255, 267 (discussing authorities related to S. 2075, the 1959 bill);
see also Latman, supra note 296, at 358; Design Protection Hearings 1961, supra note 21, at 158
(testimony of Cary).
Title II of S. 22 as passed by the Senate would create a new limited form of copyright
protection for "original" designs which are clearly a part of a useful article, regardless of
whether such designs could stand by themselves, separate from the article itself. Thus
designs of useful articles which do not meet the design patent standard of "novelty"
[nonobviousness?] would for the first time be protected.
H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 352, at 50.
586. See supra notes 244, 583 and accompanying text. Both the Department of Justice and
certain sectors of industry thought an "originality" standard too low. See, e.g., Design Protection
Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 19 (letter from Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Attorney General),
85, 88 (letter from Harry R. Mayers, General Patent Counsel, General Electric Co.).
587. See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1218 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (concurring opinion of Rich,
J.). Sections 202 and 203 of Title II, S. 22,supra note 573, may have opened the door to considera-
tions of prior art. Consider, most recently, the following observation of Professor Fryer, supra
note 244, at 166 (discussing provisions of H.R. 20, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), which were the
same in this respect as the sections of Title II discussed here):
It is a fact ... that to the list of requirements already mentioned, the useful article,
ornamental appearance, and originality must be added a requirement found in Section
902(b) similar to, but not the same as, "novelty" and a requirement in Section 902(c) that
is similar to but not exactly the same as "unobviousness."
See supra note 247.
588. Uniform Benelux Designs Law, arts. 1, 4, supra note 117; see supra note 430.
In the United States, it was thought that Judge Rich's decision in In re Laverne, 356 F.2d
1003 (C.C.P.A. 1966), which opened a split in the circuits, was intended to introduce a standard of
novelty without nonobviousness. Until recently, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in-
sisted that nonobviousness in design patents should be tested against an ordinary observer stan-
dard rather than the presumably stricter ordinary designer standard followed by most other
circuits. See I D. CHISUM, supra note 367, § 1.04[2][f], at 1-130 to 1-134. The Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, which has now been succeeded by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
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These positions are not inherently irreconcilable within the pecu-
liar environment of design protection law, where preconceptions based
strictly on a "copyright" or a "patent approach" may obscure the real
complexity of the issues.589 Insistence at the subject matter stage that a
candidate design should manifest sufficient creative content to distance
itself from the prior art, and especially from public domain matter,
may serve a number of useful purposes. One is to limit the kind of
automatic protection that the "design copyright" might otherwise con-
fer upon designs of low or negligible creativity.590 Another is to reduce
the potential for harassment actions against manufacturers who hon-
estly create their own designs from public domain material.59' At the
same time, allowing independent creation as a defense to an infringe-
ment action encourages fair followers, and excuses the manufacturer
who in good faith hits upon a protected design innovation.5 92 Protec-
tion against copying also avoids much of the rigidity and unwieldiness
of the patent-law paradigm, which, under the proposed regime of dual
protection, would have become an obstacle only if absolute protection
against independent creation were desired. 593 A hybrid design law that
Circuit, abandoned the ordinary observer test in 1981. In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d 1214, 1216
(C.C.P.A. 1981).
It is far from clear that the standard that Judge Rich advanced required novelty only, as this
term is used under the present design patent law. Indeed, a novelty requirement divorced from a
requirement of qualitative originality or nonobviousness tends to become more stringent than
when it is joined to this additional requirement. See Reichrnan,Afier the CopyrightAct, supra note
65, at 293-97 (Uniform Benelux Designs Law). What Judge Rich really wanted was not this or
that standard so much as an effective design protection law. See In re Nalbandian, 661 F.2d at
1218-19 (concurring opinion of Rich, J.).
589. Ljungman, supra note 147, at 117; sge supra note 147 and accompanying text.
590. Protection becomes automatic at the infringement stage in cases of slavish imitation, al-
though the duration is relatively short. See supra text accompanying notes 482-83. Professor
Latman, who denied that S. 2075 (1959) imposed a test of novelty, nonetheless agreed that "the
design cannot be so staple or commonly known as to lack a minimum of creativity." Design
Protection Hearings 1960, supra note 115, at 70 (testimony of Latman); see supra note 247 (full
quote). In both design law and copyright law, the unanswered question was-and remains-how
minimum is minimum.
591. In copyright law, the Second Circuit became concerned about the issue of harassment
after 1976. See, eg., Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910-11 (2d Cir. 1980); L. Batlin
& Sons v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1976)(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976); see also
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 312-21, 340-50 (discussing these cases).
592. See supra notes 254, 491 and accompanying text.
If you consider designs at a low creative level . . . a heavy risk exists for identical
achievements without copying ... . A manufacturer can always avoid infringement...
by not copying existing designs. ... But. . . he is badly protected as to designs which
he has himself produced without copying .... This risk increases with a less pro-
nounced requirement for design creativity.
Ljungman, supra note 147, at 123. For Register Fisher's view that "actual copying" was all that
design protection should cover, see supra note 254.
593. See supra note 573; supra notes 243-46, 254 and accompanying text.
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protected against copying only, despite a creativity requirement, 94
would in some respects have resembled the design law of the Federal
Republic of Germany as originally drafted in 1876.
595
Whatever dimensions sections 202 and 203 might have assumed
once Title II was enacted,596 they clearly required of ornamental de-
signs some measure of quantitative creativity 97 not expressly required
for works of applied art under either the originality requirement of
Title I or the pre-1976 case law, notably Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda
Fine Arts, Inc. 598 If so, the integrated law could not reasonably con-
tinue to afford seventy-five to one hundred years of copyright protec-
tion under Title I to industrial art manifesting merely distinguishable
variations from designs in the public domain or from designs still in
copyright under either title. Logically, Title I would have to demand at
least the same degree of quantitative creativity required for ten years of
"design copyright" protection under sections 202 and 203 of Title II.
599
594. "Protection under Title II of S. 22 was like copyright in several ways.. . . The protec-
tion under the bill was unlike copyright in other ways." Kadden, supra note 506, at 595 n.19.
595. Law Concerning Copyright in Designs, January 11, 1876, art. 1, 5, Federal Republic of
Germany, supra note 96. This "design copyright" law continues to protect against copying only,
but its subject matter requirements have drifted upwards to the point where both novelty and
qualitative originality (nonobviousness) are now required. See, e.g., B. ENGLERT, supra note 6, at
50, 78. The Federal Republic also protects utility models. See supra notes 378-81 and accompa-
nying text.
596. Title II was never enacted; see infra notes 641-44 and accompanying text.
597. See A. LATMAN, supra note 160, at 24-26.
598. 191 F.2d 99, 104 (2d Cir. 1951). With reference to pre-1976 case law, the requirement of
originality even for works of applied art was satisfied when the author added something recogniz-
ably his own without simply copying a preexisting work. See, e.g., Monogram Models v. Industro
Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974); Puddu v.
Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1971); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951). These cases suggested that any "distinguishable varia-
tion" that was "more than trivial" would suffice if the work was otherwise independently created.
A separate requirement of creativity as such had been perceived and enlarged by district court
decisions in the artificial flowers cases of 1968, see supra note 456; but by 1970 the Second Circuit
had aligned the requisite degree of creativity, even for applied art, with the modest quantum that
otherwise satisfied the requirement of originality. See, e.g., Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J.
Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971); Puddu v.
Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401, 402-03 (2d Cir. 1971).
Ostensibly, Title I was to codify the modest originality requirement of41fredBell. S. 22, Title
I, § 102, supra note 573; S. REP. No. 473, supra note 573, at 50 ("the phrase 'original works of
authorship,' which is purposely left undefined, is intended to incorporate without change the stan-
dard of originality established by the courts under the present copyright statute"). H.R. 2223,
Title I, § 102, Hearings 1975, supra note 169. Both § 102 of Title I, S. 22, supra note 573, and the
excerpt from the Senate Report bear the date 1975; this means they both referred to "the standard
of originality established by the courts" prior to L. Batlin & Sons v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486 (2d
Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
599. Although § 102 of S.22, Title I, supra note 573 (the predecessor of 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1982)), was to codify the standard of originality established by the courts, see supra note 598, the
district courts in the Second Circuit were in open revolt, by 1975, against the standard of41fred
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And if a test of quantitative creativity had become necessary to avoid
short-term protection of staple, commonplace, or familiar designs, then
it would seem equally logical to require a much higher standard of
creativity for ornamental designs seeking long-term protection as ap-
plied art under Title 1.600
As to ornamental designs in general, a minimum level of creative
content would suffice for purposes of Title II. As to works of applied
art, courts and administrators anxious to implement the policies behind
the integrated statute601 could construe Title I as implicitly subjecting
ornamental designs to a requirement of substantial creativity when
more than the short-term protection of Title II was sought.60 2 If such a
solution subtly reintroduced the derogation from Bleistein rejected in
Vacheron,603 the end result would have paralleled developments in the
Berne Union in which leading European member countries were taking
steps to elevate the standard of copyrightability for works of applied art
once broad-gauged special design reforms went into effect. 60 4
The introduction of substantive barriers to copyright protection of
applied art at the subject matter stage might then have excluded all
ornamental designs of useful articles-including toys, dolls, and cos-
tume jewelry-that were either commonplace or otherwise deficient in
creative content. 60 5 The fact that such designs, or even fabric designs,
might incidentally satisfy a criterion of material separability would
then have proved unavailing.60 6 This approach could also have com-
pensated for the relative inability of courts to narrow the scope of pro-
Bell as the Second Circuit had been interpreting it in cases involving applied art since 1970. See
generally Reichman,After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 297-321 (quantitative creativity in
the Second Circuit).
600. Only copyright protection, i.e. protection against copying, was given under either Title,
and independent creation remained a perfect defense.
601. See supra notes 257-71 and accompanying text (discussing the policies behind S. 2075).
602. For the evolution of the doctrine of substantial creativity from 1976 on, see generally
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65.
603. Such a derogation was to prevail in the Second Circuit from 1976 to the present day. See
supra note 602.
604. For discussion of the trend in foreign law towards regimes of partial cumulation, see
supra notes 279-83 and accompanying text. Of chief interest for present purposes were the
Benelux countries, which agreed in 1966 to restrict concurrent copyright protection to designs of
"marked artistic character" once the Uniform Benelux Designs Law, supra note 117, took effect in
1975. See supra note 430. The Nordic countries present another example. See infra text accom-
panying note 624.
605. Relevant precedents were the artificial flower cases of 1968: Florabelle Flowers, Inc. v.
Joseph Markovits, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(copyright of commonplace design inva-
lid); Gardenia Flowers, Inc., v. Joseph Markovits, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 776 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)(design
invalid for lack of creativity and originality).
606. See supra note 341 (remarks of Cary). Works already in copyright would not have been
divested. See S. 22, Title I, § 113(d), supra note 573.
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tection otherwise accorded copyrighted designs of low creativity when
taken by slavish imitation. Yet most ornamental designs that were not
commonplace should have continued to meet the test of quantitative
creativity laid down by sections 202 and 203 of Title II even if they
lacked the substantial creativity that might logically be required for
long-term protection in Title 1.607 These designs would not, therefore,
have been cast into the public domain, nor should they have required
assistance from trademark and unfair competition laws prior to estab-
lishing verifiable secondary meaning. Instead, the result would have
been to foster the objective of keeping most ornamental designs out of
copyright law and in a special design law.
60 8
Much indirect evidence suggests that the Copyright Office per-
ceived the advantages of switching to a regime of partial cumulation.
60 9
In 1966, only three years before the integration of Titles I and II, the
Benelux countries had accepted a stiff exclusionary standard for ap-
plied art, to take effect January 1, 1975, cast in the following terms: "A
design having a marked artistic character may be protected both by this
[design] law and by the copyright laws if conditions for the application
of both legislations are met. ' 610 The key phrase in this provision re-
sembled that of the first exclusionary criterion set forth by Register
Fisher in his 1956 regulation, which permitted copyright registration if
the object, although a useful article, was "clearly a work of art in
itself."6
11
Register Fisher had thus anticipated the Benelux standard and had
continued to employ a test of aesthetic value even after the 1959 regula-
tion formally adopted the theory of dissociation.6 12 In edging the offi-
cial regime of noncumulation, later couched in terms of conceptual
separability, closer to foreign regimes of partial cumulation based on
aesthetic value, Fisher and his successors had, in effect, aligned them-
607. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text. One function of continuing the design
patent law in effect was to exert downward pressure on the subject matter requirements of the
special design law and in this way increase its receptivity. For the different meanings of substan-
tial creativity in United States law after 1976, see supra note 602.
608. See supra notes 264-66 and accompanying text; text accompanying note 241 (quote from
Ringer); note 347 (views of Derenberg).
609. For evidence that the Copyright Office has used a modified version of this strategy under
the 1976 Act, see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 373-82 ("Strengths and
Weaknesses of the Competing Domestic Models" (citing cases)).
610. Uniform Benelux Designs Law, art. 21(1), supra note 117 (emphasis added). For the
controversy this provision has recently stirred up, see Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra
note 65, at 293-97. Developments in foreign law were of continuing concern to the United States
authorities. See, e.g., Hearings 1975, supra note 169, at 171 (testimony of R. Tegtmeyer).
611. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
612. See supra notes 542-46 and accompanying text.
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selves with those Italian commentators who hold that the Italian doc-
trine of conceptual separability should lead toward a regime of partial
cumulation, based on a test of aesthetic content, as in the Federal Re-
public of Germany.613 Moreover, in 1973, the Compendium of Copy-
right Office Practices exhibited the framework for a regime of partial
cumulation that was already inconsistent with the criterion of separa-
bility in Regulation Section 202.10(c). 614
If, in the early 1970's, fostering a regime of partial cumulation thus
constituted a plausible strategy for the copyright authorities, it nonethe-
less clashed with the anti-maim compromises of the 1960's, which had
gutted Register Fisher's proposals in S. 2075. 6 15 One would naturally
expect the general revision bills pending since 1965 to have codified the
separability criterion of the 1959 regulation in conformity with these
compromise arrangements. But this cannot be verified. The Register's
Report of 1965 stated only that "copyright in a pictorial, graphic or
sculptural work will not be affected if the work is employed as the de-
sign of a useful article," without reference to the doctrine of separabil-
ity.6 16 Similarly, no reference to separability has been found in any of
the 1975 revision bills, either in Title II or in the definition of "picto-
rial, graphic and sculptural works" in Title I, which laconically de-
clared that
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimen-
sional and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art,
photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts,
plans, diagrams, and models. 617
613. See supra text accompanying note 547; notes 405-10 and accompanying text.
614. See supra note 459 and text accompanying notes 513-16. The Copyright Office had also
attempted to restrict copyrightability by proposing in 1961 that the general revision bill should
recognize only works manifesting "an appreciable amount of creative authorship." See supra note
311 and accompanying text. This attempt to elevate the basic subject matter requirements of
American copyright law proved abortive. Id Butsee 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)("works of author-
ship"). It nonetheless demonstrated that the policy framework within which both the 1956 regula-
tion as overtly administered and the 1959 regulation as covertly administered were generally
coherent. See supra notes 182-83, 541-45 and accompanying text.
615. See supra text accompanying notes 295-302, 330-36.
616. REGISTER'S REPORT 1965, supra note 298, at 47; H. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1967),reprintedin I1 OMNIBus COPYRIGHT REvISION (1976);seesupra note 298 and accompany-
ing text.
617. S. 22, Title I, § 101,supra note 573; H.R. 2223, Title I, § 101, supra note 573. No separa-
bility language appears elsewhere in the 1975 revision bills, and this was also true of the 1965 bill.
See supra note 298. In at least one report, separability is used to explain past practice; but there is
no unequivocal expression of intent as to future practice. See REGISTER'S DRAFt REPORT 1975,
supra note 36, ch. VII, at 13. Apart from such informal references, prior to the Final Act in 1976,




Nothing in these same bills guaranteed that copyrightability for
works of applied art would in fact continue to be governed by the doc-
trine of separability.618 Only Regulation Section 202.10(c), which
claimed to interpret Mazer v. Stein, continued to impose the doctrine of
separability.619 Yet section 202.10(c) would arguably become superan-
nuated the moment Titles I and II were enacted into law as integral
parts of a single reform bill.
A Copyright Office bent on switching to a regime of partial cumu-
lation had, therefore, only to quash its 1959 regulation and replace it
with a new one, derived by inference from sections 202 and 203 of Title
II, that would impose, in one form or another, a doctrine of substantial
creativity on all works thereafter claiming copyrightability as applied
art.620 The most elegant technique might, indeed, have been to reissue
a 1970's version of the "clearly a work of art in itself' criterion of
Fisher's 1956 regulation.621 When challenged in the courts, the Copy-
right Office could have argued that this criterion now rested upon the
foundation of Titles I and II, which implied legislative rejection of
long-term protection for most ornamental designs of useful articles
from the grant of short-term protection for the same subject matter.
622
The Register might have reinforced this claim by echoing the conclu-
sions that a high-level committee of inquiry had reached in Sweden
when preparing the new design law of 1970:623 "[Als soon as an effec-
tive protection of registered designs on a pure novelty basis had been
launched, there was no longer need for a tolerant copyright protection
618. In keeping with the "anti-maim" premise, which abolished the proposal for a "terminable
copyright," works of art once admitted to copyrightability could not thereafter be expelled when
embodied in the designs of useful articles. See, for example, S. 22, Title I, § 113(b), (c), and its
mirror image, S. 22, Title II, § 227(b), supra note 573. The same language was used in H.R. 2223,
supra note 573. If the owner of the copyrighted design embodied in a useful article voluntarily
sought to register for special design protection under Title II, then copyright protection would be
lost as to the utilization in useful articles. S. 22, Title I, § 113(c), supra note 573; S. 22, Title II,
§ 227(a), supra note 573. But this gave no assurance that any particular criterion would be used to
determine that an ornamental design was a work of art (i.e. a pictoral, graphic, or sculptural work)
in the first instance.
619. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
620. See supra notes 596-605 and accompanying text. As matters turned out, after 1976 the
Copyright Office latched onto the doctrine of substantial creativity developed by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Reichman,After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at
373-86.
621. See supra text accompanying note 173.
622. See in this connection the express power to establish regulations "not inconsistent with
law for the administration of the functions and duties. . . under this title" granted to the Register
by 17 U.S.C. § 702 (1982). See also 17 U.S.C. § 410(b) (1982)(Register's power to refuse registra-
tion when "the material deposited does not constitute copyrightable subject matter").
623. See supra note 117.
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of applied art. Thus, it was decided to ... raise the requirement for
creativity substantially in connection with the new wording."
624
b. Noncumulation without a design law. The Copyright Office
originally used the Italian criterion of separability to thwart the possi-
bility of interpreting Mazer v. Stein so as to adopt the French unity of
art doctrine.6 25 Although the exclusionary power of the separability
criterion had undoubtedly been weakened in the course of time,626 the
Copyright Office had nonetheless managed to avoid a direct test of its
legality prior to the 1976 decision in Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer.627 Enact-
ment of Titles I and II before 1976 would have relieved the pressure on
separability and made it both plausible and feasible for the Copyright
Office to implement a program of partial cumulation along the lines
suggested above. But Esquire, together with other decisions tending to
validate a broad reading of Mazer,628 undermined the criterion of sepa-
rability before the design law of Title II could be adopted. These cases
legitimated an American version of the unity of art thesis629 on the very
eve of final adoption of the General Revision of Copyright Law under-
way since 1955. They also made it politically inexpedient for the Copy-
right Office to "reimplement" Mazer630 by inferring a doctrine of
substantial creativity from the integration of Titles I and II, absent ex-
press legislative permission to derogate from Bleistein, which at this
late date was unthinkable.631 Under the circumstances, the only option
624. Ljungman, supra note 147, at 122. Of considerable interest are the photographs of a
modernistic coffee pot, chair, and telephone, all of which could obtain copyright protection prior
to the new dispensation, id at 120-24, under the Nordic Design Laws, supra note 117. The Uni-
form Benelux Designs Law was to achieve a similar result by means of the "marked artistic char-
acter" test of article 21.
625. See supra notes 196-203, 501 and accompanying text.
626. See supra notes 502-26 and accompanying text.
627. 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
440 U.S. 908 (1979); see supra text accompanying notes 550-62.
Professor Latman had pointed this out in 1969. Latman, supra note 9, at 282. In 1975, a state
court had rejected separability in dealing with a common law copyright in a furniture design. See
Gustave v. Zuppiger, 24 Ariz. App. 557, 559, 540 P.2d 176, 178 (1975); see supra note 524 and
accompanying text.
628. See supra notes 521-26, 558-71 and accompanying text. For the broad reading of Mazer
v. Stein, see supra notes 44, 141.
629. These cases relied on the broad reading ofMazer v. Stein; for the most recent exposition
of this view, see 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-96.2 to 2-96.4. See supra note 347
(views of Derenberg, Nimmer, and Ringer).
630. See supra note 198 and accompanying text.
631. "IThe definition of 'pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works' carries with it no implied
criterion of artistic taste, aesthetic value, or intrinsic quality. The term is intended to comprise not
only 'works of art' in the traditional sense but also works of. . . 'applied art.'" H.R. REP. No.
1476 (1976), supra note 352, at 54. In effect, an official switch to a regime of partial cumulation
means suspending Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), with regard to
applied art. See supra note 620. The fate of Register Fisher's 1956 regulation after the Second
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then still open to a Copyright Office historically opposed to the unity of
art position was to codify the regime of noncumulation all italiana632
that opponents of S. 2075 had been promised since the 1960's.633
Sometime after May 1976, when the district court decided Esquire,
the House Committee on the Judiciary was prompted to amend the
Senate's version of the pending revision bill by adding the separability
language in section 202.10(c) of the 1959 regulation almost verbatim to
the definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" in section
101 of Title I.634 Under the definition of "useful articles," also in sec-
tion 101,635 ornamental designs of such articles, however aesthetically
pleasing, would normally possess an intrinsic utilitarian function.636
The amended text thus subjected virtually all industrial art seeking
copyright protection under Title I to the separability criterion of sec-
tions 101 and 102(a)(5), despite the district court's decision in Esquire.
This doctrine of separability could then authorize the denial of
copyrightability to modern, functional designs, a practice the Register
had unsuccessfully tried to defend at the district court level in Es-
quire.637 Such designs would obtain protection for up to ten years
under the sui generis regime of Title II, which had already passed the
Senate for the fifth time.
638
Circuit's decision in the Vacheron case is instructive in this regard. See supra text accompanying
notes 194-96.
632. See supra text accompanying notes 299-300, 333-36.
633. See supra notes 295-302 and accompanying text.
634. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B],
at 2-93. Compare S. 22, § 101 (1975), supra note 573 (no separability language in definition of
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works") with 1976 Act, § 101, supra note 199 (containing sepa-
rability language from former Regulation § 202.10(c) (1959)).
The criterion ofscindibitll was now on its way to official congressional endorsement at a time
when the design bill itself, Title II, had already passed the Senate for the fifth time. See H.R. REP.
No. 1476, (1976), supra note 352, at 50; Kadden, supra note 506, at 595-96 (citing bills by number).
This definition of "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" replaced the term "works of art" in
§ 5(g) of the 1909 Act. 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B], at 2-93; see supra note 9.
635. In some earlier versions, this definition had been attached to the forerunner of section 113
(earlier section 111). But by 1975, the definition of useful article was located in section 101, where
it ultimately resided. See § 101, in H.R. REP. No. 2223 (1975), supra note 573; supra text accom-
panying notes 259, 303-06, 330-32.
636. H.R. REP. No. 1476 (1976), supra note 352, at 55; 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 2.08[B],
at 2-93, to 2-95. But there were plenty of ambiguities even if matters had gone as planned. See
Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 373-86.
637. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 798-99 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'g, 414 F. Supp. 939
(D.D.C. 1976); Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note 65, at 350-65.
638. See supra note 634. Section 113 of Title I meshed the two titles together and also ensured
that copyright in a work that portrayed any useful article as such, whether or not patented, did not
include the exclusive right to the article manufactured from the work that portrayed it. See, e.g.,
§ 113, Title I, H.R. REP. No. 2223 (1975), supra note 573; § 111, 1965 Draft Bill, REGIsTER's
REPORT 1965, supra note 298, at 202 (predecessor of § 113) (comparative table).
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The new definition of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,
combined with Title II of the pending revision bills,639 amounted to an
American version of the Italian noncumulationist model. This scheme,
unlike its Italian counterpart, did not provide for the protection of util-
ity models. It sanctioned a dual regime of short-term design protection,
below the line of demarcation with copyright law, that would have ena-
bled users to choose between absolute protection under the design pat-
ent law and protection against copying under Title 11.640
At least one foreign source under press at the time treated Title II
as part of United States intellectual property law.64 1 But the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Adminis-
tration of Justice decided, in a closely divided vote, to strike Title II
from the Senate's version of the general revision bill.64 2 The Confer-
ence Committee did not restore this provision to the Final Act before
its enactment in October 1976.643 Further action on the design bill was
suspended sine die.644
The 1975 version of § 113 contained four subsections. Subsections (b), (c), and (d) deal spe-
cifically with the interrelationship of Title I and Title II. See H.R. REP. No. 2223 (1975), supra
note 573. In Title II, § 227(b) related back to Title I and was the mirror image of § 113(b) as it
stood in 1975. Id (Title II, § 227(a) reiterated the "anti-maim" rule, that Title II was not to curtail
rights granted under Title I). Both § 113 of Title I and § 227 of Title II were then functionally
linked by a common reliance on the definition of useful article. Kadden suggests that, without this
provision, technical drawings or photographs of patented articles as such might have been denied
protection against copying. Kadden, supra note 506, at 599-600.
639. See supra note 573 (citing S. 22 and H.R. 2223).
640. See supra notes 253-56; note 333 and accompanying text; note 584. The Italian model
also offered a double regime of design protection below the copyright line in that users could
choose between protection of an ornamental design and registration as a utility model. But both
these regimes are yoked to the industrial property matrix, whereas, given the continuation of the
United States design patent law, Title II might have operated largely on copyright principles. For
the difference between Title II and the design patent law, see Kadden, supra note 506, at 594 n.l 1,
595 n.19.
641. B. ENGLERT, supra note 6, at 47 n.46, 74.
642. CONFERENCE COMMITrE, GENERAL REVISION OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW, TITLE 17 OF
THE UNITED STATES CODE, CONFERENCE REPORT, H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 82
(1976), reprinted in 17 OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (1976); Latman,
supra note 524, at 639 n.80.
643. H.R. REP. No. 1733, supra note 642, at 82.
644. Latman, supra note 19, at 315 n.1. When S. 22 reached the House Judiciary Committee
following Senate passage, the Committee elected to delete Title II, giving as one of the principal
reasons its uncertainty whether typeface designs should receive even the limited protection of Title
II. See H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 352, at 50; Kadden, supra note 506, at 595.
The House Report expressed concern about a number of issues, including the proper admin-
istrative agency for design protection. H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 352, at 49-50. Deletion of
Title II was to enable the House Judiciary Committee to give these and other issues "further
study." Latman, supra note 19, at 315 n.l. At least one source, however, attributes the demise of
Title II to "strong opposition to creation of a new form of intellectual property." Norris Indus. v.
ITT Corp., 212 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 754, 756 (N.D. Fla. 1981)(citing the Congressional Record), ajftd,
696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983). Chairman Kastenmeier said:
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The General Revision of Copyright Law that emerged from the
Conference Report was thus a mutilated version of the Register's last
proposal. It retained the separability criterion in the new definition of
"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works," which reads as follows:
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional
and three-dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photo-
graphs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, technical
drawings, diagrams, and models. Such works shall include works of
artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical
or utilitarian aspects are concerned; the design of a useful article, as
defined in this section, shall be considered a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design in-
corporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identi-
fied separately from, and are capable of existing independently of,
the utilitarian aspects of the article.
645
The General Revision also retained the inclusive definition of useful
articles: "A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information. An article that is normally a part of a useful arti-
cle is considered a 'useful article.' -646 But the reformed copyright law
lacked the special regime of design protection that gave logical coher-
ence to the Italian system.647 By accepting the doctrine of scindibil&
and rejecting a special design bill, Congress, in the provisions signed
The final major area of controversy is title II of the Senate bill which provides for a new
form of protection for ornamental designs which cannot be identified separately from the
useful articles of which they are part. This "no man's land" between copyright and
patent law presents difficult public policy questions. The Department of Justice strongly
opposed the creation of this new form of intellectual property on the grounds that no
need for it had been demonstrated. Because sufficient information was not available to
enable the subcommittee to resolve the issue at this time, we deleted title II from the bill
with the understanding that the subject would be considered in depth during the next
Congress.
122 CoNG. Rc. 31,979 (1976).
The opposition of the Justice Department had not been considered strong by the Copyright
Office in 1975, REGISTER'S DRAFT REPORT 1975, supra note 36, ch. VII, at 22, nor by witnesses at
the 1975 hearings, see, e.g., Hearings 1975,supra note 169, at 1000 (testimony of Latman). Title II,
furthermore, had the strong support of the Commerce Department. See Hearings 1975, supra
note 169, at 167 (testimony of Tegtmeyer); see also Reichman, After the Copyright Act, supra note
65, at 352-61. At a recent public meeting Professor Latman expressed his opinion that it was
Chairman Kastenmeier who opposed Title II. Association of American Law Schools, Section on
Intellectual Property Law, The Scope andLimits of Trademark, Copyright and Patent Protectionfor
,4ppliedArt and Industrial Designs (conference at San Francisco, Jan. 8, 1984) (statement of Pro-
fessor Latman)(available in recorded tape form).
645. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1982).
646. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
647. In the Conference Report, section 113(b), (c), and (d) of the 1975 bill were deleted from
the final version, in keeping with the deletion of Title II, and section 113 was renumbered to
become section 113(a)(l) and (2), without further change or comment regarding their meaning in
the absence of the design bill. CONFERENCE REPORT 1976, supra note 642. It is in this form that
the "mutilated" proposal entered the 1976 Act as sections 101 and 113.
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into law on October 19, 1976, ensured continuation in the United States
of a system that was fundamentally flawed.
The design protection bill omitted from the Copyright Act (Title II) was reintroduced, with
minor changes, in the first session of the 96th Congress as H.R. 2706, where it died in the House
Judiciary Committee. J. MILLER, U.S. COPYRIGHT DOCUMENTS 279 (1981). Essentially the same
bill was repeatedly reintroduced as H.R. 20. See Fryer, supra note 244, at 164 & n.2.
A new design bill has been introduced at the time of this writing. See 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP.
(CCH) 20,228 (1983). This bill, H.R. 2985, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), is essentially the same as
H.R. 20. See also H.R. 1028, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984), reprinted in 27 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 645-48 (1984).
1264 [Vol. 1983:1143
